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THE CONDITIONS OF THE MASSES IN HUNGARY DURING THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1929—1933[1]

by

M. INCZE

The over-production crisis of 1929—1933 took place against the background of the general crisis of capitalism. This was the first *world* crisis following the first *world* war. This world crisis developed differently in the various countries, it became intertwined with the agrarian crisis, which, in turn, intensified it, and made it singularly protracted. The money and credit crisis broke out some time later, but its severity was all the greater.

Production fell rapidly, unemployment assumed tremendous proportions, the living standard of the working masses sank catastrophically. By the end of 1932, in the U. S. A. industrial production had dropped to 84 per cent of the pre-war level; in the United Kingdom to 75 per cent, in Germany to 62 per cent. As compared with 1928, industrial production fell to 56 per cent in the U. S. A., to 86 per cent in the United Kingdom, and to 55 per cent in Germany. Throughout the capitalist world the number of unemployed industrial workers rose to 35—40 millions.

In the same period the Soviet State, accomplishing its first Five Year Plan, was achieving new successes in building Socialism. There the annual growth of industrial production averaged 22 per cent. At the end of 1932, the industrial production of the Soviet Union amounted to 334 per cent of

[1] The effects of the World Economic Crisis of 1929—1933 on Hungary have been analyzed by a group of historians organized by the Historical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The results of this collective work, which lasted several years, include a presentation of Hungary's economic structure in the 1920's, an analysis of the effects of the industrial, agrarian and financial crisis as felt in Hungary, a recapitulation of how the Hungarian working people, led by the Communists, fought against the fascist governments, against the fascist regime of Admiral Horthy which threw the burden of the crisis on to the masses, and, finally, an analysis of the persistent consequences of the crisis. The present paper deals with the impoverishment during the crisis, of the Hungarian working people, the majority of Hungary's population. It is founded on material compiled by the above-mentioned group of historians and edited by Miklós *Incze*. Those parts of the work on which the present paper is based were done by: Miklós *Incze* and Elek *Karsai* (The conditions of the working class in the 1920's); Miklós *Incze* treated the impoverishment of the middle classes during the crisis (in this survey the author made use of the results of investigations made by the former Institute of Political Economy regarding the conditions of private employees and civil servants); Miklós *Incze* also treated the depression period; Pál *Petőcz* and Miklós *Incze* elaborated the subject of the working peasantry (on the basis of material collected chiefly by Pál *Petőcz)*; and, finally, Elek *Karsai* treated the conditions of the working class during the crisis.

pre-war, or 219 per cent of the 1928 level. The Soviet Union succeeded in creating a new, modern technical basis for its industry, agriculture and transport.

The capitalist countries were also caught in a severe agrarian crisis. In the U. S. A. the value of agricultural production fell from $ 11 000 million in 1929 to $ 5000 million in 1932. In the main grain area growing countries of the capitalist world, the sown area diminished by 8—10 per cent and millions of peasants were ruined as a result of the agrarian crisis.

By contrast, in the Soviet Union the small peasant holdings, unable to employ tractors and other modern agricultural machinery, were integrated into modernly-equipped large-scale collective farms. Soviet agriculture was reorganized on the basis of collective labour and large-scale farming.

In the capitalist world, the burden of the crisis was transferred on to the working masses to a far greater extent than during former crises. At that stage of the general crisis of capitalism the monopolies tried to find a way out of the crisis by intensifying the imperialist exploitation of the dependent, colonial or semicolonial peoples ; they forcibly kept up high prices of their own products, and forced down the wages and raw material prices to an extremely low level. They abused of the dependency of the under-developed countries which exported raw materials and food against imports of finished manufactured goods. All this led necessarily to the result that there was a persistent gross disproportion between the purchasing power of the working masses all over the world and the value of the goods to be realized, a circumstance that caused the crisis to become extraordinarily protracted.

Under the effect of the crisis the antagonisms between labour and capital, between the various imperialist powers, and between the imperialist powers and the colonial peoples, sharpened out of all proportion.

Thus, the World Economic Crisis deepened the general crisis of capitalism both politically and economically. The crisis put a violent end to the temporary stabilization of capitalism which lasted between 1924 and 1929. This temporary stabilization was characterized, among others, by the fact that, after the period of revolutionary upheaval which followed the war had passed, the capitalist countries could once more raise their production above the top level of the preceding economic cycle, and that the markets were still relatively stable. The Great Crisis ended the stability of markets and sharpened the struggle for markets to the extreme, further deepening the general crisis of capitalism.

It was not accidental that, parallel with the economic crisis, a revolutionary crisis was brewing in many capitalist countries, and that in certain states the bourgeoisie saw no other way out than helping the fascists to power. Thus, together with the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, political reaction became more accentuated.

As a result of the crisis, the capitalist countries were no more able to raise their production above the pre-crisis level ; production was, in fact,

stagnant. Such was the state of the economy of the capitalist world when a new severe crisis set in in 1937, which led to the Second World War. All this goes to show the growing decay of the capitalist system and the deepening of the general crisis in every sphere.

*

In Hungary, the effects of the 1929—1933 crisis were extremely devastating. The industrial crisis was deepened by a chronic agrarian crisis, by the low purchasing power of the small-commodity producing peasantry. The plight of the Hungarian agricultural population was particularly aggravated by their extreme indebtedness.

In Hungary, as in other moderately developed capitalist countries, which prior to the crisis had been largely dependent on imports for their supplies of manufactured foods, the industrial crisis produced symptoms which differed from the general course of the world crisis. During the crisis the governments of these countries, to safeguard the interests of their industrial capitalists, prohibited or at least severely restricted the imports of finished goods. Such measures did, to a certain extent, counterbalance the shrinkage of the home market, as imports could thus be replaced by home-made goods. This was the case in Hungary, where some industrial branches producing consumer's goods found, in the ban on imports, which had been considerable enough, a partial compensation for the shrinkage of the home market. This explains the fact that the drop in Hungary's industrial production during the crisis was not so considerable as it would have been, had the home market previously been supplied totally or mostly by the domestic industry.

This relatively favourable situation of certain industrial branches was not reflected, however, in the conditions of the working class. The industrial reserve army of unemployed labour swelled owing to the chronic unemployment in agriculture and the acute deterioration in the conditions of the agricultural working population, leaving the capitalists free to fix wages as they pleased. At the same time, also the conditions of the working peasants became worse than ever before, because of a government policy which enhanced the economic supremacy of the big estates and made the working population bear the brunt of the crisis.

Class struggle sharpened under the impact of the extremely severe crisis. Although there were clashes of interests between the rival groups of the ruling classes, they were all in agreement as to their efforts to find a bourgeois way-out, with the support of the government, by throwing the whole burden of the crisis on to the backs of the working people. The growing discontent of the masses, their deliberate opposition to the regime became, under the conditions of mass misery, a serious menace to political stability.

The opposition of the working masses to the anti-democratic policy of the ruling classes was organized by the most advanced of the workers. The communists led the struggle of the masses against their oppressors, against the forces of fascism.

The crisis deeply affected the production, the distribution of income, the standard of living, the price structure, as well as the finances and the international position of the country. These changes persisted even after the crisis, and set the course for the historical development of the country up to the Second World War.

Even after the crisis the hectare yields of agriculture did not rise, the level of farm prices remained below pre-crisis. The wages of farm workers did not rise before 1936, and even then there was but a slight improvement.

It is true, that, thanks to the embargo policy, there was some industrial development ; this development, however, was very uneven. Real wages and salaries kept decreasing until 1935, and rose but very moderately thereafter. Militarization went on rapidly, and aggressive ambitions strengthened.

The particularly decayed and parasitic character of Hungarian capitalism found expression in the fact that a considerable part of the profits squeezed out of the working people was transferred abroad. This greatly restrained the extent of expanded reproduction. The international money and credit crisis in 1931 stopped the inflow of foreign loans. Interests of former loans were paid after the middle of 1931 mostly in blocked Pengő. But the foreign creditors used part of their non-transferable assets for industrial investments in Hungary. All this was connected with the fact that the international credit system, disrupted by the crisis, could never be re-established, not even in the form in which it functioned before 1931, and that increasing militarization and the switch-over to war economy in the aggressive countries was leading to growing economic isolation between the capitalist countries, as an early symptom of the disintegration of the capitalist world market.

The policy of the ruling classes bound the fate of Hungary to that of Nazi Germany ; the country was gradually brought into submission, both politically and economically, to the aggressive, expansionist German imperialism. Nazi Germany secured an important position in Hungarian economy by means of political pressure. Although the Hungarian capitalists were bound by many ties to the Anglo-American finance capital, and maintained these relations also during the long depression and until the Second World War, they nevertheless hoped to obtain, on the side of Nazi Germany, new sources of maximum profit in the form of new markets and territorial conquests if the Western imperialists would succeed in diverting German aggression eastwards.

After the crisis, only the Communist Party of Hungary continued to fight consistently, under the very difficult conditions of underground activity,

against fascism and the preparation of war, for the interests of Hungary's working people. The communists, the most advanced section of the Hungarian working class, were strengthened in their struggle against fascism and war by the knowledge that the building of Socialism was forging ahead victoriously in the Soviet Union. The peace policy of the Soviet Union, its efforts to check the fascist aggressors and prevent the outbreak of a new world war, gave strength and endurance to the Hungarian working people.

*

This paper is designed to give an analysis of the changes which took place in the conditions of the Hungarian working masses during the 1929—33 world crisis. It goes without saying, however, that the effects of the crisis could not be properly exposed if the student were to restrict himself to an examination of the years of the crisis. When studying the economic history of a given capitalist country, one is advised to consider an economic cycle as a whole. This precept would appear to hold good also of an examination of the conditions of the working masses.

Industrial workers

After the downfall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919, the plight in which the Hungarian proletariat found itself was more grave than ever before. The counter-revolution, having established itself with the help of the Western imperialists, murdered or imprisoned the most advanced workers, and suppressed every action which could have resulted in the least improvement of the workers' conditions. The militarized industrial production of 1914—1918 had stopped, and unemployment reached unprecedented proportions. Inflation, a heritage of the war, was pushed by the counter-revolutionary regime to fantastic heights and became an instrument of the additional exploitation of the working people.

Some idea might be formed of the proportions of unemployment by taking into account that, whereas in 1913, of the workers of the Hungarian manufacturing industry, about 219 000 had been employed on the territory that was left of pre-war Hungary after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, the first post-war statistical record in 1921 found only 136 000 workers in the manufacturing industry. The number of employed workers at the beginning of the counter-revolutionary regime (August, 1919) was, as the available figures go, even smaller. In 1913, there had been 80 000 workers in the heavy industry on the post-war territory. By the end of the war this number had risen to 140 000—150 000[2], and dropped back to 63 000 in 1921. It must have

[2] Estimates of the former Institute of Political Economy.

been still less in 1919 and 1920, but figures are only available for some of the largest factories. Seven of these employed a total of 24 000 workers in 1913 ; 56 000 in 1917 ; and 28 000 workers, that is, more than in 1913, even in July of 1919, at the fall of the Soviet Republic. But two months later, the total number of workers employed in these seven factories amounted only to 12 500 and never exceeded 20.000 in 1920 and 1921.[3]

The data of the Ironworkers' Union on its employed members in Budapest show the same development : the number of these was 42 477 in October, 1918 ; 9 953 in October, 1919 ; and 16 011 in 1920.[4]

It may also be mentioned that the Trade Unions which, until the end of 1919, still continued to pay some scanty unemployment benefits to their members, kept on their registers 114 000 beneficiaries in October ; this number rose to 150 000 by December, 1919.[5]

Immediately after seizing the power, the counter-revolutionists cut wages mercilessly. The new wages were much lower than they had been under the Soviet Republic.

Inflation and a resulting considerable reduction of real wages had been evident already during the war. According to the figures of the Trade Unions' Council of the time, the »minimum cost of living« of a worker's family at the end of 1918 was 6,8 times as high as in July, 1914 ; whereas wages had increased only 5,7 times, salaries 3,4 times during the same period. According to the same source, the minimum cost of living rose, between December, 1918, and July, 1919, to 11,1 times the pre-war level, but wages also rose 11,6-fold, and salaries 6,2-fold. Thus, it was under the Soviet Republic, that, for the first time since the beginning of the war, wages kept pace with the rising prices, and salaries came somewhat nearer to them. On the other hand, between July and December, 1919, the minimum cost of living rose 21-fold, while the reactionary regime reduced wages to 8,3-times and salaries to 4,7-times their pre-war level.

The capitalists were absolute masters of the situation and fixed the wages at will : the government flatly refused to intervene on behalf of the workers. On October 30, 1919, Minister of Commerce *Hegyeshalmy*[6] issued an order prohibiting the administrative authorities from dealing with wage problems because »with the downfall of the Proletarian Dictatorship, its wage system lost its validity. The right of self-determination is restored to the proprietors of the undertakings, and the fixing of wages is a question to

[3] Dezső *Laky*, Magyarország megszállásának közgazdasági kárai (Economic Damages Resulting from the Occupation of Hungary) Budapest, 1923, p. 364.

[4] Data from *Szakszervezeti Közlöny* (Bulletin of the Trade Unions' Council).

[5] Ibidem.

[6] In Hungary, industrial affairs belonged under the competence of the Ministry of Commerce until 1935.

be decided on the basis of free negotiations between employer and employees.«[7]

In anticipation of such »free bargaining«, the National Association of Manufacturers set up a Wage Board of the employers, who came to agreement, regarding the wages to be paid.[8]

As to the results of »free bargaining«, Table 1 contains some striking figures. It reveals that wages were reduced 50 per cent (for women workers even more), and that the 48-hour week, introduced under the Soviet Republic, was lengthened up to 78 hours.[9]

TABLE 1

Trade	Weekly working hours		Wages (in Koronas)		Percentage of wage reduction[10]
	July 31, 1919	August 31, 1919	July 31, 1919	August 31, 1919	
Male workers:					
Smiths	48	48	314	168	62,8
Turners	48	48	408	168	71,1
Chemical workers	48	48	300	210	51,0
Brick-makers	48	52	384	146	73,4
Flour mill-hands	48	66	264	184	51,2
Bookbinders	48	48	408	240	58,9
Printers	48	48	408	260	55,7
Unskilled workers in printing industry	48	48	288	168	58,1
Transport workers	48	78	400	250	56,3
Female workers:					
Engineering workers	48	48	235	93	72,3
Bookbinders	48	48	268	145	62,5
Printers	48	48	264	145	62,5
Brick-makers	48	52	240	104	66,7
Chemical workers	48	48	240	150	58,2

Thus, the workers — that is to say, those who had found a job during that period of mass unemployment — lost 50—70 per cent of their earnings in August, 1919. After that month the earnings continued to dwindle with the mounting inflation. The minimum of living costs, as has been said, amounted

[7] Public Archives of the Town of Eger, Mayor's Archives, 1919/7276.

[8] A Magyar Gyáriparosok Országos Szövetségének jelentése (Annual Report of the National Association of Manufacturers) Budapest, 1921, pp. 21—22.

[9] Benő *Gál*, Az árak alakulása a háború idején. (The Trend of Prices during the War.) Budapest.

[10] After a deduction corresponding to the devaluation of the Korona notes during the month of August, 1919 (30 per cent of the gold standard).

to 21-times of the pre-war figure at the end of 1919, but nominal wages were only eight times of what they had been in 1914. At the »dawn« of fascism even those who worked full-time could not attain more than 40 per cent of their pre-war living standard.

The merciless wage-cut which had been carried out at the very beginning of the counter-revolutionary era left its mark on the whole period. Throughout the following twenty years there was not even a short period when the Hungarian working class could have attained the living standard of 1913 — a living standard which in itself had been miserably low. This latter fact deserves particular attention, for after the First World War people, when comparing the post-war standard of living with pre-war, were apt to fall into the error of considering pre-war conditions as »normal« or satisfactory. That this was far from being the truth, will be seen from the following few figures.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, food prices and rents rose rapidly all over the world, creating a wide gap between cost of living and wages. In Budapest, for instance, between 1901 and 1911 retail prices rose 83—84 per cent for pork and fat, 87 per cent for veal, 45 per cent for beef, 64 per cent for dry beans, and 55 per cent for flour; the rise in the rents of workers' dwellings was estimated at 60—100 per cent. On the other hand, even the best organized workers could only win wage rises of 20—40 per cent. Thus, the living conditions of the Hungarian working class deteriorated very seriously during the last ten years preceding the war.[11]

As for 1913, according to the index number of living costs calculated by the Hungarian Central Office of Statistics, 1380 Koronas were necessary to cover the annual expenses of a Budapest worker's family of four. In reality, the commodities considered in computing this index number did not by far include all the necessaries.[12,13]

[11] Magyar Közgazdasági Társaság: A drágaság. Ankét-anyag. (From a Survey by Jenő *Varga* in *The High Prices*. Findings of an inquiry conducted by the Hungarian Economic Association, Budapest, 1912, p. 259.)

[12] The currency of Hungary in 1913 was the Austro-Hungarian Krone or Korona (»crown«). One Korona was worth approximately 1 contemporary British shilling. Until the end of the First World War, it lost about two-thirds of its original value, and after the war, until the stabilization about the middle of 1924, depreciated temporarily to 1/18,000 and became stabilized at 1/14.500. From then on the paper Korona now stable though devaluated, continued to serve as currency until January, 1927, when it was replaced by the Pengő. Meanwhile the original crown-value, called »gold Korona«, was also widely used as a counting unit. The Pengő, introduced in 1927, was originally worth 0,86 gold Korona.

[13] The quantities of food, considered in computing this index number, could have covered the meagre hypothetical quantity of calories needed by the family, but the quantity of fats thus calculated was but half of the optimal requirement, and the supply of animal protein was also very poor. Such items as butter, vegetables, onions, fruits, spices, salt, rice, coffee, coffee surrogate and tea were ignored altogether; the weekly sugar ration of this family of four was supposed to be half a kilogram; and they had to content themselves with three eggs a week and with one litre of milk a day. The sums estimated for clothing expenses were rather niggardly and incomplete. Rent, heating, and lighting costs were calculated for a lodging consisting of one room and kitchen. No allowance was made for wear and tear or for such long-term purchases, as overcoats, bed and table-linen, utensils, furniture, etc., and there were no amounts provided

By adding 20 per cent to cover at least the most important items which were disregarded, the annual cost of living expenses of a Budapest worker's family of four in 1913 may be estimated at 1660 Koronas. Yet in 1913, the best paid skilled workers of the heavy industry, if working *fulltime* (that is a total of 2500 hours a year) could earn 1800 Koronas. The full-time earnings of semi-skilled workers in the heavy industry were 950 Koronas (800 Koronas for women workers); in the textile industry, skilled workers earned 1125 Krs. (women workers 500 Krs.). The day-labourers of the building industry were paid 775 Krs. (women workers, 575 Krs.). All figures refer to the case of *full employment*. It goes without saying that no worker of the building industry, and only very few of the rest could work 2500 hours a year. Thus, only the skilled workers of the heavy industry, and only those of them who had a full-time job throughout the year, could afford indulging in the »luxury« of keeping a wife and two children. In all other categories, earnings were far below this level, not to mention the frequent cases of long unemployment. Besides, it was at that time hardly possible for a wife to eke out the earnings of the husband, for women workers totalled only one-fifth of all employed labour, and besides, women's wages were incomparably lower than men's.

So this was the much vaunted »peace-time living standard« that served during the whole inter-war period as a basis of comparison. Yet, for two decades the Hungarian working class could never attain even this miserable level!

We have already seen that at the beginning of the Horthy regime, the living standard even of full-time workers was only 40 per cent of the »peace-time level«. Table 2 shows the trend of this living standard from 1921 to 1937.[14]

The normal wages during the inflation years 1921—1924 were calculated in terms of gold Koronas and then in terms of Pengős. As is known, at the first stage of inflation domestic prices and wages, as a rule, do not rise to such an extent as currency loses its value. The same process took place also in Hungary. Thus it was possible that in 1921 and 1922 nominal earnings worth only P 500, or less than 30 per cent of the pre-war earnings, still possessed a purchasing power equal to 64 per cent of pre-war. But in 1923 and in the first half of 1924 the situation was different. Then prices were rising as fast as the currency was losing its value, and at the last stage of inflation, rose even faster. On the other hand, wages — as it always happens during an inflation — were lagging behind. Thus in 1923, when the inflationary »boom« of industry hit the peak, and the capitalists were making enormous profits, real

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for soap, matches, tobacco, newspaper, cultural requirements, transport fares etc. Taking into account only the most important of these items, it should be no overestimate to add another 20 per cent to the official figure.

[14] Magyar Statisztikai Szemle (Hungarian Statistical Review), Budapest, 1938, pp. 456—457. The year 1913 has been substituted for the original basis year (1921), on the basis of the ratio between 1913 and 1921, which is stated in the article quoted.

TABLE 2

Year	Average earnings		Year	Average earnings	
	nominal wages (Pengős)	real wages (1913 = 100)		nominal wages (Pengős)	real wages (1913 = 100)
1913	1835	100,0	1929	1483	68,5
1921	522	64,0	1930	1426	73,0
1922	505	64,0	1931	1316	71,0
1923	500	51,2	1932	1172	65,3
1924	965	55,7	1933	1132	67,5
1925	1273	64,0	1934	1125	68,5
1926	1318	70,4	1935	1113	66,6
1927	1407	69,1	1936	1132	64,0
1928	1465	68,1	1937	1147	60,9

wages were only one-half of what they had been in 1913, and were hardly any higher even in 1924.

Throughout the whole inter-war period, real wages reached their highest level in 1926, and even then they amounted to not more than 70 per cent of the pre-war level. However, after the »economic rehabilitation crisis« of 1925—1926, domestic prices and living costs began soaring again, and wages dropped behind.

A detailed analysis of wages and the cost of living will be given on other pages of this paper. It will be demonstrated then, that the story told by the figures of Table 2 is in many respects incomplete, for the wages and living conditions of the workers of the Hungarian manufacturing industry were, especially in the years of the Great Crisis, with their staggering mass unemployment, even worse than what can be gathered from the above table. But before this, it is expedient to examine the shape of things which determined the condition of the Hungarian industrial workers in 1929, on the eve of the crisis.

That year saw a considerable drop in the number of jobs, and a corresponding rise in unemployment was reported by the Government Labour Exchange.[15]

Of course, the data given by this authority do not afford an accurate appraisal of the actual proportions of unemployment, for not all workers looking for employment registered at its bureaux, and only part of the vacancies were filled through the latter.

In 1929, the Labour Exchange kept on its registers 64 805 unemployed men and women, and only 34 377 vacancies were reported to it ; in 26 701 cases it allotted jobs. Thus, for every 100 unemployed there were only 53

[15] 1929 Report of the State Labour Exchange, Budapest, 1930, p. 10. Some of the figures of Table 3 and of the text are results of computations based on the data given in this report.

vacancies and 41 actual employments. This ratio varied from one category of workers to the other, as will be seen from Table 3.

The numerical strength of the various categories listed in Table 3 was very different. Also, it should be borne in mind that 63 per cent of all the unemployed were skilled male workers. One-third of these belonged to the heavy industry, another third to the clothing industry, (the number of unemployed textile workers was relatively small) and only one-third belonged to all the other industries (mainly to the wood industry and to the food industry).

TABLE 3

Categories	Vacancies	Employments
	for 100 unemployed	
Skilled male workers (all trades combined)	47	34
Metal workers	47	37
Engineering workers	34	23
Wood workers	38	33
Textile workers	48	27
Clothing workers	58	40
Food workers	35	23
Unskilled workers and day-labourers (males)	65	55
Female workers (all trades combined)	61	49
All workers (male and female)	53	41

Thus, 63 per cent of the unemployed were skilled male workers ; 25 per cent were unskilled male workers or day-labourers ; and only 12 per cent were women, of whom but a negligible fraction were skilled workers.

Table 3 demonstrates that skilled workers had much more difficulty in finding a job than had day-labourers or women. Prospects for skilled workers in the engineering, wood, and food industries were markedly worse than in the rest. Only the clothing industry was in a more favourable situation ; this improved the general average. Just then the garment industry was developing rapidly — at the expense of many small craftsmen — and absorbed a part of the tailors who had been ruined and their former journeymen, though not more than 40 per cent of all the unemployed in the trade.

In another part of this paper attempt will be made at estimating the absolute extent of industrial unemployment. It appears from those estimates that already in 1929 there was considerable unemployment. It seems that, in 1929 and 1930, more than 120 000 industrial workers and miners lost their jobs ; and a considerable part of these (though probably less than one-half) must have been laid off in 1929. This estimate is also supported by the fact that the percentage of unemployed trade unionists rose from 9,6 per cent

at the end of 1928 to 13,1 per cent at the end of 1929, and to 17,6 per cent by the end of 1930. Thus, the growth of unemployment seems to have been almost equally distributed between 1929 and 1930.

Even the reactionary clergy could not help noticing the misery of the working class. In 1929, the following report was sent from one of the outlying working-class districts of Budapest, to the Ministry of Education : »The number of the parishioners here is 18 000—19 000. Ten thousand people have been moved hither from various slums by the Ministry of Public Welfare. They are so poor that on every quarter-day 100—300 families are given notice to quit because they cannot pay their rent. Fifty per cent of the factory workers have been out of work for years. Many work three days a week at best, and do not earn enough to buy bread for their family.«[16]

What did the Church propose to alleviate this terrible misery ? The document quoted gives a striking answer : they proposed to install another curate in that district.

The Trade Unions, controlled by the social democrats, kept on their registers only their unemployed members. (Organized workers represented in 1929 about one-fourth of all industrial workers, miners and day-labourers.) The percentage of unemployed in the T. U. membership was 8,9 per cent at the end of 1927 ; 9,6 per cent at the end of 1928 ; and 13,1 per cent at the end of 1929. Thus, unemployment rose by 41 per cent between 1927 and 1929. According to the same statistics, the unemployed in organized labour represented 12 per cent of the ironworkers, 15 per cent of the food workers, and 16 per cent of the leather workers.[17]

At the 1929 Congress of the Trade Unions, the secretary of the Woodworkers' Union said : »Here in Budapest, some of the best skilled workers in the world are literally starving to death. The world-renowned Thék (furniture) Factory has now laid off its last batch of 20 workers, some of whom have had over 30 years service with the firm . . . What are things like now? The wife takes in washing, the child goes to work in a factory, and the big, strong man stays home peeling potatoes, and doing the cooking and making the room . . . First-class skilled workers called at our office asking us to get them jobs as scavengers. We could do nothing, for there were no vacancies. Not only first-class cabinet-makers but all walks of life are represented among the scavengers : 6 engineers, 12 graduates of technical schools, 9 with secondary school certificates, 2 graduates in law, 9 commercial clerks, 1 musician, 54 leather workers, 14 building workers, 10 garment workers, 41 iron workers, 22 food workers, 13 wood workers and 21 workers from other trades . . .«[18]

[16] Archives of the Ministry of Education, Jan., 1929, Dept. I., 170—1413.
[17] Szakszervezeti Értesítő (Bulletin of the Trade Unions' Council), 1927—1929.
[18] A szakszervezeti mozgalom Magyarországon, 1926—1929. (The Trade Union Movement in Hungary, 1926—1929), Budapest, p. 136.

As to the »measures« »postulated« by the right-wing social democrat trade-union leaders to prevent the further impoverishment of the working class, the following information is found in the source quoted (p. 172) : »Nothing but benevolent understanding on the part of the capitalists would be necessary for solving this problem. Capitalism could, with a minimum of insight, help to solve this problem . . .« That speaker at the T. U. Congress proceeded to propose to the capitalists that they should refrain from lengthening the work-day in order to give other workers a chance!

The capitalists, however, gave little evidence of »benevolent understanding«, which the social democrat orator so humbly solicited.

They had no intention whatever to shorten the working-day. On the contrary, the capitalists tried to »economize« at the expense of the working class, by making less workers work more. Speed-up methods were introduced, the number of working-days was restricted and their length increased. They could do what they liked : at that time Hungary and Turkey were the only countries in Europe where the eight-hour day had not yet been introduced.

The length of the working-day kept increasing until the outbreak of the crisis. This is shown by Table 4, the figures of which refer to the first working-day of July each year.[19]

TABLE 4

Year	Percentage of workers whose working day lasted	
	8 to 10 hours	10 hours or more
1923.....	49,0	20,1
1924.....	50,9	22,0
1925.....	51,6	25,0
1926.....	54,3	37,9
1927.....	53,4	38,7
1928.....	56,0	40,4

The sharp rise in the percentage of people working 10 hours or more is appalling. In 1929, even official statistics showed a daily average of 8,97 hours per worker. Only the printing industry averaged slightly under 8 hours ; but in several industries (brick-making, textiles, food, and chemicals) the average working-day amounted to almost 9,5 hours. The length of the working-day in 1929 was as follows[20] :

[19] Hungarian Statistical Review, Budapest, 1930, p. 130.

[20] Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv (Hungarian Statistical Year Book), Budapest, 1930, p. 100.

TABLE 5

Length of the working-day	Number of workers	
	in winter	in summer
Less than 8 hours	14 597	10 280
8 hours	122 060	97 773
8,5 «	12 999	11 034
9 «	18 243	18 343
9,5 «	8 601	7 789
10 «	47 061	66 083
10,5 «	3 761	7 090
11 «	8 095	10 965
11,5 «	242	341
12 hours or more	9 448	10 108
Total	245 107	239 806

Thus, during the summer of 1929, only 45 per cent of all factory workers worked eight or — very few of them — less than eight hours a day. Even in winter this percentage rose only to 55 per cent. At the same time, 20 per cent worked eleven or twelve hours and even longer. The proportion of those who worked 10 hours or more did not fall under 28 per cent even in winter.

The textile industry took the lead in the sweating of the workers. In summer, only 5625 or 14 per cent of its 42 961 workers worked eight hours, whilst 27 764 or almost 65 per cent worked 10 hours or more.

The International Labour Office urged the Hungarian government with growing emphasis to introduce the eight-hour day. (Of course, what the ILO was troubled about was not so much the Hungarian workers' well-being as the fact that the absence of working-day regulations increased the chances of Hungarian industrialists in their competition with the Western capitalists.) But the National Association of Manufacturers, in a diplomatic tone which was, however, unmistakable for all who understood the language of the period, flatly rejected the recommendation, declaring that »Hungarian industry is, in view of its most peculiar position, obliged to display increased foresight and caution regarding this matter.«[21]

Of course, the Government supported the attitude of the capitalists. On January 30, 1929, József *Vass*, Minister of Public Welfare, in his reply to a question in the House of Parliament, said: »I have no hope that the Government will in the immediate future be in a position to introduce the Bill which by now has been drafted by the Ministry of Public Welfare. After all, this is a question of social policy that must be based upon certain precon-

[21] A Magyar Gyáriparosok Országos Szövetségének 1929. évi jelentése (1929 Report of the National Association of Manufacturers), Budapest, 1930, pp. 78—79.

ditions, failing which Legislation would be building castles in the air.«[22] It should be noted that exactly two years later, in the midst of the slump, Sándor *Ernszt*, who succeeded József Vass as Minister of Public Welfare, replying to an interpellation concerning the regulation of working time, expressed the same view: »I cannot overcome my misgivings that a restriction of the working time would, through the resulting rise in production costs, make it difficult for many branches of our industry to compete successfully either at home or abroad, and would thus create unemployment rather than a possibility to draw more labour into production . . . Therefore, while in principle I would advocate legislative regulation along the lines of the Washington Convention, I am nevertheless compelled by economic conditions to handle this question cautiously and to exercise utmost circumspection in choosing the appropriate time for the legislative regulation of working hours.«[23]

Another characteristic feature of sweating was found in the particularly bad working conditions of female and child labour. Between 1872 and 1928 Hungarian legislation had brought no decisive improvement in the regulation of female and child labour. There was nothing to curb the arbitrary power of the employers.

Female and child labour was widely employed especially in the brick factories, and in the textile and clothing industries. A government factory inspector reported from the town Szombathely: »Instead of installing conveyors, the brickyard owners have young workers — and very often children — carry the shingles from the presses to the drying-stands. Unlawful employment of youth labour has been observed in five factories.«[24]

Unlawful employment of female workers was also common practice in the brickyards. Although the factory inspectors had to report the most glaring instances to the local authorities, the latter did not apply even the very mild sanctions provided by the law. The report quoted above states that »factory inspectors were compelled to protest against the unlawful employment of female workers in brick factories. These female workers were employed on tile and brick-making out in the open. In summer their workday would begin at 4 or 5 a. m. and end at 7 or 8 p. m. A long rest would be taken at midday, in order to work rather in cooler parts of the day. Under such conditions, however, they could not enjoy a night's rest of 11 consecutive hours as prescribed by the law.«[25]

Even the passing of the Female and Child Labour Regulations Act of 1928 brought no improvement whatever in this state of things, as it could not be enforced pending the promulgation of its enacting clauses, which was

[22] Képviselőházi Napló (Parliamentary Records), January 30, 1929, 245th session.
[23] Parliamentary Records, January 27, 1931, 457th session.
[24] A m. kir. iparfelügyelők tevékenysége az 1919—1925. és 1928. években (Activity of the Government Factory Inspectors in 1919—1925, and 1928), Budapest, p. 80.
[25] Activity of the Government Factory Inspectors in 1928, 1929, 1930, Budapest, p. 34.

postponed *ad infinitum*. Whenever the question of the clauses was taken up, the capitalists would harp upon the »interests of industrial production« with the result that the promulgation of the clauses was further postponed. When, after long delays, the draft of the clauses had been made by the competent Ministry, the Board of Employers asked the Minister »to apply the law with a certain tolerance and ensure certain transitory relaxations especially in the textile industry.« The Government acted in compliance with this request, and the law came into force only on July 1, 1931, while for the textile industry a further postponement of six months was accorded.[26]

It is worth mentioning that the scope of this Act did not include agriculture, the railways, and the postal and telecommunication services. With these exceptions, the law prohibited the employment of children under fourteen, but promptly added : »however, for a transitional period, until compulsory education will be extended to fourteen years, children of 12 to 14 years of age may be also employed.« The preamble to this article of the law explained that it was necessary to make this exception to prevent the corruption of children not going to school.[27]

This law also prohibited the employment of women six weeks before and after birth. Wages for this period, however, were to be paid only when expressly stipulated by the contract. Thus pregnant women and nursing mothers were excluded from work but they did not get wages for this period because the employers — under the well-known conditions of »free negotiation« — always refused to accept terms to this effect.

It was characteristic for the »public-spiritedness« of the industrialists that, when in 1927, the Minister of Commerce (whose authority extended also to industry) introduced the compulsory medical examination of children under sixteen before their employment, they openly declared that »we had only one wish, namely, that the regulations should not be applied to people already working in the factories, for such a wrong measure would have caused difficulties in industrial activity.«[28] The words »would have« are a tactful allusion to the fact that the Government did *not* take this »wrong measure.«

The social institutions in the factories were miserable. According to the 1929 reports of the factory inspectors, social institutions in the 17 717 factories and mills, — with a total labour figure of 298 675, — which belonged under their control, presented the following picture :

Of about 300 000 industrial workers, 53 per cent had no showers, 66 per cent had to have their meals in the workshop, 73 per cent had no bathrooms in the factory, 82 per cent had no factory medical service, 99 per cent could

[26] Report of the National Association of Manufacturers, pp. 85—86.

[27] Magyar törvénytár, 1928. évi törvények (The Hungarian Statute-book, 1928 Acts), Budapest, 1929, p. 232.

[28] 1927 Report of the National Association of Manufacturers, pp. 445—446.

not put up their children in factory nurseries, and 99 per cent had no factory libraries.

TABLE 6

Social institutions	Number of factories and mills	Number of workers
Canteens	545	113 500
Bath rooms	356	81 984
Showers	971	142 459
Medical service	122	55 278
Out-patients' departments	86	35 325
Nurseries	31	30 285
Libraries	31	30 285

The level of the services offered by the *social insurance* system was very low. The total sum spent on all services (sickness benefits, various allowances, costs of medical service etc.) amounted to P 50 500 000 in 1929, when wages paid in the manufacturing and handicraft industries totalled over P 700 000 000. During the crisis, the expenditures on the health services were being slashed from year to year, but administrative expenses grew considerably, and even »loans« were granted to the State from the social insurance fund. Table 7 shows the receipts and expenditure of the largest of these institutions (National Institute for Social Insurance).

TABLE 7

Year	Receipts	Expenditure on services	
	in 1000 P-s	in 1000 P-s	percentage of receipts
1929	55 630	50 461	90,7
1930	51 401	44 670	86,9
1931	47 669	35 614	82,0
1932	40 460	35 614	88,0
1933	40 371	26 773	66,3

Thus, even the official statistics admitted that in 1933 the National Institute for Social Insurance spent nearly 50 per cent less on services than it had done in 1929.

It is also worth mentioning that the number of doctors serving in the N. I. of S. I. dropped from 2515 to 2416 between 1930 and 1933.

Safety precautions in the factories were very defective. In 1929, 31 923 accidents were reported by the factories where insurance charges or benefits

were paid. One out of every 25 workers covered by the insurance scheme had an accident. Among the miners this ratio was one in every five (19 per cent); among brick-makers one in thirteen; among building workers one in every fifteen; among iron workers and transport workers one in every eighteen; and among engineering and chemical workers, one in every twenty.[29]

These figures are based only on accidents *reported* from factories where accident insurance was compulsory!

Such were the conditions under which the Hungarian industrial workers worked and lived in 1929. It has been necessary to acquaint the reader with these conditions, so that he may see that the conditions of the industrial workers, which kept deteriorating throughout the crisis and the subsequent depression, had been distressing enough already in 1929, worse in fact, than at any time during the preceding three years and considerably worse than before the First World War.

Those of the figures of Table 2 which stand for 1929 and after must be corrected, not only because they represent average wages which in reality were lower, but also in view of the rapid growth of unemployment.

Official statistics did not record the total number of unemployed. This was in keeping with the policy of a government which regarded unemployment as a »private affair«, and were reluctant to show any sign of their noticing its rapid growth during the crisis, save for some cheap charity measures and the organization of relief work, which was sheer exploitation. Never during the twenty-five years of the fascist regime were unemployment benefits paid in Hungary!

The vicissitudes and eventual failure of the intended unemployment relief scheme are most illuminating. This story goes back to 1926 when the Minister of Public Welfare was to take up this question. Yet, as is self-confidently stated in one of the reports of the National Association of Manufacturers, »impressed by the arguments and protests advanced by Hungarian Business as a whole against this Bill, the Ministry of Public Welfare shelved it and, taking our initiative, decided to proceed to drafting another Bill regarding the introduction of old-age and disability pensions.«[30]

It is said in the same report that a decision was taken by the Budapest City Council to the effect that, if the unemployment relief scheme would not be introduced on a national scale, the City of Budapest should introduce it on a municipal scale. There again the National Association of Manufacturers made representations: »This matter never got beyond the initial stage of planning, *for our organization and other parties concerned were compelled to protest most energetically against this rather inconsiderate initiative.* (My italics, — M. I.)

[29] Hungarian Statistical Year-Book, Budapest, 1929, p. 46.
[30] 1928 Report of the National Association of Manufacturers, Budapest, pp. 84—86.

Therefore, we immediately took steps with the competent Government authorities, and explained to them the points of view which had once compelled Hungarian industry to oppose this particular branch of social insurance. We stressed that this time the matter in question was not a local issue, but one of national importance, regarding which the City of Budapest must not forestall the decision of Parliament and the Budapest City Council could not arrogate to themselves legislative powers under the pretext of introducing a local scheme. The competent authorities shared our view, and we understand that the Municipal Authorities have been informed that the Government would not be in a position to sanction such decisions as might be taken by the City Council on this matter, and that, therefore, the City Council had better strike it off its agenda.«[31]

Perhaps the most characteristic point about it all is the fact that the potentates of the N. A. M. did not even deem it necessary to keep up the appearance of having any comments on the merits of the matter, and of their willingness to negotiate, should these have been taken into consideration. Indeed, it could not have been stated more bluntly that this question was not even to be discussed in Hungary. The complete absence of unemployment benefits, the utter defencelessness of the workers, gave the capitalists and their flunkeys power over life and death, so that before them — as one reads in an official report — »strong, able-bodied men kneel down weeping and implore that they shall not be dismissed.«[32]

Strong light is thrown on the miserable and helpless condition of the workers by the following quotations taken from a few letters.

József *Braunász* wrote to the »Right Honourable Board of Directors« of the Wolfner Leather Factory : » . . . I am a Hungarian citizen, ex-serviceman, married, have a family of seven, and am a qualified mechanic. I am a good hand at operating and repairing steam boilers and steam engines of all types. I am also skilled in operating various special machines in which I have had a long practice . . . My wife is ill and incapable of work ; some of my children are still too young, the others are out of work like I am, and I have also my helpless mother to support. And, apart from a few odd jobs, I haven't had a permanent job for four years, so that we are mostly unable even to provide for our basic needs.«[33]

Lajos *Takács*, Jr. wrote from Újpest, 97 Horthy Miklós Street, directly to the Regent, Admiral *Horthy :* »I have been out of work since February 1931 (that is, for two years ! — M. I.), which is so much the worse as my wife

[31] Ibidem.

[32] Archives of the Institute of the Hungarian Working Class Movement, XXII. 4, 11 (1930) 2.

[33] Central Record Office, Wolfner Factory, Board of Directors, Personel Department, applications for employment, 1934—1938, June 22, 1936.

is ill. She has high fevers, and the doctors cannot cure her. Here I am without a livelihood and shelter. I am young, 24 years and I wish I could earn a bare living.«[34]

Mrs. József *Heincz*, Újpest, 6, Arany János Street, wrote to one Mr. *Faragó*, who had dismissed her after a few days of work: »On May 10, 1933, I attempted suicide together with my little son because of the misery we are living in, but now I should like to live and work for my little family. Please, do something for me, that I may have work again . . . don't let us perish so young, me and my two children who are excellent pupils.«[35]

Another woman of twenty-one, who had finished four classes of a secondary school, wrote: »I would do any kind of work and . . . if I can get 20 fillérs an hour, I should accept it with very many thanks.«[36]

*

Only on one occasion was the total number of unemployed industrial workers stated in a more or less reliable manner. That was in the census of December 31, 1930.[37]

According to this census, the total number of wage workers in the mining, smelting and manufacturing industries and handicrafts amounted to 653 000; and 156 000 of these were unemployed on December 31, 1930. Thus, the total number of employed workers must have been 497 000, which is about 10 per cent less than the figure given by the social insurance statistics for the same date. This is probably due to differences in the statistical classification, for the statistics of the social insurance institutions included also the manual workers of commerce and transportation.

As the annual changes in unemployment can be measured only on the basis of the social insurance statistics, in order to make them conform with the Census figure, 10 per cent must be subtracted from their figures for each year, according to the difference mentioned above. The figures of the social insurance statistics thus corrected reveal a considerable drop in the number of employed workers between 1929 and 1932. The number of workers employed in the mining, smelting, and manufacturing industries and handicrafts amounted (in yearly average) to 578 000 in 1929 and to 429 000 in 1932. Thus, the number of employed workers decreased by 150 000, or 24 per cent, in three years. It can be assumed that all these workers, who had lost their jobs, swelled the ranks of the unemployed, as they had hardly any chance to find work outside of

[34] Ibidem.
[35] Ibidem.
[36] Ibidem.
[37] It will be seen later on that the census figures presented no accurate picture of unemployment in agriculture, if for no other reason than that the time of the year the census was taken (December) was unsuitable.

industry. And though there might be a few such cases of re-employment, these were more than offset by the unemployed of other branches of the national economy finding re-employment in industry.

However, on the basis of this decrease in the number of employed workers one cannot form an idea of the actual proportions of unemployment. To do this, one has to consider two more factors: the number of those who were unemployed already in 1928, on the one hand, and the number of young people who reached working age in the years under examination.

There had been some unemployment even in 1928, when Hungarian industrial production was on the peak of the boom. »Full employment«, as is known, is inconceivable under capitalism. This is so not only because it is in the interest of the capitalists that there should always be a reserve army of unemployed labour to force down wages, but also because the anarchy of capitalist economy, the destitution and inhuman working conditions of the workers are necessarily accompanied by frequent migration of labour; the workers are compelled, even at a time of boom, to spend some time looking for jobs. On the basis of the figures of various capitalist countries in periods of prosperity, it seems reasonable to reckon that in Hungary about 5 per cent of all industrial workers must have been out of work even in 1928.[38]

As a result of the growth of the population, the number of new worker generations exceeded the number of those who became too old for work each year. This yearly accretion of the ranks of labour in that period has been estimated at 5000.

Thus, taking the figure of the 1930 Census Report as a basis, the total number of labour, as well as those of the actually employed and unemployed can be computed for the period as far back as 1928, and after 1930.

Table 8 reveals the catastrophic growth of unemployment during the crisis, which is the main characteristic of the conditions of the working class in that period. In the three years 1932—1934 practically one in every three industrial workers was out of work and the situation was not much better in previous or subsequent years either. The rapid growth of unemployment up to 1932 and its stagnation after that year indicate, better than anything else, the development of the crisis. Even in 1937, unemployment was still greater than in 1928 or 1929.

[38] At the end of 1928, out of 159 000 organized workers 15 000 or 9,6 per cent were unemployed. Yet, organized labour accounted for only slightly over one-fourth of all industrial workers. The former were mostly well-trained, skilled workers who — at that time at least — were anxious to find work in their respective trades. Therefore, in their case, unemployment, due to the »migration of labour«, must have been of proportions greater than the average. Moreover, the above figure dates back to the end of the year when the proportions of unemployment were, on account of the seasonal fluctuation in the building industry, greater than the yearly average. It was this consideration that led to estimating the percentage of unemployed at no more than 5 per cent as an average for 1928.

TABLE 8

Year (annual averages)	Labour	of these	
		employed	unemployed
	mining, smelting, manufact. industry and handicrafts[39]		
	thousands		per cent
1928.....	649,0	616,6	32,4	5,0
1929.....	654,0	578,4	75,6	11,6
1930.....	659,0	528,7	130,3	19,8
1931.....	664,0	482,8	181,2	27,3
1932.....	669,0	429,3	239,7	35,8
1933.....	674,0	432,1	241,9	35,9
1934.....	679,0	468,1	210,9	31,1
1935.....	684,0	501,0	183,0	26,7
1936.....	689,0	550,8	138,2	20,0
1937.....	694,0	604,2	89,8	12,9

It follows from the above figures,[40] which show a constant rise between

[39] In the first column of Table 8, the 1930 figure has been calculated on the basis of the 1930 Census which has been modified in order to obtain an annual average. To this figure (659 000) has been added 5000 for every year after 1930; on the other hand, the same number has been deducted from it to get the figures for 1929 and 1928. The second column contains the number of employed workers in annual averages, as supplied by the social insurance statistics, after a 10 per cent deduction for non-industrial occupations. The third column reveals the balance of columns 1 and 2.

[40] This estimate is the first attempt to establish the number of unemployed industrial workers in Hungary for each year of this period. It seems to be supported by the fact that the unemployment figures recorded by the Trade Unions after certain necessary corrections indicate a similar development. It was shown before that on the eve of the crisis only one-fourth of all industrial labour was organized in the Trade Unions. (In later years this proportion was even smaller.) During the crisis, the unemployment rate of organized labour was always lower than our estimates which refer to all workers. It should be borne in mind that the size of the membership of the T. U's decreased year by year and fell from 158 000 in 1928 to 119 000 in 1933. It is very probable that withdrawals were in the first place by unemployed. Even assuming that the latter represented no more than one-half of the workers who withdrew from the T. U.'s, the unemployment quotas thus obtained will very nearly tally with ours. This is shown by Table 9. (annual averages).

TABLE 9

Year	Members of the T. U.'s (1000-s)	Of these unemployed (%)	Unemployed trade-unionists (incl. 50 p. c. of resignees) related to 1928 T. U. membership figures	National percentage of unemployed (Table 8)
1929.....	158	10,2	10,2	11,6
1930.....	151	14,7	16,1	19,8
1931.....	132	11,3	26,2	27,3
1932.....	122	25,4	31,0	35,8
1933.....	119	23,4	30,0	35,9
1934.....	117	21,0	28,7	31,1
1935.....	118	16,3	24,8	26,7
1936.....	118	14,1	23,2	20,0
1937.....	120	12,7	21,7	12,9

The unemployment rate of organized labour was necessarily lower than in the case of the working class as a whole, for, in the latter case also the number of young people reaching working-

1928 and 1933, that the average period of unemployment became ever longer, for it is obvious that, such conditions prevailing, it would seldom occur that a worker, having lost his job, could soon find another. Very many of those who lost their jobs in or after 1929 could not find regular employment until 1934 or even later.

The fact that unemployment was so protracted is at least as important as the vastness of its proportions. The worker who lost his job could somehow manage to get through the first few months with the aid of relatives and comrades, by taking small loans and selling his belongings. But later on, things went from bad to worse for him. Therefore, it is important to know the average length of unemployment, which is shown by Table 10.

TABLE 10

Industry	Average length of unemployment (trade unionists only) in days	
	1930	1932
Iron and metal industry	169	563
Engineering	230	583
Earthenware and glass ..	147	434
Wood	153	488
Leather	167	581
Textile	165	456
Clothing	204	528
Food	232	581
Chemical industry	213	574
Printing	229	674

The method used in estimating unemployment did not allow of considering workers other than fully unemployed. However, no exact estimate is possible of the actual proportions of part-time unemployment ; they were no doubt very serious. Table 11 gives some idea of them.[41]

As there are no statistics of the number of workers employed in the plants which were idle part of the year, the total number of day rates, thus lost, is unknown. Taking the average manpower per plant for a basis, wage rates lost because of idle days can be estimated at more than P 10 million a year during the crisis.

age — and finding no work — has been considered, while this factor was disregarded by the Trade Unions. On the other hand, the fact that in 1936 and 1937 it was the Trade Union unemployment rate that was higher than our general estimate may be accounted for, first of all, by the increasing fascisation of the country and by the increasing hostility of the employers toward organized workers.

[41] Hungarian Statistical Year-Books (statistics on manufacturing industry).

TABLE 11

Year	Plants idle over 50 days in the year		Total number of idle days
	number	percentage of all working plants	
1929.....	494	14,0	69 100
1930.....	534	15,2	78 642
1931.....	587	17,0	87 151
1932.....	860	25,8	133 483
1933.....	821	24,5	131 284

*

It was necessary to work out these rough estimates of the proportions and length of unemployment before trying to give a fair idea of the living conditions of the working class. The knowledge of wages, or even real wages, alone could not have yielded an adequate idea of the impoverishment of the working class during the crisis. This is possible only when the ratio of employed and unemployed is known.

»Usually, when speaking of the living standards of the working class (in capitalist countries), what is meant is only the standards of employed workers, and not of what is known as the reserve army of unemployed. Is such an attitude to the question of the living standards of the working class correct? I think it is not . . . the unemployed must necessarily form part of the working class . . . their destitute condition cannot but influence the living standards of the employed workers,« writes J. V. Stalin.[42]

According to the 1930 Census Report, there were 91 non-earning dependants for every 100 employed workers. This ratio does not, however, express the whole burden weighing on the workers' household budgets, and still less the tremendous increase of that burden during the crisis. *A fair idea of this can only be formed by adding to the dependants of the employed workers the able-bodied but actually unemployed workers and their dependants.* The sustenance of these people — taking the working class as a whole — was, in some way or other, borne mostly by the employed members of the working class. They had to keep either their able-bodied but unemployed sons and daughters, or their unemployed parents who were still capable of work ; they had also unemployed relatives and friends to be supported with money, food, lodging, etc.

This grave situation could have been slightly alleviated if those of the unemployed workers who had family relations with peasants could have escaped from hunger by moving to the countryside. Demographical statistics, however,

[42] *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U. S. S. R.*, by J. Stalin, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, p. 50.

do not reveal such a trend. On the contrary, part of the unemployed farm-workers, driven by misery, went to the towns in order to try their chance there.

Thus, broadly speaking, the contention may be correct that the sustenance of the unemployed workers and their families was borne by the working class as a whole. Accordingly, if one is to estimate the number of dependants, including the able-bodied but permanently or part-time unemployed, who were to be provided for by every employed worker, the number of employed should be contrasted with that of the whole working class (Table 12).

TABLE 12

Year	Wage workers of mining, smelting, manufacturing industry, and handicrafts and their dependants			
	Employed (1000)	Employed plus unemployed, and dependants[43] (1000)	Number of dependants and unemployed for every 100 employed	Number of persons living on the wages of 100 employed
1928.....	615,2	1229	100	200
1929.....	578,4	1245	115	215
1930.....	528,7	1261	138	238
1931.....	482,8	1277	164	264
1932.....	429,3	1293	201	301
1933.....	432,1	1309	203	303
1934.....	468,1	1325	185	285
1935.....	501,0	1341	168	268
1936.....	550,8	1357	147	247
1937.....	604,2	1373	127	227

Thus, before analyzing the wages and earnings, it should be taken into account that whereas in 1928 the wages of one worker were supposed to secure the livelihood of two people on the average, the number of the latter rose to three in 1932 and 1933; and that even in 1937 the situation was still worse than in 1928 or 1929.

When examining wages, the official statistics on the manufacturing industry must be taken as a starting-point, for only these offer a possibility of establishing average annual earnings. But it should be stressed that the figures of these statistics were based on information furnished by the establishments. A scrutiny of the pay-rolls left from this period reveals that the wages as shown by the industrial statistics were invariably higher than wages actually paid.

According to the official statistics, the nominal value of average annual earnings dropped 23 per cent between 1929 and 1933, and continued to

[43] With allowance made for the annual growth of the population.

decrease a few more per cents also in 1934 and 1935. Even in 1937 it was less than in the slump. (See Table 13.)[44]

TABLE 13

Year	Average	
	annual	weekly
	nominal earnings in pengős	
1929....	1526	29,34
1930....	1497	20,78
1931....	1390	26,73
1932....	1243	23,90
1933....	1183	22,75
1934....	1125	21,62
1935....	1115	21,44
1936....	1135	21,82
1937....	1150	22,11

Thus, though our data concerning employment register a certain improvement after 1933, this process was offset by the continued decrease of earnings. The growing number of workers included an ever greater percentage of unskilled workers, apprentices and female workers, categories that were usually paid low rates. (Female labour accounted for 30,7 per cent of all factory workers in 1929 ; 35,0 per cent in 1933 ; and 33,1 per cent even in 1937.) This was partly due to the fact that during the crisis the output of the heavy industry declined sharply whilst the textile industry, which employed mostly female workers, could even increase its output.

The percentual increase of the lower-paid workers is shown by the social insurance statistics.[45] (See Table 14.)

It was shown before that lower earnings were not compensated by the growth of employment, because the number of people living on the earnings of one worker had also risen.

*

A question still more important is : what could these wages actually buy ? For this purpose, we shall use the index number of the living costs as computed by the Trade Unions' Council. According to this index number, the weekly costs of living of a family of five were as follows[46]. (See Table 15.)

[44] The figures for annual earnings were taken from the Statistical Year Books. They differ slightly (by 2,9 per cent at the most) from those of Table 2, which were borrowed from the Hungarian Statistical Review. For the purposes of the present analysis, these small discrepancies are of no importance.

[45] Corresponding volumes of the Ungarisches Wirtschaftsjahrbuch, Budapest.

[46] From corresponding volumes of the Trade Unions Bulletin.

TABLE 14

Year	Workers earning daily wages	
	2 pengős or less	6 pengős or more
	in percentage of the total	
1929....	25,6	29,5
1931....	34,4	19,7
1932....	39,1	16,5
1933....	42,1	14,6
1934....	50,5	11,8
1935....	48,9	11,0
1936....	49,3	11,0

TABLE 15

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934
	pengő					
Weekly expenses:						
Food	29,10	26,63	25,57	21,66	17,92	16,29
Fuel and lighting	5,15	5,13	5,03	4,44	3,95	3,46
Household articles	4,62	4,62	4,62	4,48	4,26	4,18
Clothing	13,68	14,01	13,56	12,84	11,19	10,34
Rent	10,32	10,32	10,32	10,32	10,32	10,32
Other expenses[47]	12,48	13,31	13,82	13,45	13,11	12,98
Total	75,35	74,02	72,92	67,19	60,75	57,57
Annual expenses	3918	3849	3798	3494	3159	2294
Index numbers, 1929=100 ..	100,0	98,2	96,7	89,2	80,6	76,4

These figures can be compared to wages after establishing, on the basis of the unemployment figures, the number of earners for every five persons. We know from Table 12 that, for instance in 1928, 200 persons depended for their livelihood on the earnings of 100 workers. Therefore, 5 persons had to live on the earnings of 2,5 workers. The figures for the other years can be worked out by the same method.

Disclosed here is working-class poverty in its entire abjection. Average earnings were already in 1929 insufficient to make both ends meet, the gap between wages and prices being almost 10 per cent. The gap widened to nearly 20 per cent in 1930, to 30 per cent in 1931 and to 43 per cent in 1932. In 1933 the drop in prices was somewhat greater than in earnings, but the gap

[47] School supplies, sickness and disability insurance charges, newspaper, barber, tobacco, taxes, transport.

TABLE 16

Year	Number of wage-earners per 5 consumers	Annual earnings per 5 consumers	Annual costs of living per 5 consumers (Table 15)	Gap
		pengő		
1929.....	2,32	3540	3918	378
1930.....	2,10	2144	3849	705
1931.....	1,90	2641	3792	1151
1932.....	1,66	1997	3494	1497
1933.....	1,65	1942	3159	1217
1934.....	1,75	1968	2994	1026

was still 40 per cent. In 1934 there was a slight improvement ; but even then the gap was still as wide as 34 per cent.

A closer examination of the workers' household budget, however, reveals still greater deficiencies because in certain, by no means insignificant, items of the household budget, such as rent, fuel and lighting, no saving could be made even in the crisis : the rents of tenements were just as high everywhere, and the family must have their food cooked and have lighting as well even though the prices of fuel, gas, electricity, etc. were hardly any lower than before. Table 17 shows the sums remaining for food, clothing, etc. after a deduction for rent, fuel, and lighting costs.

As the expenses for rent, fuel and lighting were almost the same throughout the period, the money left, for instance in 1932, covered only 45 per cent of all the other expenses.

TABLE 17

Year	Earnings of a family of five (Table 16)	Rent, fuel and lighting (Table 15)	Amount left for food and other expenses	Cost of food and other necessities (Table 15)
	(in pengős) per annum			
1929.....	3540	804	2736	3160
1930.....	3144	802	2341	3112
1931.....	2641	790	1843	3053
1932.....	1997	746	1251	2789
1933.....	1942	742	1200	2477
1934.....	1968	717	1251	2284

As other sources of receipts (taking in lodgers, night-lodgers, selling or pawning clothes etc.,[48] aids from relatives, soup-kitchens and so on) were

[48] The number of transactions effected by pawn-offices of the Postal Savings Bank rose from 2,1 million in 1929 to 2,2 million and 2,4 million in 1932 and in 1934, respectively, while their sum-total remained the same (P 52 million).

very limited, it is obvious that the balance of the workers' household budget could only be maintained if they consumed less and poorer quality food and bought less and poorer quality clothes.

In view of this deficit in the workers' budget, the question now arises of how this affected their diet. Naturally, in this respect we are compelled to rely on conjectures. It is obvious that the family must use their means to secure, first of all, the amount of calories required for sustenance and work in the form of relatively cheap food stuffs. Of course, other requirements of an adequate diet (e. g. sufficient quantities of fats, proteins — partly animal — vitamins, etc.) had to be neglected. Tables 18 and 19 reflect the nature of the almost insoluble problems which the wives of workers had to face in 1932.[49]

TABLE 18

Expenditure	Necessities according to index number (Table 15)	Available amounts
	in pengős, 1932 prices, per week	
Total expenses	67,19	38,40
Rent	10,32	10,32
Fuel and lighting	4,44	4,44
Amount left for other expenses	52,43	23,64
Of this: food	21,66	10,51
clothing	12,84	3,00
household articles	4,48	2,12
others	13,45	8,00

It is evident from Table 18 that in respect of food the standard of living must have fallen seriously. Table 19 shows the necessary changes in the diet to make up for the difference between P 21,66 and P 10,51. We have to emphasize that our calculations have been made on the understanding that the money was spent in the *most rational* way.

In this reduced diet calories are down 5 per cent below the original diet which was just enough to cover the needs of a man doing hard physical work, a woman doing light physical work, and three children. The additional calories required by hard physical work could not be secured by the reduced diet. As for the quantity of fats it is far below normal even in the original diet, and is now shown to have been 40 per cent less. As a result of the

[49] We have attempted to figure out — in terms of 1932 prices — the most advantageous way of spending the sum left after necessary deductions for rent, fuel, lighting, and a minimum of clothing and household expenses (shoe repairs, sewing, matches, soap), on foodstuffs with the greatest possible calorific value.

TABLE 19

Food	Quantities consumed weekly in 1932	
	according to original index numbers	according to our calculation based on actual buying power
Beef	1 kg	—
Pork	1 kg	—
Horse meat	—	1 kg
Bacon, smoked	1 kg	—
Fats	0,50 kg	0,75 kg
Bread	13 kg	15 kg
Flour	1 kg	1 kg
Potatoes	1 kg	1 kg
Cabbage, picked	3 kg	3 kg
Dry beans	2 kg	3 kg
Salt	0,50 kg	0,50 kg
Sugar	0,70 kg	0,25 kg
Eggs	4 pieces	2 pieces
Milk	7 litres	4 litres
Total	P 21,66	P 10,51
Total of calories	76,455	72,890
Total of fats	2,294 gm	1,457 gm
Total of proteins	2,591 gm	2,294 gm
of this: animal	606 gm	364 gm
Total of carbohydrates	11,852 gm	12,915 gm

greater consumption of beans, the protein content of the diet increased, but the percentage of animal protein diminished from 26 to 12,5 per cent, although the dietetic standard would be 40 per cent.

The diet was totally lacking in fresh vegetables and fruits ; yet, as has been pointed out, the diet could not be improved by slashing other expenses.

As for clothing, only P 3,00 was left against P 12,84 in the original estimate which did not even cover the expenses on shoe repairs and sewing thread. In the household articles category, the actual sum of P 2,13, which stood against the P 4,48 of the original estimate would go to buy only matches and soap. In »Other Expenses« (taxes, insurance costs, school supplies etc.) no reduction could be made ; the only saving that could be made was in fares.

Such was the standard of living of a worker's family in 1932, provided that a family of five enjoyed (according to the average) $1^2/_3$ of an industrial worker's earnings, that is to say, that the husband earned a wage slightly

above the average rate for men, and the wife's wage was equivalent to the average rate for women ;

that they had work throughout the year ;

that they did not have to provide for more aged dependants or unemployed relatives than the average of all families ;

that they did not smoke or drink ;

that they were well off for clothes, furnishings, etc. so that they did not have to make purchases, and so forth.

But in the case of tens of thousands of workers' families, one or more of these conditions were lacking ; the misery of these families was beyond description and past hope.

In 1932, when Budapest had 1 020 000 inhabitants, the records of the City Administration spoke of 67 474 families numbering 184 155 as »in need of public assistance«. They represented 18 per cent of the population of the capital!

These included :

families incapable of work	10 263
« of intellectual »relief workers«	4 592
« of skilled workers	21 751
« of day-labourers	30 868.

The number of families in need of public assistance remained almost the same during the whole year. It was 60 237 in January, 68 934 in May, 63 321 in June, and 67 474 in December. The families kept on record in May included :

Single men or women	16 974
married couples without children	30 085
« « with one child	9 940
« « « two children	6 189
« « « three «	3 219
« « « four «	1 207
« « « five or more children	1 320

Such a mass misery was too terrible even for a fascist system like Admiral Horthy's to be able to refrain from organizing some relief scheme. In Budapest, 17,2 million free meals were handed out in soup-kitchens in 1932, averaging 47 670 meals a day. Thus, almost five per cent of the population of the capital lived on free meals.

Characteristic of the grievous condition of the toilers, and in particular of the unemployed, is the following quotation from a document relating to

1932: »Under the present disastrous economic conditions, most children under six had no adequate clothing so that their parents could not put them up in nursery schools. Moreover, parents were not willing to take their children to and from infant school twice a day. They had mostly no time to do so, because very often the mothers would have to work instead of their unemployed husbands or else they had to go to the soup kitchen at noon to fetch the free meal.«[50]

Driven by misery to despair, many workers saw no escape but to commit suicide. The increasing impoverishment of the working-class found expression in the increased number of suicides among the industrial population. The official statistics classified the suicidal cases according to occupation and to the probable motives. The number of industrial workers who committed suicide because of poverty and unemployment in 1933 was almost two and a half times as high as in 1929. (See Table 20.)[51]

TABLE 20

Year	Suicidal cases among the industrial population resulting from »*misery and lack of earnings*«	
	number	1929 = 100
1929.....	311	100,0
1930.....	394	120,6
1931.....	537	172,6
1932.....	667	214,4
1933.....	749	240,8

The working peasantry

One of the characteristic features of the counter-revolutionary regime, helped to power by foreign interventionists and the internal enemies of the people, was its striving to create a social basis for itself among the kulaks and the petty bourgeoisie, and at the same time, to undermine the alliance of the working-class and the poor peasantry. Its phrase-mongering about a land-reform was made to serve this purpose. But »the further the menace of revo-

[50] Statistical and Administrative Year-Book of the City of Budapest, 1933, Vol. XXI, p. 535. That not only the workers' condition was disastrous, and that class distinctions were made even in the matter of relief, is evident from the following quotation, taken from the same document: »Four soup-kitchens were established... to cater for distressed intellectuals. Diet and helpings were much the same here as in other soup-kitchens, the difference being that instead of horse meat and sausages filled with horse meat the former invariably bad supplies of beef or pork. The *essential* difference between the two types of soup-kitchens was that, at the soup-kitchens of the so-called distressed intellectuals, dishes were served on laid tables«. (Italics mine, —M. I.)

[51] Statistical Year-Books, 1929—1933.

lution receded, the less inclined the Hungarian big land-owners were to carry out the land reform, the further they cut the area of land to be distributed. And, eventually, the land reform dissolved into thin air.«[52]

After much demurring, a sham reform was introduced in the form of Act XXXVI of 1920, designed, in point of fact, to consolidate the system of large estates. According to the official accounts, the scope of this »land reform« extended to a total area of 1 224 000 *holds*.[53] This amounted to 7,6 per cent of the country's total area (16,1 million *holds*). Of this total, there was no change in the ownership of 153 000 *holds*, on which »small tenancies« were established. Another 60 000 *holds*, representing the total area of 260 000 building plots, were also included in the total figure. Thus, the tillable land which changed hands amounted to 1 000 000 *holds*, or about 570 000 hectares.

Table 21 indicates the division of land, on the basis of statistical returns, in groupings of holdings under and over 100 *holds*.[54]

TABLE 21

	1918	1921	1925	1928
	in thousand *holds*			
Total area	16 100	16 100	16 100	16 100
Holdings of under 100 *holds*	7 267	7 590	8 058	8 218
Holdings of over 100 *holds*	8 813	8 510	8 042	7 882
Holdings of over 100 *holds* %	54,1	52,9	50,0	48,2
Arable land	9 710	9 683	9 692	9 576
Holdings of under 100 *holds*	5 443	5 594	5 950	6 109
Holdings over 100 *holds*	4 267	4 089	3 742	3 567
Holdings over 100 *holds* %	43,5	42,2	38,6	36,8
Total area lost by holdings of over 100 *holds*	—	303	468	160
arable land	—	178	347	175

The division of land in the Hungary of the inter-war years ran a good deal more to the disproportionate than in the pre-war times. The territory that had been left of pre-war Hungary (16,1 millions *holds*) constituted 32 per cent of the former ; and 42 per cent of all arable land had remained within the new boundaries. But the country inherited 60 per cent of all estates of

[52] Mátyás *Rákosi*, A magyar jövőért (For the Future of Hungary), Budapest, 1947, P. 178.
[53] 1 hold = 0,57 hectares = 1,42 English acres.
[54] Hungarian Statistical Year-Books, 1921—1925, 1928, Figures for 1918 from László *Buday:* A megcsonkított Magyarország (Hungary Mutilated), Budapest, 1921, pp. 78—79.

over 100 *holds* (including 70 per cent of all estates of over 1000 *holds*)! Thus, whereas in pre-war Hungary 30 per cent of the total arable land had belonged to estates of over 100 *holds*, this percentage rose to almost 44 per cent in the Hungary of the counter-revolution.

The Tribunal for Redistribution of Landed Property, called into being under the Land Reform Act, set to work on June 20, 1921. According to the Act, the process of land distribution was to be finished by the last day of 1925. As can be seen from Table 21, during this period the total area of the big estates was reduced by 468 000 *holds*, including 347 000 *holds* of arable land. Thus, the land transferred to the category of smaller farms under the »land reform« of Horthy Hungary was not very much in excess of what the latter category would have gained through spontaneous breaking up or parcelling out of larger holdings. During the 3 years between 1918 and 1921 the total area of the estates of over 100 *holds* decreased by an annual average of 100 000 *holds*. During the four years of the »land reform« (1921—1925) this decrease averaged 116 000 *holds* annually, while during the next three years (1925—1928) the average decrease per annum was down at 55 000 *holds*.[55]

Thus, it cannot be doubted that a considerable part of the land affected by the »land reform« changed hands without altering the proportion between the two main categories of holdings. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, at the same time, the general tendency towards concentration, which is one of the laws of capitalist economy, continued to work, counteracting partly the effects of the »land reform«.

It is worth while quoting a few figures to show how the land redistributed under the »land reform« was broken up into economically worthless units.

Of the large category of people, classified by law as »war invalids, war widows, war orphans, and landless farm labourers«, 242 298 people were each allotted plots of 3 *holds* at the most (on the average 1,5 *holds*). In this way 363 000 *holds* were split up into »farms« which were economically unviable, so that the new landholders, far from having been assisted, were rather ruined by the high price of the allotted land.

The situation was much the same with the 46 813 »civil servants, craftsmen, industrial workers and re-enlisted servicemen«, who were allotted at most 1 *hold* each (on the average ¾ *holds*), totalling 35 000 *holds*.

The greater part of the land redistributed under the »reform«, — besides the larger plots of land, forming kulak holdings and medium-sized estates, which were allotted to the supporters of the fascist regime — was used mainly

[55] In Table 21 the changes appear separately for arable land. In this respect, the average annual shrinkage of the area of the large estates amounted to 60 000 *holds* between 1918 and 1921; to 87 000 *holds* between 1921 and 1925; and to 60 000 *holds* between 1925 and 1928. The latter figure is, at the same time, indicative of the fact that, as the total area of the large estates shrank to a lesser extent than their arable land, the share of the large estates in other branches of agriculture did, in fact, increase (from a total of 4 300 000 *holds* to 4 315 000 *holds*).

for »ekeing out« existing peasant farms with. Officially, these »ekeing-out plots« were supposed not to exceed 15 *holds* in any case. Practically, however, influential kulak families got much more, for each of their members had advanced claims.

This is what a bourgeois author had to say concerning the outcome of the land reform »... the number of farms, big enough for a peasant family to subsist on was hardly changed at all by the land reform. On the other hand, there were created more than half a million new dwarf holdings of even less than five *holds*, on which a family cannot subsist, while there are mammoth estates of many thousand *holds* stretching up and down the country. The number of dwarf holdings, on which a family could not subsist, had increased to over 1,2 million *holds*.«[56]

The same author admits, drawing up the balance of the »land reform«, that it »... did not liquidate the mammoth estates, for only about one million *holds* were distributed among 420 000 people, and of this total no more than 650 000 *holds* had been contributed by the large estates, the rest having been cut out of smaller farms. All in all, the big landowners had come off rather cheaply from the land reform. The new dwarf-holders were encumbered with enormous amounts of redemption, and had not the means for making investments ...«[57]

This quotation partly explains the contradiction between the figures cited above. Out of the 650 000 *holds*, at the price of which the big landowners »had come off cheaply«, 153 000 *holds* were cut up into small tenancies which remained in the possession of the landowners. The remainder, 497 000 *holds*, is fairly near the figure indicated in Table 21 (468 000 *holds*) as the decrease in the total area of the large estates between 1921 and 1925.

One cannot, however, draw an exact picture of the unsound division of land in Hungary from these figures alone unless there follows a detailed classification of the sizes of farms under 100 *holds*. For this purpose the only available figures are supplied by a statistical investigation carried out in 1935. Although that was ten years after the »land reform« had been completed, still there was not much difference between conditions in 1925 and 1935 as regards the proportion of the smallest, unprofitable units, which had been and remained, exceedingly high. The returns of the 1935 statistical investigation are the following :[58]

[56] *History of the Agrarian Question in Hungary* by János *Fejes*, Debrecen, 1943, p. 222 (In Hungarian).

[57] Ibidem, p. 223.

[58] Hungarian Statistical Bulletin, Vol. CXIV, pp. 101—102. The above table includes only such holdings which consisted, at least partly, of arable land. Apart from these, the returns spoke of 628 433 owners whose property was less than one *hold*. Apparently, a great many of the latter were other than agriculturists (e. g., owners of plots, etc.) But almost one-half of these holdings (292 548) consisted, in part, of arable land, and must have belonged mostly to peasants.

TABLE 22

Size of farms (in *holds*)	Number of owners	Total area of farms (in *holds*)
1—5	529 079	1 343 450
5—10	204 471	1 477 376
10—20	144 186	2 025 946
20—50	73 663	2 172 300
50—100	15 240	1 036 162
100—200	5 792	805 164
200—300	2 126	516 875
300—500	1 714	663 676
500—1000	1 362	944 250
1000—2000	581	798 490
2000—3000	187	452 109
3000—5000	117	451 376
5000—10000	101	680 084
10000—20000	48	690 952
20000—50000	25	855 106
50000—100000	10	671 475
over 100,000	1	209 256

It is clearly shown by the proportions figuring in Table 22 that, as a matter of fact, the »land reform« of the counter-revolution left the system of large estates intact, ensuring huge profits to the big landowners. It helped to consolidate the position of the landowners and kulaks, accelerating at the same time the process of proletarianization of the working peasantry.

The agents of the big landowners and big capitalists on the *Tribunal for Redistribution of Landed Property* saw to it that land was distributed only there and to such an extent as was advantageous to the landowners. Claims of peasants were left standing over for months or even years. A great number of claims were refused, because of an alleged lack of land to be distributed. The ruling classes did everything in their power to restrict the number of claimants to a possible minimum. Many landowners even went as far as to dismiss farm-hands who had laid claims to land. This is revealed by a letter written by the farm hands of an estate which belonged to the Roman Catholic Chapter of Esztergom. It shows how intense was the yearning of the peasantry for land, how ready they were to go to all lengths to obtain a small strip of land.

»We the undersigned are farm-hands in the Tapsony Estate of the Chapter of Esztergom . . . But as we have advanced claims for land, . . . [and], in spite of the repeated warnings, made in a manner nearly amounting to outright maltreatment, from the Steward, have refused to withdraw our claims, we

have been dismissed. We have all been working on this Estate for very many years ; some of us were even born here. One man, whose fifty years' unbroken service record with this Estate would qualify him for an old-age pension, got the sack only because he wouldn't give up his claim to the 1½ *holds* allotment he had been promised . . . Now we and our numerous families are going to have the worst of times. It is now almost impossible for us to earn our living, and we have no hope to enter, within a definite time, into possession of the land which has been promised to us . . .

». . . We ask Your Excellency to exert your influence, it being in your power, that the Estate shall retain us in service (at least in this year) till we can take possession of the land. And since, so far as we know, *most of the farm-hands of the Estate, anxious to avoid having to share our uncertain fate*, have yielded to force and waived their claims, as a result of which considerable patches of land must have remained unallotted, we, therefore, humbly request Your Excellency to favour us with Your Excellency's assistance and advice as to how the allotment of land could be brought up to 3 *holds* instead of the 1½—1 *holds*, as originally envisaged.«[59]

This petition of farm-hands of Tapsony was pigeonholed in the Ministry of Agriculture with the addition of the written comment, »To be disregarded, since petitioners have vacated their living quarters.» As to why and under what circumstances these farmhands had »vacated their living quarters« was of no interest whatever to the Ministry.

The extent of victimization for claiming land is unknown, but that the poor peasantry was hard hit by it is proved not only by the letter of the Tapsony farm-hands, but also by the fact that in 1927 even the Central Chamber of Agriculture found it necessary to investigate the matter. »Now that the land reform may be on the whole regarded as accomplished« — said the annual report of the Chamber, — »we have deemed it opportune to carefully investigate its effects on farm labour. Our intention in carrying out this nation-wide investigation has been to disclose the extent of dismissals of farm labourers in the course of the land reform.«[60]

It is only natural that such a partial investigation as this should have produced »reassuring« results. For us its importance lies in the fact that the issue was so acute as to demand publicity.

One of the most important effects of this »land reform« from the point of view of the big landowners consisted in facilitating the exploitation of agricultural labour by increasing the number of dwarf holdings. The one or two *holds* of the 300 000 new dwarf-holdings were not enough even to provide bread for a family ; the new owners were compelled to hire themselves out

[59] Central Record Office, Sect., Ministry of Agriculture, 1925-620-25,902. (My italics — M. I.)

[60] 1927 Report of the Central Chamber of Agriculture, Budapest, 1928, p. 158.

on the neighbouring large estates. Thus, by the allotment of such dwarf-holdings the big landowners tied down the manpower all around their estates, as a permanent reserve army of agricultural labour.

Another advantage the land reform offered the big landowners was the possibility for them to get rid of their worst and most distant lands for high prices. Everywhere the landless peasants were allotted the worst, mostly alkaline, lands which lay farthest from the villages. At Szentes (South-East Hungary), for instance, a great number of the allotments were at a distance of 10 to 12 kilometres from the town. Many allotments were simply inaccessible, the roads being private ones. In a number of instances it was many years before the problem of the right of way was settled.

Similar conditions prevailed in the distribution of building-plots. For this purpose 58 697 *holds* were distributed under the land reform. Naturally, it was not the peasants who were allotted the best plots. For instance, at Gödöllő, a community some 30 kilometres east of Budapest, most of the building-plots were allotted to civil servants from Budapest.[61] Similary, the list of allotments of Kalocsa (Southern Hungary) shows that in granting building plots preference was given to civil servants and office workers.[62]

We do not know the number of poor peasants who were allotted building plots. But we know that almost all the plots allotted to them were humid grounds lying at a great distance from the villages.

Even the Central Chamber of Agriculture were compelled to deal with this question : »... In many places building plots have been distributed on humid grounds, on which, primitive as building methods are, it is impossible to build healthy dwellings«.[63]

The price and terms of payment of the allotted lands were not fixed before 1928, because the big landowners were reluctant to accept indemnity in inflated currency at the time of the reform law. The financial questions of the land reform were settled by Act XLI of 1928, and by a Decree 1300 of 1929. The law laid down as a principle the »full indemnification« of the landowners. In reality, the big landowners received much more than full indemnities through the impoverishment of the new landholders.

According to the above-mentioned Act, the price of the allotted land was to be fixed on the basis of the net income as fixed in the land-register.[64] The prices per *hold* amounted to P 60 for every gold crown of the net income schedule. For lands, which under a former law on capital levy had become the property of the State and were also distributed, the price was 25 times the annual rent.

[61] Central Record Office, Dept. for Min. of Agric., 1926—29—61,590.
[62] Ibidem, 1926—29—77,410(68,740).
[63] 1925 Report of the Central Chamber of Commerce, p. 18.
[64] The net income of landed property as fixed in the land-register for purposes of taxation, dated back to the 1870's. This rate of assessment was supposed to reflect the differences of fertility, location, etc. of the various lands. The net income of landed property was fixed in terms of »gold crowns«. (See Footnote No. 12.)

In both cases the new proprietors had to pay annuities through 52 years, each annuity amounting to 5 per cent of the whole indemnity plus 0,4 per cent for administrative costs. As the average net income of landed property amounted to about 10 gold crowns, for arable land the average indemnity per *hold* was P 600, the annuity of which amounted to P 32,40. At this rate the indemnity would have totalled P 1684,80 in 52 years. This annuity constituted a heavy burden even when the wheat price was P 30 a quintal ; but it became absolutely unbearable when the wheat price fell under P 10.

Suppose that the average yield per hold is 6 quintals of wheat. (On many »reform lands« of inferior quality even yields of 3—4 quintals were not uncommon). At the time when the wheat price fell to P 10, more than half of the yield was devoured by the annuity. Add to this seed, thrashing costs, taxes, etc., and it becomes obvious that after a years' toil the working peasant who enjoyed the »blessings« of the counter-revolutionary land reform, did not have enough produce left even to feed himself and his family. The new landholders fought a life-and-death struggle for their land. They toiled day and night, they and their families worked for sweating wages on the large estates to be able to pay the annuities.

The law offered ample opportunity for abuses in the form of the »revision« of net income rates. To enable the landlords to get good prices for their worst lands, for which low net income rates had been fixed in the land-register, the law laid down that net income rates under 4 gold crowns were to be considered equal to 4 crowns ; moreover, it gave the landowners the right to request the »revision« of net income rates for their lands which had been redistributed under the land reform so as to obtain irrationally high prices.

These abuses aroused great indignation throughout the country. It was this indignation that evidently prompted the Central Chamber of Agriculture to state in December, 1929, that ». . . one of the members of our Managing Board has pointed out a concrete case in which the net income rate, which in the land-register was fixed at 3,99 gold crowns, have been revised and raised to 11 gold crowns for the purpose of determining the price to be paid for that particular land. Sandhills, which were fixed at 0,25—0,30 gold crowns have now been revalued at 4,70 gold crowns.«[65]

This quotation proves that the »revisions« made were in no way insignificant. At Kiszombor (Csanád County, S. E. Hungary) the price for first-class land was fixed at P 1440, for the third-class, at P 1200 ; and the annuities amounted to P 78 and P 64, respectively. Thus, in 52 years, one *hold* of first-class land would have cost P 4045, the third-class, P 3328.[66]

Still higher prices were established for an estate in Vas County, Western Hungary ; for first-class land, at P 1600 ; second-class, at 1500 ; third-class,

[65] Central Record Office, Min. of Agr. 1930—29—37,508.
[66] Ibidem, 1927—29—21,327.

at P 1400. One *hold* of first-class land would have cost 4472 in 52 years, whereas first-class land was sold by private contract for P 1200 in the same region.[67]

»Reform prices« ranged from P 1400 to 1500 at Enying, a community in Veszprém County, Western Hungary, where 400 *holds* were distributed among 210 claimants. In a letter, these peasants complained that »these fields lie at a distance of 6—8 kilometres from the centre of the community of Enying. The road leading to them is almost impassable for seven months of the year. With our weak, underfed horses we are unable to transport the manure, therefor we cannot convey more than one waggon-load a day. If we have it transported by a cartier, we are charged P 3 per trip. In short, we are unable to cultivate these fields because of the great distance and the bad roads.«[68] Later on, they wrote in another letter : »Some of the new landholders have already given up their titles to the land, and none of the people here, at Enying, is likely to lay a claim to any of these lands. We stick to the land, we want land, for tilling is our very life, we earn by it our living, our bread ; but these fields only take work, and will not even yield so much as would go to pay the annuity and the taxes.«[69]

The prices fixed for allotted lands exceeded those of the local free sales by 30—40 per cent already in the early 1930's. The discrepancy grew rapidly during the crisis years. One may form an idea of this difference by comparing the above-quoted prices of P 1000—1500 with the official statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture, according to which the average price of 1 *hold* arable land ranged from P 500 to 700 for plots smaller than 5 *holds* and from P 280 to 440 for estates larger than 100 *holds* in 1933.

The State of the landlords and capitalists saw to it that the big landowners should not have to wait fifty-two years until full payment of these advantageous prices was made to them. In order to ensure an early compensation, a »Cooperative Society for Financing the Redistribution of Landed Property« was founded. To raise the funds for the compensation was secured by the Government loan of $ 36 million (P 205 million) contracted with the Swedish Kreuger Safety Match Trust. The loan was to be repaid in fifty years, and the interests amounted to 5,5 per cent. Moreover, the State ceded the safety match monopoly to the Trust and permitted them to raise the retail price of matches by 50 per cent. It was from this loan that indemnities were made to the former owners of the allotted lands. Thus, the direct legal relation between big landowners and new landholders ceased to exist, and the latter became debtors of the State.

On the poor and far-away lands, life was full of cares for the new landholders. Besides the heavy burden of high annuities, farming in itself was for them a difficult problem. Having no draught-animals and implements, they were compelled to take further debts on themselves. They depended for seed and draught-animals on the kulaks who wretchedly exploited them.

[67] *Studies in Agricultural Policy*, Imre *Nagy*, Budapest 1950, P 239. (In Hungarian
[68] Central Record Office, Min. of Agric. 1931—29—51,627.
[69] Ibidem.

The agricultural inspectors would usually report from all over the country that most of the new landholders possessed no implements ; that they had to hire others to plough their fields, for which they pay high charges either in cash or in labour. Such ploughing was generally done late and in no satisfactory manner, with the result that the soil was badly cultivated. Crop rotation was never employed ; cereal crops were sown year after year, and numerous plots were left fallow.[70]

*

During the years of the fascist regime Hungarian agriculture was running into debts at a very fast rate, three times as fast, in fact, as prior to the First World War.

Thanks to the inflation after the war, Hungarian agriculture got rid of its former debts, amounting to about P 3000 millions. But while the big landowners had been able to profit nicely from the war-time and inflationary boom, the working peasants had sunk into utter poverty. True, they too had been relieved of their debts as a result of the depreciation of the currency, but their income was too meagre to cover the replacement of livestock lost and implements depreciated during the war. Therefore, after the stabilization of the currency their indebtedness grew rapidly.

The total debts of agriculture as regards their nominal value, grew sixteenfold from the stabilization to the 1932 slump. Still greater was the growth of the *real encumbrance*, for, at the same time, the prices of agricultural produce were roughly halved. Table 23 contrasts the sums of debts, interests and amortizations with the prices and the income of agriculture.

TABLE 23

Crop year (ending July 31)	Total debts at the middle of the financial year	Total income	Annual payment of interests and amortizations	Farm prices of agr. produce (1924/25—1926/27 = 100)	Real value of	
					total debts	interests and amortization
	million P				in million P (purchasing power of 1925—1927)	
1925/26	135,5	1399,4	20,2[71]	92	147,3	21,9
1926/27	429,6	1406,6	55,9[71]	96	447,5	58,4
1927/28	835,9	1447,8	100,3[71]	105	796,1	95,5
1928/29	1171,6	1507,8	130,0	100	1171,6	130,0
1929/30	1718,3	1444,8	191,0	85	2021,5	224,4
1930/31	1936,4	1078,4	215,0	70	2767,3	307,1
1931/32	2116,5	807,2	225,0	57	3713,0	394,8
1932/33	2178,7	662,9	167,0	48	4539,0	348,9

[70] Ibidem, 1926—29—47,394.
[71] Our estimates.

Thus, at the end of 1925 agricultural debts totalled less than one-tenth of the income resulting from production. In 1928—1929, on the eve of the crisis, the nominal value of the debts still amounted to only 78 per cent of the income. But in 1930/31, two and a half years', and in 1933, more than three years' income would have been necessary for the repayment of all debts. And while just before the crisis the annual payment of interests and debts absorbed less than 9 per cent of the income, this proportion grew to almost 28 per cent in 1931/32. Even in 1932/33, after measures had been taken to »protect the debtors«, more than one-fourth of the income would have been required to cover the payment of all interests and amortizations.[72]

The relative value of debts reached such catastrophic proportions as a result of the slump in agricultural prices. Our price index shows that, to repay a debt of P 1000 in 1932/33, more than twice as much agricultural produce had to be sold as in 1928/29. Calculated in these terms, the real value of the total indebtedness had, by 1932/33, increased almost fourfold. The real value of the 1932/33 interests and amortizations was 2,7-times as high as in 1928/29, notwithstanding the lowering of interests effected by measures »to protect the debtor«. In 1931/32, before the measures were taken, the real value of interests and amortizations had been 3,4 times as high as in 1928/29.

The extent of encumbrance on the various categories of landed property is shown by Table 24.[73]

Thus, the average encumbrance was heaviest in the category of working peasants' holdings ; it was much less on the category of the kulak farms, and still less on the large estates.

These figures, however, convey but an incomplete picture, for they compare the debts to the total area of *all* farms belonging to the various categories and not with the area of *encumbered* farms. We have no data that would afford a comparison between *all* debts and the total area of properties encumbered. Such figures are available only for loans granted by credit banks. (See Table 25.) This part of the debts of agriculture represented P 1358,6 million, or 62 per cent of the total. It should not be forgotten that besides the farms classified in Table 25 there were other farms that were encumbered with other debts (e. g. tax arrears, private loans, etc.) and that, on the other hand, also the farms figuring in Table 25 were encumbered with such »other debts«.

The table, though it comprises only a part of the whole indebtedness, shows markedly the oppressive burden that weighed heavily on the working

[72] Of course, a great part of the interests and amortization remained unpaid. This, and to a lesser extent the growing tax arrears, explains why the total debts continued to increase even after 1931 when practically no new credits were contracted.

[73] *Mortgage Debts of Hungarian Agriculture*, by Gyula *Kónkoly-Theze*, Budapest, 1933, (in Hungarian). The territory figures have been taken from the 1935 farms statistics. The change that had taken place in the various categories during the intervening 2 1/4 years was probably not significant. The figures of the first column of our table include holdings under 1 *hold*, as these were also encumbered (for instance, with loans for house-building).

TABLE 24

Category of landed property	Debts million P (end of 1932)	Farms		Average encumbrance per 1 *hold* (Pengoes)
		number (thousands)	area (1000 *holds*)	
Working peasants' holdings :				
Up to 5 *holds*	676,3	1506	1509	448
5—10 *holds*	184,7	204	1477	125
10—20 *holds*	227,9	144	2026	112
Total	1 088,9	1854	5012	217
Kulak farms :				
20—50 *holds*	258,5	74	2172	119
50—100 *holds*	106,1	15	1036	102
Total	364,6	89	3208	113
Large estates :				
100—500 *holds*	223,6	10	1986	113
500—1000 *holds*	126,6	1	944	134
Over 1000 *holds*	368,6	1	4829	76
Total	718,8	12	7759	93
All categories	2 171,3	1955	15979	136

peasantry. Out of the 1,8 million holdings of under 20 *holds*, about 600 000, or one in every three was encumbered with bank loans. But, as we may see when comparing Tables 24 and 25, the working peasants had, besides bank loans, also P 470 million in other debts. Some of these debts were owed by those who were also indebted to banks. But the greater part of this P 470 million encumbered the holdings of about 200 000—300 000 other working peasants. Thus, at least every other working peasant must have been heavily indebted, quite apart from those smaller debts owed to shopkeepers, kulaks, etc. which could not be included in the statistics but which embittered the life of almost every working peasant in that period.

Extremely heavy were the bank debts per 1 *hold* in the category of the smallest holdings, especially when compared with the low prices of land during the crisis. (We have seen that, according to the statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture, the price of land in the category of 1—5 *holds* varied from P 500 to P 700.)

In the category of 5—10 *holds* bank debts were relatively smaller. This fact may be explained by the smaller percentage in this category of new landowners who had contracted debts deriving from indemnities to be paid after allotments of land and building-plots, or from house-building loans. For other pur-

TABLE 25

Category of landed property	Number of debtors	Landed property encumbered (1000 *holds*)	Debts with credit institutes			
			per 1 *hold* (Pengoes)	total	of this	
					amortization loans	bills of exchange
			million P			
Working peasants' holdings :						
Up to 5 *holds*	485 019	891	463	412,3	5,5	103,7
5—10 *holds*	68 539	496	183	90,7	8,1	78,6
10—20 *holds*	40 658	575	202	116,2	19,9	90,1
Total	594 216	1962	316	619,2	33,5	272,4
Kulak farms :						
20—50 *holds*	22 230	672	214	144,2	36,8	97,6
50—100 *holds*	5 031	345	223	76,8	21,3	47,8
Total	27 261	1017	217	221,0	58,1	145,4
Large estates :						
100—500 *holds*	3 485	746	217	162,1	57,3	84,2
500—1000 *holds*	627	438	203	88,9	34,8	39,9
Over 1000 *holds*	499	1602	167	267,4	136,5	84,1
Total	4 611	2786	186	518,4	228,4	208,2
All categories	626 088	5765	235	1 358,6	320,2	626,0

poses, the smallholder had meagre chances of getting a bank loan ; their debts, therefore, consisted mainly of various unregistered loans.

The bank loan average increases gradually in the categories of 10—20, 20—50 and 50—100 *holds ;* on the other hand the value of »other loans« decreases in the same fashion. (The latter represented 44 per cent of all debts with the working peasants, 39 per cent with the kulaks, and only 28 per cent with the big landowners). Thus, the per-*hold* average of *all* debts of the encumbered landed properties was the largest in the lowest category and decreased gradually in the higher ones.

There was another conspicuous difference between working peasants, kulaks, and big landowners as to the terms of loans contracted by them. Of the bank loans granted to the working peasants (excluding the debts deriving from the land reform)[74] only 5 per cent were long-term amortization loans, and 45 per cent consisted of bills of exchange at very short terms and very high

[74] The long-term loans deriving from the land reform could not serve productive investments, and must, therefore, be left out of consideration.

interest rates. On the other hand, 27 per cent of the bank loans contracted by the kulaks, and 40 per cent of those contracted by the big landowners, were long-term loans.

In October, 1932, the government was compelled to take measures concerning agricultural debts. The real motive, of course, was not any desire to help the working peasants. It was the impossibility of recovering the loans that threatened to ruin the whole banking system, as well as the straits the big landowners and kulaks were in, that prompted this move. Financial capital was not inclined to put up with a situation in which hundreds of thousands of debtors could have simply refused to pay. On the other hand, the enforcement of payments by legal procedure might have revolutionized the peasant masses. The »solution« was found in the institution of »protected farms«. Under this institution every landowner whose debts exceeded a certain multiple of the registered net income of his property was entitled to request that his holding should be legally declared »protected«. Such landowners were granted a respite for the repayment of the principal sum, and a ceiling was set on the interest rates they were expected to pay. The new landowners, too, were given respites of varying terms ; this, however, did not concern directly either the ex-owners or financial capital ; the new landowners were the debtors of the Treasury and, through it, of the Kreuger Trust. The Treasury also assumed part of the debts encumbering the farms of under 10 *holds*, that is exactly those debts the banks had no hopes of collecting, considering that at the actual price level the whole property of the debtors would have but covered a mere fraction of their debts. The finance-capitalists were only too glad to accept the Treasury as the successor of these debtors, making payments at the expense of the rate-payer. After all, this meant only a change in the mode of collection, making it more expedient for them.

The owners of the »protected« large estates could now enter into »free negotiations« with their creditors. Such negotiations were made easier by the fact that part of their long-term loans had been contracted in foreign currencies which depreciated during the crisis.[75]

But, in spite of all these measures, in 1932/33 25 per cent, and even in 1933/34 — with its rich crops — 22 per cent of the agricultural money income was required for the payment of liabilities, against less than 9 per cent in 1928/29. The reduction of interest rates did not compensate for the fall of prices. This discrepancy was particularly serious in the case of the working peasantry.

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[75] As a result of the factors set forth above and of the amortization payments made the liabilities of agriculture fell from P 2179 million in 1932 to P 1600 million in 1938 ; the value of the annual payments due decreased from P 225 million to P 75 million during the same period. Even so the latter amount still represented 8,2 per cent of the 1938 money income of agriculture, although in that year, owing to the above-mentioned Government measures, only interest rates were to be paid and no amortizations were made.

Another factor aggravating the conditions of the working peasantry was the glaring discrepancy between *taxes* and prices.

The former Institute of Political Economy, in a study which will be quoted later on, estimated the incomes and direct taxes of a middle peasant holding of 15 *holds* as follows :[76]

TABLE 26

Year	Money income				Direct taxes		Left for personal consumption and investments	
	total		after deduction of production costs in cash					
	P	1925-1927=100	P	1925-1927=100	P	1925-1927=100	P	1925-1927=100
1925	1740	106	1460	107	219	100	1242	109
1928	1484	90	1211	89	219	100	993	87
1929	1401	86	1148	84	219	100	930	82
1930	1163	71	937	69	198	91	739	65
1931	907	55	661	49	195	89	466	41
1932	865	53	670	49	203	93	468	41
1933	920	56	736	54	206	94	530	46
1934	760	46	581	43	210	96	371	33
1935	745	65	546	40	204	93	343	30
1936	1121	68	931	69	213	97	719	63
1937	1153	70	953	70	229	105	724	68

In the case of this middle peasant farm, direct taxes absorbed 12,6 per cent of all incomes in 1925, 14,8 per cent in 1928, and 23,4 per cent in 1932[77] for in spite of the agricultural price slump, the direct taxes imposed on the working peasants were reduced only by 11 per cent by 1931. In 1932 the taxes began to rise again. The rigidness of the tax-burden was in no small measure responsible for the unprecedented shrinking of the sum left for the working peasant's consumption and investment expenses. This net income was at times down to one-third of pre-crisis.

This survey gives a detailed exposure of the anti-democratic character of the Hungarian system of taxation, and especially the anti-democratic manner in which it was applied during the crisis. In agriculture, the basis of taxation was the land tax. This was assessed at *the same rate* for a peasant who possessed one *hold* of land and for Prince Esterházy, the owner of 210 000 *holds*. The classification of landed properties had been done as far back as the second half of the

[76] From an MS prepared by the Institute of Political Economy.

[77] Of the sum left after deduction of production costs, paid in cash direct taxes absorbed 15 per cent in 1925, 18 per cent in 1928, and 30 per cent in 1932.

Nineteenth Century in a manner favourable to the big landowners and detrimental to the working peasantry. The iniquity grew with the passage of time. On the one hand, the »revision« of the net income rates of landed properties was effected in favour of the landlords and resulted in the reduction of their taxable income ; on the other, with the steady progress of capitalism in agriculture the economic superiority of the large estates over the small holdings became ever more conspicuous. With the development of the productive forces in agriculture, the productivity of labour grew much faster on the large estates than on the peasant farms, with the result that the net income of the former grew ever larger in relation to the latter. In spite of this, the big landowners continued to pay their land tax on the basis of the net income rates which had been fixed in the land register fifty years before. Thus, in view of these different developments of production and rentability, it is obvious that the application of a uniform rate of assessment was in reality strongly degressive in favour of the large estates.

This iniquity continued to grow under the counter-revolutionary regime. The process was facilitated, as has been pointed out, by the »revision« of the net income rates of landed property redistributed under the land reform law. Thus, not only the price of the allotted land, but also its tax rates were raised over their former level.

The land tax served as a basis of assessment of several other taxes. Therefore, when at the time of the currency stabilization the rate of assessment of the land tax was raised 25 per cent, this meant a serious increase in taxation. This higher rate was applied until 1930, when the former rate was restored.

The house tax was reduced by a few per cents in 1929, but the introduction in 1932 of a »*crisis emergency duty*« virtually converted this reduction into a 25 per cent rise. It was a rule that the effect of the occasional reductions intended as »window-dressing« was promptly neutralized by the introduction of »extraordinary« surtaxes. For instance, the property tax (also assessed at a uniform rate for all classes) was reduced by 25 per cent through modification of the rates of assessment of property, but *at the same time* a 100 per cent surtax was levied, which made for the tax being practically raised by 50 per cent. The income tax was automatically reduced as a consequence of the fall of prices, but this was compensated by surtaxes which were officially styled »emergency« but remained in force for ten years (15 per cent in 1932, 45 per cent in 1933, 60 per cent in 1934 and after). Still greater was the increase of the municipal tax rates. It was laid down by law that the municipal taxes must not exceed 50 per cent of the land tax and the house tax. Year after year, however, a growing number of communities were permitted to disregard this provision. Already in 1930 municipal taxes averaged, on a national scale, 70 per cent of the land and house taxes, rising to almost 100 per cent by 1937. In the case of the farm-type which served as a basis in the study we have quoted, the

annual total of direct taxes rose by almost 25 per cent between 1929 and 1931. The position of the middle peasant was further aggravated as a result of the ruthless tax redemption levies. There are many documents attesting to the effect.

»Many people have complained to me, in writing and by word of mouth«, — said one of the Deputies in the Committee of the Thirty-three,[78] — »that the sequestrators act mercilessly, that their barns have been swept clean of the last grain of corn, in most places nothing but one month's supply of bread grain having been left. They have left no seed grain«.[79]

At the end of 1932, some of the members of this Committee, alarmed at the general indignation produced by the frequent distraints and public sales in the villages, urged the government to check, to a certain extent at least, these wrongful practices. As one of them said, »This question should be taken seriously, both as a political and economic issue . . . an upheaval is sweeping through the country, the political and social consequences of which are incalculable.« To support this statement, they cited numerous facts which throw a light on the fascist system : »I've received a note to-day«, said one of the deputies, »informing me that at Mágócs, Baranya County, a cow worth P 200 was sold by auction at P 75, but the buyer resold it to the proprietor, at a gain of P 10. The expenses of the auction, apart from the costs of the gendarmery and of the sheriff, amounted to P 72.« According to another letter, a cow had been sold by auction at P 47 ; a bull worth P 270, at P 108; a horse worth P 150, at 35 ; stocks of maize had been sold at P 1 or even 0,50 P a quintal. At Baja young oxen changed hands at P 10 each.«[80] In certain parts of the country distraints were held monthly : »The district distrainor fixes the date of distraint, then he postpones it against the payment of 20 per cent. A month later he fixes another date and collects another 20 per cent. This goes on for months on end. I wouldn't believe this at first, but having made inquiries, I have now convinced myself that this is so«, — said another deputy in the Committee of the Thirty-three.[81]

»Prompted by what I have observed in my homeland, the Eastern Tisza Region«, said one of the deputies, speaking in a debate on the plans of the Governement regarding an increase in taxes, »I must put the question : what does the Minister of Finance expect an increase in taxes would bring in, say, from the Bihar County? In this county the value of the wheat harvested is P 5 million less than it was last year, and this is only a single item. The price subsidy granted the county on wheat is P 2 million less — this adds up to a deficit of P 7 million as compared with last year. This is a county where the

[78] This Committee was set up by Parliament in 1931 to give an appearance of legality to the acts of the Government. It was invested with »exceptional powers«.

[79] Central Record Office, Presidential Council, files of Minutes of the Committee of 33, Vol. VI. p. 169, October 8, 1931.

[80] Ibidem, Vol. XIII, p. 81.

[81] Ibidem, Vol. XIV, P. 58.

total revenues from the toll and the labour service levy are transferred to cover the arrears of the State taxes, and, in order to maintain the county administration, the Deputy Lieutenant has to travel from village to village and collect the taxes personally by exercising pressure. In this county, the County of Bihar, where the arrears of the rate payers are twice as high as the annual budget, or in any of the neighbouring counties which have also suffered damages by weather, I do not believe that there is any possibility of collecting additional taxes«.[82]

Another speaker made it clear that this state of affairs was by no means unparalleled, restricted to Bihar County and its neighbouring counties east of the Tisza river. »My Honourable Friend may rest assured«, he said, »that all that he has observed in Bihar County holds good also of the region of Szeged or, for that matter, of Fejér County, and Transdanubia as a whole«.[83]

Having given a general outline of the effects of the land reform, indebtedness and taxes, we should now proceed to an analysis of the condition of the various sections of the working peasantry. The 1930 Census returned the following figures concerning the various sections of the agricultural population :

TABLE 27

Section	Breadwinners or owners	Breadwinners or owners and dependants
Poor peasants :		
Farm-hands	218 044	599 622
Other landless agricultural population	478 255	1 005 267
Peasants possessing less than 5 *holds* of land	443 606	1 490 369
Total	1 139 905	3 095 258
Small or middle-peasants with holdings of 5—20 *holds*	268 149	1 065 431
Kulaks (20—100 *holds)*	68 222	286 281
Owners of medium-sized estates (100—1000 *holds)*	6 638	22 901
Big landowners (over 1000 *holds)*	745	2 242
Stewards	5 611	13 223
Lessees	5 193	14 057
Total agricultural population	1 494 463	4 499 393

According to Table 27, the population possessing no land or less than 5 *holds* numbered almost 3,1 million. This was the population after which Hungary was styled »The Country of Three Million Beggars«, though the style »The Country of Three Thousand Lords« would have been more in place.

[82] Ibidem, Vol. XIII., p. 173.
[83] Ibidem, Vol. XIII., p. 183.

The agrarian proletariat possessing nothing at all, or at most, a miserable cottage, formed together with the »dwarf holders«, that is, those who had less than 5 *holds*, the »poor peasantry«. This section of 3,1 million people lived wholly or mostly on wage labour (farm hands hired for a year or for a couple of months ; seasonal workers ; sharecroppers ; day-labourers paid in cash, etc.). The average size of the holdings under 5 *holds* was less than 2,5 *holds*. These strips of land were, even before the crisis, too small to ensure even the most miserable subsistence for a family, save for a few exceptional cases (e. g. gardening in the neighbourhood of towns). The head and all able-bodied members of these families were compelled to hire themselves out regularly. Thus, the landless and the dwarfholders lived under much the same conditions, both sections being dependent chiefly on wage-labour.

The greater part of the »three million beggars«, 1,6 million people, possessed no land at all. The remainder, 1,5 million dwarf-holders, had altogether about just as many *holds* of land. Thus, one-third of the agricultural population owned no land, and another third possessed but 9 per cent of the country's territory.

The small and middle-peasants numbered over one million and represented 23,6 per cent of the agricultural population. They were running farms in the size of 5 to 20 *holds*. Their aggregate possessions amounted to 21,9 per cent of the country's territory. For this section of the peasantry, the yield of their own farms was, if not always the only, but at least the main source of living ; only occasionally would they hire themselves out as wage-labourers. On the other hand, they did not, as a rule, hire labour ; only the larger farms of the group would take on croppers at the time of the harvest.

The category of 5—20 *holds* (classified as middle-peasants) is rather arbitrarily chosen. It would be more appropriate to draw the line between middle-peasant and »kulak«-farms (that is, farms regularly employing labour) at 25 *holds*. The compilers of contemporary statistics, however, used this classification and, at any rate, the correct classification should vary according to regional and local conditions.

About 6,3 per cent of the whole agricultural population belonged to the category of farmers possessing 20—100 *holds*, owning between them about 20 per cent of the country's territory.

The narrow section of owners of estates of 100—1000 *holds* (in Hungary called »middle estates«) represented slightly more than 0,5 per cent of the agricultural population, but owned 17,5 per cent of the total area. Finally, the largest estates of over 1000 *holds* belonged to 2242 people who owned 26,8 per cent of the country's territory.

This was the pattern of agriculture which the legislators of the time regarded, as indicated by the title of the land reform Act, as the »Fair Redistribution of Landed Property«.

*

We propose to begin our survey of the conditions of the working peasantry, proceeding from the lowest grade of the scale, with the agricultural labourers. As in industry, a serious drop in wages and growing unemployment were evident also in agriculture in the years of the crisis. But in agriculture, a special situation was created owing to the fact that the working capacity of the agricultural population had, even before the crisis, never been fully utilized, and had never been devoid of seasonal fluctuations.

According to a study, based on the 1930 figures of land distribution and production,[84] the working capacity of the whole agricultural population (476 million normal workdays) was utilized only 76 per cent in annual average. Within this average, however, there were great fluctuations. The working capacity of farm hands (57 million days) was utilized 100 per cent, and the working capacity of 91 million days of the »small-holders« and »small-tenants« (holdings of 10—100 *holds)* up to 96 per cent. But the working capacity of the »small-holders and small-holder day-labourers« (in this category the author included all landless labourers other than farm hands, dwarf-holders, as well as small and middle-peasants with up to 10 *holds* of land) totalling 328 million workdays was utilized only 66 per cent. And within this latter average, there were still quite considerable divergencies. The middle-peasants with farms of 8 to 10 *holds* whom our source included in this category, spent all or most of their time working on their own farms, and seldom, if at all, hired themselves out. Therefore, unemployment among the landless labourers and dwarfholders must have been well above 66 per cent ; even in 1930 when production and marketing conditions had been more favourable than they were later on.

It should be noted that our authority, having painstakingly calculated the quantity of labour needed in agricultural production, added 25 per cent to the results, representing the time lost by the labourers going to, and returning from work and changing their workplaces during the day. This increased amount was then compared to the working capacity of the population.

This method is quite misleading when applied to estimating the degree of employment and the earnings of wage-labourers. The beginning and end of the daily work on the fields was always fixed exactly (from sunrise to sunset or otherwise), and the employers never cared about how long it took the worker to walk to and from work. Thus, the only effect of these losses of time was that they cut short the worker's leisure time. They neither created more work, nor did they increase the earnings. The change of work places during the day might have had such effects ; but evidently the employers took every care to assign work in such a manner as to reduce such losses to a minimum.

Thus our conclusion, according to which the utilization of the working capacity of the agricultural proletariat was 55—60 per cent in annual average,

[84] *Unemployment in Hungarian Agriculture*, The Hungarian Institute for Economic Research, Budapest 1932. (In Hungarian.)

must be rectified in the light of what has been pointed out above. Therefore, the maximum annual utilization of their working capacity should be put at 50 per cent.

According to the same author, also the seasonal demand for labour was uneven in the extreme. Between November and March, the working capacity of the landless labourers and peasants of the under 10 *holds* class was utilized only 20—25 per cent. (This means again that in the case of the landless or dwarf-holder peasants this percentage was even smaller.) Things were not very much better in August and October, when employment reached 50 per cent at the most for the whole category (and was correspondingly less in the case of landless labourers and dwarf-holders). Thus, the peasants who earned their living wholly or mainly as wage labourers were more or less fully employed only five months of the year.

Similar conclusions were drawn by another author.[85]

»Even if we consider the days spent in temporary work and work on a compensation basis« (work done in return for the ploughing of their fields)« this author writes, »no more than 50 per cent may be accepted as the maximum utilization of our agricultural labourers' annual working capacity. By contrast, in 1910, according to official statistics, the day labourers spent 225 days working which means a degree of utilization of at least 80 per cent.« Elsewhere he writes : »Before the war, the farm worker spent an average of 220 days in work, and earned something between P 450 and P 850. Today (i. e. in 1936 — M. I.) he works 150—180 days at the best, and earns P 250—300.«[86]

The bourgeois authors repeatedly pointed out that in Hungary the demand for agricultural labour was determined by the June-July »peak«. During that period practically every working hand was needed and it was only a »natural« consequence of the uneven, seasonal character of farm work that during the rest of the year there was no work for all.[87] But these apologists went wrong right at the point of departure. We are in possession of many data to the effect that many farm workers remained unemployed even during the summer »peak«.

A group of navvies wrote from Jászárokszállás on June 11, 1925, that is, immediately before harvest : »Our situation is most desperate. We want to work, to earn at least a piece of bread for ourselves and our starving children. . . Even in years of good harvest only a few of us are ever taken on as croppers . . . We are all hard-working people, industrious citizens of this country . . . we do

[85] *The Material Conditions of Agricultural Labourers*, by Mihály *Kerék*, The Hungarian Review, Budapest, January 1934. (In Hungarian.)

[86] *Earnings and Living Conditions of Agricultural Labourers*, by Mihály *Kerék*, Hungarian Farmer's Review, Budapest, 1936, pp. 503—504.

[87] Official documents bear ample evidence to the universal acceptance of this apologetic view. »Among the agricultural labourers«, wrote the Agricultural Inspector from Szolnok, »there has been no evidence of unemployment except for the winter months, which is concomitant to agricultural work.« Central Record Office, Min. of Agric., files of 1928—29—, 59247.

not come begging for alms, we ask only for work . . . please get us some work as soon as possible, lest we and our families die of hunger.« [88]

Official reports prove that the number of unemployed was considerable even during harvest. The Agricultural Inspector of Hajdú County reported to the Minister of Agriculture on the 1 of July, 1925 : »At present, the following number of individuals cannot find work either as croppers or thrashers : at Balmazújváros 300—400 men and 100—200 women, at Mikespércs 30—40 men and 20—25 women, at Hajdúsámson 150—180 men and 100—120 women . . . Nádudvar, 250 men and 100 women . . . Unemployment is evident throughout the District of Hajdúböszörmény. In Hajdúböszörmény town 80 men and 71 women have remained out of work ; at Hajdúnánás 120 men, 90 women ; at Hajdúhadház 85 men, 78 women ; at Alsójózsa 200 men, 200 women ; at Felsőjózsa 250 men, 250 women, at Hajdúdorog 600 men, 400 women, and at Téglás 10 men, 10 women remained without work.« [89]

Conditions were not any better in the Transdanubian counties, either. The Chamber of Agriculture for Southern Transdanubia wrote : »The estates in Somogy County are employing farm workers coming from Zala, Vas, Borsod and other counties whilst thousands of workers of Somogy County are out of work and may have nothing to eat when winter comes.«[90]

During the crisis no major structural changes took place in agricultural production which could have considerably modified the amount of labour required by agriculture. The greatest differences in the structure of production may be observed when comparing the years 1930 and 1932. The structural changes and modifications in the demand for labour between these two years are shown by Table 28.

According to Table 28, the growth of the area under maize, potatoes, and turnips and the diminution of fallow land were largely offset by the shrinkage of the area of other intensive cultures (sugar beet, tobacco, vineyards) but, at least theoretically, the demand for labour in agriculture as a whole increased 2 per cent. This, however, refers to the *total* manpower and not to *hired labour*. The change in the latter cannot be estimated for lack of statistics. It is known, however, that the actual structural changes were not favourable for hired labour. Those crops the area of which had been increased were mostly grown by smallholders without hired labour ; on the other hand, the intensive cultures the area of which had shrunk were largely grown on large estates. Thus, only 43 per cent of maize and 33 per cent of all potatoes were grown by big landowners and kulaks, who produced 92 per cent of all sugar beet, 80 per cent of hamp and flax and nearly 100 per cent of tobacco.[91] Therefore, out of the additional 5,8 mil-

[88] Ibidem, 1925—62—27,450.
[89] Ibidem, 1925—62/a—25,203.
[90] Ibidem, 1925—62/a—25,203/27,492.
[91] According to the Farm Statistics of 1935.

TABLE 28

Produce	Required labour (working days per *hold*)	Area (1000 *holds*)		Required labour (millions of working days)	
		1930	1932	1930	1932
Cereals[92]	8,5	5 338	5 102	45,4	43,4
Maize.....	22,0	1 868	2 047	41,1	46,0
Potatoes	23,0	480	518	11,0	11,9
Sugar beet	40,0	130	74	5,2	3,0
Turnips	30,0	191	229	5,7	5,9
Tobacco	160,0	41	40	6,6	6,4
Hemp and flax	20,0	42	25	0,8	0,5
Other hoed crops ...	20,0	240	259	4,8	5,2
Rough fodder crops .	9,0	1116	1 176	10,0	10,8
Fallow	1,0	260	253	0,3	0,3
Arable land	...	9,705	9,723	130,9	134,2
Vineyards	120,0	372	366	44,6	43,9
Total	...	...	...	175,5	178,1

lion working-days required by maize, only 2,4 million was the share of hired labour. On the other hand, 90 per cent of the 3,1 million working days lost in sugar beet, tobacco, hemp and flax affected hired labour. Thus, these structural changes, instead of increasing the demand for hired labour, diminished it by 0,4 million workdays. The shrinkage of the cereal growing area caused a loss of 1 million days, while rough fodder crops and turnips required 0,9 million days more. The decline of 0,7 million days in viticulture hit entirely hired labour. Thus, the demand for hired labour in crop growing and viticulture decreased by 1,2 million work-days. Moreover, it must be taken into consideration that in the meantime the working capacity of the population increased at least by 3 million work-days, as a result of the growth of population.

»Misery . . . compelled the smallholders to utilize their own and their families' working capacity to a greater extent . . . work which formerly would be performed by hired workers they now do by themselves, putting in all their energies . . . Many farms have switched over to a more extensive farming. The limited use of artificial fertilizers diminished also the demand for manpower partly because of the omission of dressing, partly because the crops were poorer.«[93]

There are a number of hints revealing the tendency of the farmers to cut hired labour and increase exploitation of their farm-hands. Mihály *Kerék*, for

[92] Wheat, rye, barley, oats, millet, buckwheat.

[93] *Unemployment in Hungarian Agriculture*, The Hungarian Institute of Economic Research, Budapest, 1932, pp. 25—26. (In Hungarian.)

instance, wrote : »The agricultural depression compels many landowners to have the harvesting done by their permanently employed farm-hands, instead of employing share-croppers, which is relatively more expensive.[94] The effects were that . . . they — the farm hands — have recently been found lacking in calories owing to the fact that their working capacity is taxed to the utmost at a time when there is a tendency to cut their wages.«[95]

That is to say, the wages of farm-hands were cut, and at the same time they were made to perform such jobs which formerly had been done by season workers, day-labourers or share-croppers.

This was the most serious factor tending to intensify agricultural unemployment. Those sections of the working peasantry which before the crisis would have occasionally employed day labourers — mainly at harvest time — now tried to avoid having to do so by excessively taxing their own and their families' working capacity. The kulaks and the big landowners, in their turn, exacted more intensive work from their permanently employed farm-hands in order to restrict the volume of seasonal hired labour and reduce the cost of production.

The effects of this tendency on unemployment cannot be estimated by numbers. But if the big landowners and kulaks succeeded in increasing the performance of their permanent servants only by 10 per cent, — which is a rather cautious estimate — this must have led to a further loss of about 6 million work-days for hired labour. In that case, the utilization of the working capacity of the landless and dwarf-holder peasants was altogether about 10 million days less in 1932 than it had been two years before. And, as we know that in those days the Hungarian farm workers had to live on the earnings of 150 work-days in the whole year, the loss of these 10 million work-days was equivalent to 67 000 labourers having become unemployed. In reality, of course, this loss was spread over much greater masses. It seems therefore that in the two years between 1930 and 1932 at least 200 000 farm workers had lost about one-third of their former total of workdays. Thus, part-time unemployment in Hungarian agriculture became very acute during the crisis.

Another important factor was that, as a result of bad weather, cereal crops were rather poor in 1931 and still poorer in 1932. On farms of over 20 *holds* (farms usually employing share-croppers) about 20 million quintals of wheat, rye, barley and oats were harvested in 1930 ; however, in 1932, their crops totalled only 17,8 million quintals. Even if we suppose that the share of the croppers and thrashers amounted to 11,5 per cent of the crops in either year, it is obvious that in 1932 this share was some 200 000 quintals of grain less than in 1930 ; the share of straw was also correspondingly less. The share of a

[94] Hungarian Farmers' Review, 1936, p. 503.
[95] Ibidem, p. 505.

team of two croppers, which in years with average crops varied from 10 to 12 quintals of wheat, rye and barley, was down to 6—8 quintals in certain regions of the country in 1932.[96] And, whilst the 1930 harvest ensured the annual supply of grain and corn fodder for 180 000—200 000 pairs of share-croppers (that is, at least for so many families), the total share of 1932 was enough to provide only for 162 000—180 000 pairs. Again, in reality, the individual share was considerably reduced. But even so, it is evident that thousands of families earned nothing or next to nothing at the 1932 harvest.

*

When reviewing the conditions of the various categories of agricultural labourers we must begin with the *permanently employed farm hands*. We have already seen that the exploitation of these was intensified during the crisis. Act XLV of 1907 defined the farm labourers as »persons who are engaged by contract to render permanent personal services on a farm at least for a month and are paid wages«. It is the working conditions of farm labourers that were, more than anything else, ridden with the relics of feudalism. One of these features was the contract itself that imposed restrictions on the labourer's freedom of movement. The Farm Labour Act laid down that »the labourer shall not leave the premises of his employment without permission, either on holidays or Sundays, and still less on working days.« If a labourer left »the premises of his service«, without permission, even for a very short time, or discontinued his service »without sound reason«, the employer was entitled to have him brought back by gendarmes. Corporal punishment inflicted by the employer was not generally considered as a »sound reason«.

Labourers whose term of service was specifically fixed by the contract at a period shorter than one year were called »month hands« ; all others were »year hands«. On the big estates the year hands prevailed, while month hands were only engaged as auxiliary labour in the busiest months of the year. On the other hand, the kulaks engaged mainly month hands.

The wages of the year hands were called »convention« and consisted of lodging, the use of a strip of land, payments in kind and some money. The month hands on the kulak farms got their wages mainly in the form of meals, that is, they had to live on the meagre diet prepared for them by the farmer's wife. The position of the latter was worse than that of the labourers on the estates, as in most cases they were engaged only for the summer months and remained without employment in winter. They had to work even harder than their comrades on the estates, for besides farm work they were also made to

[96] *Cf. Facts and Figures about the Material Conditions of Hungarian Agricultural Labourers*, by Mihály *Kerék*, Hungarian Farmers' Review, Budapest, 1933, p. 590.

do every hard work around the house. Most kulaks would only keep one servant who thus lived isolated from his equals, quite at the mercy of his employer.

As for the labourers on the estates, these were envied not only by the almost slaves of the kulaks but also by many »independent« peasants in the crisis years. »You are doing well, — they used to say, — you need not worry about bread and taxes !«[98] Their wages were »secured«. Of course, their wages were not excessive. The »convention« declined from year to year, due to the greed of the employers and the pressure of the reserve army of unemployed.

On a national average, the »full convention«, that is, the annual wages of an able-bodied male labourer comprised, about 1930, the following items :[98]

12 hectolitres of wheat,[99]
8 hectolitres of rye,
4 hectolitres of barley,
the use of 1 *hold* of land,
365 litres of milk,
P 20 in cash.

It is characteristic that the quantities of grain were fixed by the contract in dry measure and not in weight. This also gave the employer an opportunity of fleecing his farm-hands. It is known that the specific weight of grain varies between broad limits. The source here cited converted the hectolitres figuring in the servants' contract into 82 kilograms for wheat, 78 kilograms for rye, and 64 kilograms for barley. By doing so, he grossly overestimated the real quantities. Considering that the best quality wheat quoted at the Budapest Corn Exhange weighed 80 kilograms per hectolitre, it is obvious that not a single estate would have paid its labourers in top quality grain. Converting the hectolitres more reasonably, we find that the labourer was paid, on the average, 9 quintals of wheat, 5,5 quintals of rye, 2,25 quintals of barley. (In many estates, rye was substituted for wheat.)

The money value of the »convention« was a rather controversial issue. From our point of view, more important is the question : how much did it cost the employer? If we value the cereals and milk at farm prices, the use of 1 *hold* of land as yielding two thirds of the average maize crop,[100] and add the money

[97] *People of the Puszta* by Gyula *Illyés*, Budapest, 1936, p. 198. (In Hungarian.)

[98] The Distribution of Income and Taxes in Hungary, Budapest, 1938, p. 19. (In Hungarian.)

[99] One hectolitre = 2,75 bushels, or 22 gallons.

[100] The employer was obliged to provide the ploughing of the plot given to the farm hand ; it was for the latter to procure seed and do all the farming other than ploughing. The farm hands grew mostly maize on these plots. The value of the land given to them under such conditions might be estimated by analogy, because the landowners used to have some of their maize fields tilled by share-croppers. In this case, the latter did all the work except ploughing, against one-third of the maize crop, and two-thirds were the share of the landowner. On this basis, it seems reasonable to consider the »cost« of the labourer's land as equivalent to two-thirds of the average yield of maize.

paid in cash, we find that the cost of the annual wages paid to a farm labourer developped as follows :

TABLE 29

Year	Money value of wages in terms of farm prices	Index number 1924/25—1926/27 = 100	Farm prices 1924/225—1926/27 = 100
1924/1925	786	114	109
1925/1926	638	94	92
1926/1927	648	95	96
1927/1928	700	101	105
1928/1929	585	85	100
1929/1930	555	80	85
1930/1931	474	69	70
1931/1932	386	56	57
1932/1933	313	45	48
1933/1934	246	36	45
1934/1935	343	50	51
1935/1936	338	49	56
1936/1937	383	55	51

Even if one considers that besides receiving wages in kind and cash, the labourer was given some miserable dwelling (we shall deal with the question of dwellings later on) it is still remarkable that the index number of the cost of the labourer's wages were ever since the stabilization below the farm price level. The discrepancy became particularly conspicuous in 1933/34. Then, the labourers' wages cost the employer 36 per cent of what it had cost before the crisis, whilst the prices of farm products sank to 45 per cent of the pre-crisis level. We might add, that the landowners could usually sell their produce at above-the-average prices, and that also their production costs, other than wages, were lower than the average. Clearly, the exploitation of farm hands was intensified during the crisis, even if we disregard the greater intensity of labour.

Moreover, bearing in mind that, in 1933/34 for instance, the daily wage of an able-bodied male farm hand cost the employer hardly more than P 0,80 and comparing this with the wages of day-labourers which amounted to P 1,30—1,40 in annual average, one can see the reason why the landowners tried to cut occasional hired labour in favour of permanently employed farm hands during the crisis. For these extremely low wages the landowners secured, through every farm-hand, the cultivation of about 20 *holds* of arable land and the tending of the corresponding number of livestock, with the exception of harvesting and of certain highly labour-consuming cultures, for which additional labour would be employed.

Of course, from the servant's point of view, his wages in kind represented a higher value than what is shown by Table 29. But this added value was invariably the result of his or his family's labour. It was his wife who baked bread from the quantities of wheat or rye received (of which 10—12 per cent had to be deducted as the miller's fee). The quantities of maize and barley received were converted into pork and lard ; but the servant's family had to spend at least 20 work-days a year cultivating their maize-field, and they had to work very hard to be able to buy a young pig, which then required attending through almost a year.

In practice, even these meagre wages were whittled down in many ways. There was a wide gap between the wages figuring in law or statistics on the one hand, and those actually paid, on the other.

As we may read in an article bearing the revealing title *Minor Complaints of the Village :* »On paper, a farm hand's annual wages are supposed to include 16 quintals of cereals ... the use of 1 *hold* of maize-field, a small garden, a room-and-kitchen dwelling or at least the right to use a common kitchen, fuel, one litre of milk every day, and pasture for his pigs ... The other side of the coin, however, presents a dreadful picture. The worst lands ... are given to the labourers. Not unfrequently gullies or alkaline patches of land are falsely represented as legally fixed wages. There have been cases of skimmed milk being given to the farm-hands ; elsewhere, eosinated wheat was given in wages.«[101]

We might add to these »minor complaints« the housing conditions of farm hands which were notoriously bad. »Month hands«, as a rule, would be put up in stables ; but conditions for the permanently employed »year hands« were not much better either. On many estates the pigsties were more comfortable (not to mention stables) than the miserable hovels the farm hands were living in. Frequently they would have no chimneys, the smoke passing through the door. Particularly backward were the conditions on the estates of the Church. Here, several families would live huddled together in each of the rooms of long-shaped, dilapidated shanties. What an appalling overcrowding this meant can be imagined bearing in mind the fact that most farm labourers had families of six, seven, or even ten.

These housing conditions, added to the growing exploitation of manpower and often the complete lack of compulsory sanitation determined the situation of the farm-hands.

[101] From an article by Béla *Malcomes*, in Hungarian Farmers' Review, Budapest, 1935, p. 560. The term »eosinated wheat« needs some explanation. To favour the big landowners, the Government's grain purchasing agency bought their wheat, paying for it more than the world market price. Afterwards, it resold to them part of this wheat for fodder — at a much lower price. But in order to prevent this cheap wheat from being ground and used for human consumption and thus curtailing one of the Treasury's main sources of revenue from the flour turnover duty, such wheat was coloured with an allegedly harmless red dye called »eosin«, to make checking easier. But the landowners and their stewards did not care much about the interests of the Treasury ; they paid the labourers in the cheap »red wheat« and left it to them to have it ground.

These conditions seriously deteriorated during the crisis, and as there was no considerable improvement afterwards, most of what has been said here hold good also of the 1937 conditions. The deterioration, besides the general intensification of exploitation, presented itself most acutely in the discrepancy between cash earnings and prices. Before the crisis, a farm hand would annually receive, in addition to his wages paid in kind, P 40—50 in cash. During the crisis, this amount was cut by the landowners, on the plea of their own dwindling money incomes, but in a far greater ratio, down to as low as P 20 or even less. These cuts, needless to say, were not in any way suited to the actual changes in the prices of manufactured articles. Besides this sum, the farm hand could make some money by selling dairy produce, eggs, etc., as he kept some poultry, pigs, or a cow, and that part of his corn-wages which he would stint himself with. Thus, the farm hands, too, were seriously affected by the fall of farm prices.

The reasoning of contemporary bourgeois authors that the farm hands, share-croppers or other agricultural season labourers were not hit so hard by the crisis as were the landowners as they continued to be paid in the same quantity of produce as before was utterly fallacious. To begin with, this assertion is at variance with reality, for the wages paid in kind to the farm-hands and other labourers during the crisis *were* substantially less. Secondly, the fallacy of this argument is proved when one realizes the fact that the farm labourers were always compelled to sell a part of the produce they received as wages, in order to be able to buy such prime necessities as salt, kerosene, matches, and a few pieces of clothing. In this respect, their position was even worse than that of the working peasants, for their resources were much more limited. In fact, the wide gap between agricultural and industrial prices weighed down with especial gravity on these sections of the working peasantry.

The wife, children and elder dependants of the farm-hand represented a cheap, disposable bound-to-the-spot reserve of labour for the landowner. They were the worst exploited of all farm labourers, being paid only one-half or even one-fourth of the usual »convention«. Of the 218 000 permanently employed farm-hands returned by the 1930 Census, at least one-third were paid less than the normal wages. They were paid half-wages but were expected to do a full job. When the farm hand became sick or grew too old for work, nothing could save him from being dismissed.

Many letters of complaint written by old farm-hands who were sacked, might be quoted. Among others, the letter written by József *Bodnár*, 54, who was turned out, a helpless sick man, after serving 30 years on the estate of the *Munk* Brothers ; or the letter written by István *Lerner*, 70, who had served 35 years on the Pannonhalma estate of the Benedictine Order and was dismissed without pensions. The most revealing of all these letters perhaps is the one written by József *Nagy*, old farm hand of the Chapter of Szombathely.

»I have a clean record«, he wrote, »but after 44 years of service, they threw me out like some old, worn-out thing, without giving any reason for it. They told me I was now too old for work, so they could not use me any more. They have never told me this in 44 years, but now when I am old, I can just pack up and scram. The best thing I can do is go begging to keep my wife and myself from starving. This is the reward for my service of 44 years.«[102]

It is difficult to tell, however, which section of the agricultural proletariat was harder up. The life of the season workers, too, was miserable enough. These workers hired themselves out in groups of 20—30 on large estates lying far from their homes, for 2 to 6 months. The landowners willingly employed such labourers for they could be most easily exploited. Coming from far-away regions of the country, these labourers, mostly young lads and girls, worked under inhuman conditions, almost as slaves. Unable to afford the travelling expenses, they could not run away, and were being strictly guarded anyway.

In the spring of 1925, 126 labourers from the villages round Monor (Hosszúberekpéteri, Káva, Bénye, Pilis, Albertirsa) hired themselves out for two months on the Ercsi farm of Messrs. Grünwald Bros. and Schiffer. There the food was so bad, the working conditions and treatment so inhuman that after a few weeks they broke down and had to quit. We read in a report on this case : »The workers are so extremely underfed that some of them broke down and ran away a few weeks ago. The bread is, in most cases, half-baked ; flour and leaven are prepared incompetently, so the bread is unfit for human consumption. The meat is bad ... on top of this all is the brutality of their foreman, György *Fazekas*, who frequently beats the workers, men and women alike. Recently he repeatedly slapped Mária *Bániczky*, of Pilis, in the face and hit Mária *Halápi*, also of Pilis, over the head with a stick.«[103]

The plight of the season workers is most strikingly described in the July, 1927 report of the »National Defence Service League« of Fejér County. »In a conversation, which I happened to hear, the steward of an estate related how season workers from Heves County, who were war-veterans, told their younger comrades how many of their own officers they had shot during the war. They told these young people to turn their rifles back, should they ever be sent to the front ... These people are forced to live under really beastly conditions on some estates where they work for six months. Women, girls, men, and lads live crowded together in a single room ...«[104]

*

There are another two important forms of agricultural labour which are to be distinguished sharply from each other. These are share-cropping and share-

[102] Central Record Office, Min. of Agric., files of 77—36810—1928, 77—34222—1928, 77—37518—1928.
[103] Ibidem, 62—27449—1928.
[104] Ibidem, 62—111242—1927.

farming. In the former case, the labourer performed one or more operations of the cultivation of some crop for a certain share of the harvest. In the latter case, the labourer leased some tract of land, paying the rent in kind, that is, he paid over to the landowner a certain share of the crop.

In the first category, the most widespread and, from the labourer's point of view, most important kind of work was the reaping and thrashing of cereals. But working for shares was quite widespread also in other agricultural activities. On the eve of the crisis, share-croppers were responsible for the performing of the following percentages of the agricultural activities indicated:[105]

Reaping of cereals	100	per	cent
Thrashing	90	«	«
Tillage of maize	77	«	«
First and second hay mowing	64	«	«
Tillage of turnips	60	«	«
Tillage of potatoes	45	«	«

»We have been giving our special attention to the extensive use of share-labour«, wrote the Central Chamber of Agriculture in their 1928 Report. »In our report last year we observed that share-labour was gaining ground rapidly and in certain parts of the country was more widely used than before the war.«[106]

The report also tells us the reason why the C. C. A. were giving their »special attention« to the extensive use of share-labour. The wide spread of share-labour was in harmony with the interests of the big landowners and the kulaks. In the first line, it was a suitable way to increase the intensity of labour. With share-labour, there was no need to drive the labourers. They did what they could in the hope of earning more.

»The performance of the day-labourers and, to a lesser extent, of season workers has fallen«, wrote the Central Chamber of Agriculture in 1929. This induced the landowners »to substitute these forms of labour by others which made it possible to save the trouble of increased control.«[107]

Not only were costs saved by this method; it also secured additional gain for the landowner. He was well acquainted with the tillage conditions and productivity of the piece of land in question, the labourers were not. So it was easy for him to conclude advantageous contracts.

Another important factor behind the spreading of this method was — in the words of the Central Chamber of Agriculture — »the extreme lack of capital, permitting only such methods of production ... which require no capital-investments. Moreover, the lack of capital has often compelled the landowners to change their farming and crop rotation system and switch over to the growing

[105] 1928 Report of the Central Chamber of Agriculture, pp. 177—178.
[106] Ibidem, p. 158.
[107] 1929 Report of the Central Chamber of Agriculture, p. 158.

of such crops as are suited for cultivation through share-labour.«[108] This is an admission of the fact that for the landowners the increased exploitation of the »three million beggars« was a more profitable way of farming than the alternative of rationalising, mechanising and intensifying agriculture. J. V. Stalin's words may be applied also to Hungary's agriculture under capitalism : »Capitalism is in favour of new techniques when they promise it the highest profit. Capitalism is against new techniques, and for resort to hand labour, when the new techniques no longer promise the highest profit.«[109]

The reapers' share was repeatedly cut. Before the First World War, the share was one-tenth of the cereal crops. In the counter-revolutionary period the share went down to one-eleventh in general, but shares of one-thirteenth were also frequently stipulated already in the 1920's. For instance, the Government farm inspector reported from Körmend, Vas County, Western Hungary, in 1925 that in his district croppers received shares of one-thirteenth of the crop ; and in addition, 30 kilograms of rye, 5 kilograms of wheat, 1 kilogram of fat, 1 kilogram of beans and 1 kilogram of salt per man as victuals for the weeks of the harvest. Half a yoke of land was given them for use, or they could undertake the tillage of maize or potatoe fields for one-third of the crop, or make hay for one-sixth. But they were bound by contract to undertake lumbering during winter for one-half of the root and log.

In the district of Vasvár, Vas County, share-reapers contracted on similar terms. Here too, the contract was linked with socage. »In winter they are obliged to do lumbering«, reported the Government inspector of Szombathely, »for which they get one-half of the log and root, and they may buy firewood at a reduced price and in quantities fixed as by the contract. As an additional service, they are obliged to gather in maize, potatoes, sugar beet, turnips etc. against normal, current day-wages.«[110]

For thrashing (by machine) the workers usually got 3 per cent of the thrashed crops. For the tillage of maize, sugar beet and potatoes through the whole season they were paid one-third or one-fourth of the crop.

It was a common method of exploiting the reapers to oblige them to perform, besides reaping and thrashing, various other farm works. These were works for which — either because they were extremely fatiguing or because they coincided with other works — day-labourers were not available, or would only contract for relatively high wages to perform. On the other hand, the share-croppers, anxious to secure for themselves a contract and by this, their bread for the winter, could not refuse undertaking these works, even at wages which were far below the normal day-wages.

[108] Report of the Central Chamber of Agriculture, p. 178.
[109] *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U. S. S. R.* by J. *Stalin*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1953, pp. 45—46.
[110] Ibidem, 62/c—18000/72840—1926.

The Government farm inspector of Szombathely, however, thought there was nothing wrong about such practices. In his letter of March, 1927, in which he reported to the Minister of Agriculture on the day-wages paid in his district in January, which were P 1,60—1,80 for men, P 1,20—1,40 for women, and P 0,80 for children, he wrote : »The day-wages which I have had the honour to report on are in fact rather low. But the local inspectors find these wages satisfactory. This view seems to be warranted by the circumstance that the labourers are in fact willing to hire themselves out for such wages, which is explained by the fact that most of them earn their living in other seasons of the year, either as so-called season workers, or by harvesting, thrashing, and other share-jobs.«[111] In other words, as they do earn a living »in other seasons of the year«, they can well afford to work for next to nothing in winter.

The Central Chamber of Agriculture even went as far as to regard this type of socage-service as a pre-condition of the reapers' contract ; »Labourers will be taken on only if they undertake to render other farm services as well.«[112].

The hardships of the share-croppers are described in poignant pages by Gyula *Illyés :* »They tried to save up as much of their daily rations as they could manage. In their far-away homes, broods of children were looking to them for bread. So they ate little that they might send home as much as possible ... On Sundays they would only take one meal. They thought up an ingenious method of saving up bread. They were each entitled to half a loaf of bread a day. Those who did not draw their bread rations received from the farmer a small piece of wood with his signature written on in ink-pencil. These chips of wood were a kind of token money, which could be redeemed any time, for certain quantities of flour and potatoes issued by the cook. These »piles« were made, indeed, from what they could stint themselves with! There were men who could in this way manage to save up three or four loaves of bread in a month. Lard was issued in weekly rations. Here saving was done on a free competition basis. The pieces strung up above the bunks would show the champion of the week.«[113]

The share-farmers were usually dwarf-holders or landless peasants. As a rule, they would pay over to the landowner half of the crop. This rent represented a scarcely modified form of the feudal rent in kind, the only difference being that it was based on contract and not on personal dependence. But even the latter survived in many forms. The tenant was formally a free man ; in reality he had even less freedom than the wage-labourer who was »free« to sell his labour-power. He was bound to the spot by his own dwarf-

[111] Ibidem, 62—50019—1927.
[112] 1929 Report of the Central Chamber of Agriculture, p. 181.
[113] *People of the Puszta* by Gyula *Illyés*, Budapest 1936, pp. 249—250.

holding of one or two *holds*, so he could only lease land somewhere in the neighbourhood. The landowners, kulaks, were alive to this difficulty of his and were not slow to take advantage of it, in a way which was very much like the personal dependence of the feudal age. They decided for him what and when to sow, when to start harvesting, when and which lots to dress with manure, and so forth. Besides, the tenant and his family had to »oblige« the landowner with small gifts and various household services to make sure that he can keep that humble lease.

*

Day-labour paid in cash, as has been pointed out, declined sharply during the crisis. The Central Chamber of Agriculture[114] stated that day-labourers represented less than 20 per cent of all hired labour in agriculture.

Day-wages remained, however, an important factor, as 20 per cent of the whole volume of hired labour was equivalent to the full annual wages of 60 000 agricultural labourers. In reality, much more people were concerned because the average day-labourer had no opportunity to perform more than 80—100 working-days annually against money wages. During the season they went out for harvesting or other contractual work, while in other parts of the year it was practically impossible for them to find work.

Statistics on agricultural wages were compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture on the basis of reports made by the Government farm inspectors. The figures of these statistics were often challenged. In their annual reports the Central Chamber of Agriculture repeatedly stated that, according to their own statistics, the daily wages were 20—25 per cent lower than those figuring in the Ministry of Agriculture's statistics.[115]

Daily wages, however, varied over an extremely wide range according to season, place and even to the extent of poverty of the labourer. Thus, a fair treatment of the wage issue would have been an insoluble task for statisticians in those days even if class interests had not required some »doctoring« of the figures. The figures of Table 30 are presented only to show what was the extent of wage reduction the Ministry of Agriculture deemed *inevitable* to publish. They are annual averages computed from the figures of the four quarters by methods which are not known to us.[116]

The extent of reduction which even the authorities felt inevitable to disclose was in itself serious enough to deserve attention. It is especially evident when in order to eliminate the possible distortion caused by that unknown method of averaging, one compares only the wages paid to men (apparently the highest wages) in the same season (summer) each year.

[114] 1927—1930 Reports of the C. C. A.
[115] Cf. 1932 Report of the C. C. A., p. 230.
[116] 1935 Report of the Central Chamber of Agriculture, p. 282.

TABLE 30

1913	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934
day-wages, annual averages, in Pengoes							
Men							
2,70	3,12	3,08	2,68	2,28	1,72	1,38	1,37
Women							
1,88	2,35	2,28	1,90	1,67	1,28	1,02	1,02
Children							
1,36	1,60	1,62	1,40	1,17	0,93	0,70	0,67

Table 31 compares these wages to the most important item of the working man's budget, the expenditure on clothing articles.[117]

TABLE 31

Year	Daily wages in summer for men (Statistics of the Central Chamber of Agr.)			Retail prices of clothing articles		Quantity of clothing articles obtainable with the day-wages	
	P	1913 = 100	1929 = 100	1913 = 100	1929 = 100	1913 = 100	1929 = 100
1913.....	3,92	100	—	100	—	100	—
1929.....	4,30	110	100	132	100	83	100
1930.....	3,60	92	84	127	96	72	87
1931.....	3,20	82	74	116	88	71	86
1932.....	2,40	61	56	111	84	55	66
1933.....	1,80	46	42	103	78	45	54
1934.....	1,70	43	40	102	77	42	51
1935.....	1,70	43	40	103	78	42	51
1936.....	1,80	46	42	117	89	40	48
1937.....	2,50	64	58	136	103	47	57

Even in 1929, when the agricultural price level and the total money income of agriculture were at their highest between the two wars, even the nominal value of the summer day-wages for men, — that is, the highest of wages each year — exceeded the 1913 level by only 10 per cent ; but their real value — on

[117] We have chosen the clothing expenditure for this purpose because most agricultura labourers earned day-wages only during one part of the year ; the rest of the year they went share-cropping, or doing other share-jobs, share-farming, or else they tilled their own strip of land. In this way some meagre quantity of food for their family and themselves was provided while the cash they earned with day-labour mainly went to cover the expenditures for clothing and other indispensable manufactured articles.

the basis of the retail prices for clothing — was by 17 per cent lower. Between 1929 and 1933/34 the nominal day-wages dropped by 60 per cent which represented a sharper decline than that of the total money income of agriculture, and even in 1937 were still 42 per cent below the 1929 level. The trend of real wages was no more favourable. In 1933 the agricultural day labourer could not buy half the quantity of clothing articles which he had been able to buy in 1913 from the wages earned for the same amount of work.

But the amount of work did not remain the same. The day-labourers were compelled by various means to increase the intensity of labour. The landowners had the large reserve army of unemployed, to select the best labourers from. On the other hand, they frequently engaged women and children at still lower wages to do the work which had formerly been performed by men.

In the autumn of 1932 Mihály *Kerék* collected the household budget figures of 96 agricultural day-workers' families from three different regions of the country.[118] We present here only a summary of his investigations. The average number of persons in the 96 families was 5,5. The average income of a family for the whole of 1932 consisted of: P 69,10 as earnings from reaping, P 137,70 as other wage earnings and P 112,00 as income from own land and livestock. From a total income of P 318,80, P 191 should have been paid out for taxes and debts during 1932, (P 19,70 on interests, P 61,00 on tax arrears, P 85,00 on other liabilities, and P 25,30 on 1932 taxes). Of these liabilities an average of only P 28,70 was actually paid in 1932. This means that in one year, the indebtedness of the average day worker rose by P 162,30, or more than half of what he and his family earned. Thus, for the living costs of the average family P 290,10 remained, partly in cash and partly in food earned in kind or produced by themselves. This worked out at P 0,79 a day for the family, or P 0,14 for each person.

Even considering that some of these families lived in their own cottages, thus having to pay »only« the taxes and perhaps the amortization of some loan, and that the money value of food earned or produced was computed at the extremely low prices of 1932, this basis of existence is still startingly low. By way of comparison, it may be recalled that in 1932, according to the index numbers published by the Trade Union Council, a Budapest factory worker's family of five needed P 1,62 per head and day (excluding rent) to maintain the minimum subsistence level and that, according to our estimates, about half of this sum was actually spent by the average Budapest factory workers. (See Tables 15 and 18.)

[118] *Facts and Figures about the Living Conditions of Hungarian Farm Workers' Families* by Mihály *Kerék*, Hungarian Farmers' Review, 1933, p. 590.

Having reviewed the conditions of the agricultural proletariat living entirely or chiefly by wage labour, we shall now proceed to examine the position of the middle peasantry.[119]

The bourgeois economists of the Horthy-Regime were generally agreed that the so called »viable size« of peasant farm holdings was about 15 *holds* of land of average fertility.[120] This type of farm was considered in the contemporary literature as sufficient to provide a peasant family with food and with the necessary money income, so that they were not compelled either to hire themselves out, or to employ labour except at the time of harvest.

We have taken this »viable type of farm« as the basis of our investigations of the conditions of the middle peasantry during the crisis. It is supposed that this imaginary farm was organized and run in as rational a way as was feasible for working peasants under the given conditions. We are going to present here the effects of the crisis on this imaginary farm and on the life of the family living on it. Our figures are the results of most careful calculations which included the farming plan, crop rotation, foraging, fertilization estimates, etc. of this imaginary farm, as well as detailed estimates regarding the possible level of nutrition, clothing of the family and their purchases of various manufactured articles for productive or consumption purposes.

In our investigation we have been guided by the well-known teaching of Lenin: »in regard to all and sundry comparisons between the remunerativeness of small farms and that of big farms, we must once and for all admit that conclusions which leave out the following three circumstances are absolutely useless, vulgar and apologetic; *viz.* : 1. How does the *farmer* feed, live and work? 2. How are the *cattle* maintained and worked? 3. How is the *land* fertilized and is it tilled in a rational manner?«[120a]

The conjectures of this theoretical example are based in every respect on most favourable conditions of working peasants in the surveyed period.[121]

[119] The following part of this article is based on the detailed investigations carried out by the former Institute of Political Economy.

[120] Arable land of average fertility was the category the net income of which was rated in the land-register at 11 gold crowns per *hold*.

[120a] Lenin, *Collected Works*, London, Martin Lawrence, Ltd., Vol. IV., Book 1., pp. 247—248.

[121] This peasant farm of 15 *holds* is supposed to have consisted of 12 *holds* of arable land (average fertility), 1 *hold* of meadow, 1 *hold* of pasture, and 1 *hold* of vegetable garden. Farming is supposed to have been done on the lines of the crop rotation system with wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize, potatoes, sugar beet, turnips, peas, lucerne as principal crops, and beans, pumpkins, poppy and fodder maize as companion or second crops. Moreover, the garden produced enough onions, cabbages and other vegetables for the household. It is supposed that all hectare yields each year equalled the national average for the corresponding culture (that is, they were somewhat higher than the actual averages of farms of under 20 *holds)*. Two horses, one cow, one sow, 15 brood-hens, four brood-geese and four brood-ducks, and a corresponding number of males were kept. The milk production is supposed to have been higher than the average of peasant farms, part of it being marketed. Of the farrows, one was fattened for the household, another one (or two in such years when there was enough fodder), for the market, the rest were sold either as farrows, or at the age of 6—8 months. The marketing of poultry and eggs was also considerable. Thus, a good part of the crops grown was sold in the form of animal products. The produce

Let us now figure out how this family, farming under conditions which contemporary bourgeois economists conceived to be as ideal, would have fared amid the tempest of the crisis.

The first column in Table 32 shows the total net production (with allowance made for farming purposes e. g. seeds, fodder, etc.). This was the quantity of produce available either for marketing or for household consumption. The second column shows the quantity marketed.[122]

TABLE 32

Year	Net production (produce consumed or marketed)	Produce marketed	Produce marketed in percentages of net production
	in Pengős (at 1925—1927 prices)		
1925....	2616	1764	67
1926....	2497	1645	66
1927....	2370	1517	64
1928....	2380	1533	64
1929....	2424	1572	65
1930....	2276	1423	63
1931....	2148	1296	60
1932....	2368	1516	64
1933....	2633	1781	68
1934....	2379	1527	64
1935....	2268	1416	62
1936....	2620	1768	68
1937....	2575	1723	67

The first column shows a relative stability. Compared with the average of 1925—1927, the fluctuation was largest in 1931 (14 per cent less), in 1930 and in 1935 (9 per cent less in both years). In all the other years the fluctuations never exceeded 5—6 per cent in either direction; the best years were 1933, 1936 and 1925.

These fluctuations are much narrower than those we find in the volume of the country's agricultural production as a whole, because the production of

was invariably marketed at yearly national average farm prices. About one-third of all food produced for human consumption was consumed by the family, which consisted of the farmer, his wife, son (15) and daughter (12). Their diet was slightly better than the national average, but did not attain the biological optimum (there was a lack in fats and in animal protein). The family is supposed to have been completely free of debts. Hired labour they would only employ during harvest.

[122] In order to show the *quantitative* changes, all produce was valued at constant prices (farm prices, national average for 1925—1927). The table contains no separate column for household consumption, because this is supposed to have been constant; its value at 1925—1927 prices amounted to P 852.

this farm was more varied and well-balanced. Of course, the marketed quantity fluctuated more sharply because household consumption remained constant.

The fluctuations are, however, found to have been rather considerable if the marketed quantities are valued at *actual* farm prices. During and after the crisis there was a wide gap between the actual money income of the farmer and the »value« of the marketed produce computed at constant prices. (See Table 33.)

Whilst the weather did, to a certain extent, influence the volume of marketed produce and, consequently, the money income (see columns 1 and 2 of Table 33), it was more decisively influenced by the price fluctuations, so

TABLE 33

Year	Marketed produce valued at				Index numbers of marketing prices 1925—1927=100
	constant prices		actual prices		
	pengő	1925-1927=100	pengő	1925-1927=100	
1925....	1764	107,4	1740	106,1	98,8
1926....	1645	100,2	1605	97,9	97,7
1927....	1517	92,4	1573	95,9	103,8
1928....	1533	93,4	1484	90,5	96,9
1929....	1572	95,7	1401	85,5	89,3
1930....	1423	86,3	1164	71,0	82,1
1931....	1296	78,6	907	55,3	70,3
1932....	1516	92,0	865	52,8	57,4
1933....	1780	108,1	920	56,1	51,9
1934....	1527	92,6	760	46,4	50,0
1935....	1416	85,8	745	45,4	52,9
1936....	1768	107,3	1121	68,4	65,8
1937....	1723	104,5	1154	70,4	67,2

that the actual value of the produce sold fell extremely sharply (see columns 3—4). The last column of Table 33 indicates the average marketing *price level* of this farm which sank exactly by 50 per cent between the basis period and 1934. And, as also the weather was exceptionally bad in 1934 (and in 1935), it was in those two years, and not in 1933, that the money income was lowest, being 46 and 45 per cent, respectively, of the basis period.

Now we have to examine for what purposes this money income was used. In the first place, part of the *production costs* and the *taxes* had to be paid. As they had no *debts*, the balance could be expended either for *consumption* or for *investments*.

Concerning the tax burden and production costs of the farm in question we may refer to Table 26 which is based on the same study.[123] Suffice it to point out that the production costs which had to be paid in money (chiefly purchases of manufactured goods, veterinary's fees, insurance charges, etc.) dropped to a smaller extent than did the money income. The latter at its lowest point (1934—1935) fell to 45 per cent of the basis level. At that time, production costs were rising again : in 1934 and 1935 they amounted to 68 per cent and 71 per cent of the basis level. Consequently, the sum remaining after deduction of production costs fell much more sharply than did the total money income ; it reached its lowest point in 1935, at 40 per cent of the basis level.

This effect received added momentum on account of the rigidity of taxation. (The direct taxes burdening this imaginary farm are shown in Table 26.) Therefore, after deduction of taxes, the remainder of the money income diminished to a still greater extent. Even in 1933, in spite of a very good harvest, it was not more than 46 per cent of the basis level, and shrank to 35 per cent and 30 per cent in 1934 and 1935.

Thus, the money to be freely used, which resulted from the »ideal« farming methods employed by this peasant family, fell to less than one-third of what it had been before the crisis.

It is with this rate of reduction in our family's budget that we have to compare *the prices of consumer goods* which were necessary for our peasant family. The first item of these consists of what would be called *minor shopping expenditures.* The study on which this investigation is based, restricted this group to a possible minimum.[124] All these articles became scarcely any cheaper during the crisis. Their combined annual prices were always somewhere about P 100 ; so that whilst before the crisis they absorbed only about 10 per cent of the family budget, later on they rose to one-fifth, and in 1935, one-fourth.

The second item is *clothing* expenses. Here, too, only the most moderate needs were taken into consideration.[125]

[123] For technical reasons, money costs of production were not shown separately in Table 26. They are the difference between the figures of the first and third columns of the table. For convenience, we give here the pengő values in the order of the years from 1925 to 1937 : 280, 273, 253, 226, 246, 195, 184, 179, 199, 190, 200.

[124] Apart from minimum quantities of salt, yeast, vinegar, and spices, the said study accorded no more than 22 kilograms of sugar a year to the whole family (that is, 5,5 kilograms per capita, which is exactly one-half of the national average of sugar-consumption during 1930—1934), 1,5 kilogram of coffee substitute, and some minimum quantities of kerosene, candles, matches, and soap (or caustic soda if soap was made at home).

[125] The farmer and his son were each supposed to wear the same »Sunday best«, an overcoat and a hat over many years (grown out suits of the boy were supposed to be sold or bartered), while at work they each wore the same cheap working-clothes over two years. The woman and her daughter were supposed to make their own dresses, one each year (alternatively a summer or winter dress); only overcoats and shawls were bought ready-made. Underwear and bed-linen were also made at home. The purchases of, and mending expenses for, footwear were also very moderately estimated.

How very moderate this estimate of clothing expenses was can be seen from the fact that the index number given by the Trade Unions' Council for the minimum clothing expenses of a workers' family of five was estimated at P 703 per annum for 1925—1927, whilst the estimates on which our study is based envisaged only half of this amount for the same period, considering that peasant clothes were cheaper than urbane ones (the more so as some of the former were home-made), and that our peasant family comprised only four members. For later years, this basic amount of clothing expenses was modified in proportion to the changes of the T. U. C. clothing index number. Thus, one may rest assured that the estimate of clothing expenses in this study is by no means a liberal one, as the last thing a Right-wing socialdemocrat-controlled T. U. C. would do is to publish figures showing that the living conditions of the workers are intolerable. It is obvious that the clothing expenditures as calculated by the T. U. C. were most moderate. Our study, however, reckons only with an amount representing one-half of the T. U. C. clothing expenses, or more precisely, 60 per cent of them if we consider the difference in the number of children.

Table 34 gives a more complete picture of the effects of the crisis upon the conditions of the working peasants. The prices of consumer goods were even more rigid than the prices of production goods. Between the basis period and 1932, there was only a reduction of 3 per cent in the expenditure for consumers' goods, whereas at the same time, the money income was nearly halved.

Thus, while before the crisis it had been possible for this peasant family to pay the taxes, secure a more or less satisfactory diet, cover the (very restricted) needs of consumers' goods and still have an unexpended balance of P 500—600: this balance shrank to two-thirds already in 1929, to less than one-third in 1930, and was transformed into an annual deficit of about P 100 in the next five years (except the year 1933 when a very good harvest brought a small »surplus«). In order to be able to judge what this change meant to our family, we must consider that in 1931, 1932, 1934 and 1935, when the deficit was about P 100, they found themselves faced with the alternative of cutting their very modest clothing expenses by 40 per cent, or tightening their belts, in order to cover the deficit by marketing part of their own food. In the latter case, a very serious restriction would have been necessary because, for instance in 1935, the actual value of *all* home-produced food consumed by the family amounted only to P 478. Thus, only a reduction of more than 20 per cent of the diet could have covered the deficit. This must have led to serious malnutrition, for in such cases the cuts are made, as a rule, in the consumption of milk, eggs, poultry etc., that is foodstuffs that contain the most valuable proteins and vitamins.

In reality, most working peasants applied both »solutions« combined: they were worse-fed and worse-clad than before.

TABLE 34

Year	Cash in hand pengő	Total consumption expenses 1925—1927=100		Surplus (+ or deficit (—) pengő
1925.....	1242	600	109,6	+ 641
1926.....	1096	532	97,2	+ 564
1927.....	1085	511	93,3	+ 574
1928.....	993	543	99,1	+ 450
1929.....	930	556	101,4	+ 374
1930.....	739	564	103,0	+ 175
1931.....	466	557	101,7	— 91
1932.....	468	531	96,9	— 63
1933.....	530	485	88,4	+ 45
1934.....	371	461	84,1	— 90
1935.....	343	444	80,1	— 101
1936.....	719	472	86,1	+ 247
1937.....	724	502	91,6	+ 222

The picture is not quite complete as yet. If we say that between 1931 and 1935 both the diet and the clothing needs of our family of working middle-peasants had to be cut drastically by about 10 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively, this statement is true only on the understanding that, between 1931 and 1935, these people :

1. did not spend a penny on replacement of their farm implements or household goods ; 2. were spared misfortunes such as serious illnesses, losses of livestock, or some great loss of income ; 3. had no dependants to keep besides their own two children ; 4. had no debts whatever.

*

These reservations most clearly show that this »imaginary family« of ours were living under conditions which were more favourable than the average. Accordingly, most working peasant families had their living standards even more sharply reduced.

The question may arise whether it would be possible to assay the effects of the most important aggravating factors. There are, as a matter of fact, no real chances of such an appraisal being given. What could be done is only to charge the budget of the family with the replacement costs of their farm implements and household goods, with the probable value of livestock losses and of similar misfortunes, with the keep of a third child or of an aged family member, with the average liabilities of a farm of this size, or even with the per capita expenditure on spirits and tobacco (the latter two items alone would amount to P 40—50 a year!).

These additional conjectures, however, would not make our example more »typical«, just as the horse depicted in some veterinary text-books as bearing the symptoms of every known horse-disease is not typical. On the contrary, we should thus obscure the very important process called »the differentiation of small commodity producers«. It is known that the small commodity producers farm with *different* efficiency and luck. Some of them contract debts (and if so, then their debts probably exceed the »average« because some others have no debts) ; some are afflicted with more adversities than the rest ; some have a leaning towards profiteering, others have not, and so on. What should be stressed is the fact that *the process of differentiation among the middle-peasants went on with singular rapidity during the crisis and in the two years following it, because of the extremely narrowed remunerativeness ;* and this fact is fairly well demonstrated also by our example.

However, the circumstances enumerated above under 1—4 are of great importance. Being acquainted with these conditions, one is permitted a fuller understanding of how precarious was the position of the middle peasant farms during and after the crisis, even if they were run most efficiently. Therefore it is worth while to examine them one by one.

We have not as yet gone into the problem of replacement and investment. Even so it goes without saying that the amount of P 500—600 which before the crisis remained for this peasant family after deduction of production costs, taxes and consumption expenses, did not ensure any possibility of expanded reproduction. Every penny of this sum was needed to keep the farm going more or less on a steady level, and to enable the family to recover — at the price of a couple of years of hard privations — from such misfortunes as a serious illness[126] in the family or the loss of a horse, or a cow, or a sow. All this was not easily done even before the crisis. The cost price of the agricultural implements of our farm may be estimated at P 2000, their average length of life being 10 years, the annual replacement costs of implements may have been about P 200, and those of the livestock, P 200—300.[127]

[126] »There is documentary evidence to the effect that the illness of a six-year-old child lasting six months devoured the house and six *holds* of land of a family of three earning men and of four able-bodied women in Veszprém County«, — wrote Béla *Malcomes*, in *Hungarian Farmers' Review*, Budapest, 1935, p. 358. It is obvious from the text that the illness devoured at first all that could be afforded from the income of six *holds* and from the earnings of seven workers, and *in addition*, ate up the house and the land as well.

[127] In 1929 (and on the whole also in the preceding years) the wholesale price of a plough was P 85, that of the cheapest sowing machine P 630, of a corn-sbeller P 107, of a corn grinder P 175. The modest furniture and kitchen equipment also required some replacement from time to time, something had to be spent on the reparation of the cottage, stable, sties, maize shed etc. One light draught-horse cost P 250—500 according to quality, a milch cow P 300—400. Thus, for the amortization of the price of two horses and one cow P 100—150 must have been saved annually through 8—10 years, or, as another alternative, the aged animals could have been replaced by home-bred young ones. In the latter case, money expenditure would have been less, but the fodder stock would have been heavily taxed, with the result of a serious reduction in the marketable quantity of produce for two or three years.

All in all, the annual replacement of production equipment would have cost P 400—500 before the crisis. But the prices quoted above also give an idea of the serious difficulty the possible death of, say, a horse or a cow would lead to. Even the death of a sow or a porker would reduce the income by P 150.

When comparing the extent of the possible losses[128] with the annual »unexpended balance« of the pre-crisis years, it becomes obvious that even in this period it was not very easy for the middle-peasant to secure the necessary replacement. Little was needed to throw him into serious troubles, to compel him to sell part of his land and then gradually sink to the ranks of the poor peasantry. It is in the light of this very precarious situation, which prevailed even before the crisis and even on the best peasant farms, that one may judge what hardships the shrinking of the »money surplus«, and its eventual transformation into a deficit,[129] during and following the crisis, spelt for farms of this size.

This meant, first of all, that from the middle of 1930 right up to the beginning of the Second World War the possibility of replacing the implements and buildings in the required degree, or in many years of merely keeping them in good repair, was ruled out even in such expertly-run, absolutely unencumbered middle-peasant farms. Any such expenditure could have been covered only at the expense of the level of nutrition and clothing which was in itself unsatisfactory. But in most cases even the most severe retrenchment could not have secured an adequate replacement of the means of production, that is, simple reproduction. Of expanded reproduction no middle-peasant could even dream.

Secondly, this meant that any serious illness of a family member, or loss of livestock or other such misfortunes must inevitably spelt ruin even for middle peasants farming most efficiently under the given conditions. If their cow died they were compelled to save up every penny over two or three years to buy another ; and in the meantime, there was no milk to consume or to sell. If it was one of their porkers that died, then either the family had to go without fat and meat for a year, or their money income was reduced by 20 per cent. If one of their two horses died, very probably they could never afford to buy another. They had to be contended with one horse, to wearing it down before time through overworking. As a result, the land was tilled badly, and the crops were poor, partly because of less farmyard manure, and they could not afford to buy artificial fertilizers. And if it was their only horse that died, they had to turn to the kulak or the big landowner to have their land ploughed for one quintal of wheat per *hold*. Thus, to secure the ploughing of 12 *holds*, the family was compelled to part with 20 per cent of their money income (or only 10 per cent if they cut their consumption of bread by half).

[128] Damages done by fire or hail are here disregarded, for insurance charges are included in the production costs.

[129] It should be noted that not even after 1936 was there a »money surplus« of the extent prevalent in the pre-crisis years, for the rise in farm prices could not then keep pace with the rise in the prices of manufactured goods and in taxes.

This form of exploitation would soon be followed by others : of grain or money loans, they would contract debts with the shopkeeper, and would start hiring themselves out, hired labour, each of which represented a new step on the downhill road on which there was no stopping any more.

We should also make a brief inquiry as to how things would have worked out, had our imaginary family had an *additional child or an old dependant to keep*. In our original investigation the family consisted of only four persons all of whom were able-bodied and capable of work. Besides the farmer and his wife, their 15 year old son took his full share of farm and household work; the daughter, 12, who still went to school, would also take part in farm work during the busy season and help in the household too, taking care of poultry etc. Thus, this family had no dependants to keep who were incapable of work. For the country as a whole, the average situation was different. According to a 1943[130] statistics, Hungarian middle-peasant families had, on the average, 4,5 members. 17 per cent of the total population of middle-peasant families was children under 12 years, and 8,1 per cent was people over 66 years or otherwise incapable of work. Thus, about one-fourth of this population did not take part in productive work.

Supposing that our family had a third child of, say, 9 years or an old dependant to keep, we find that they were much worse off. The child would have been the greater burden. In the first place, a considerable proportion of the money income would have been lost as they would have had less produce to sell. Secondly, additional shop and school expenses would have resulted. In this case the »money surplus« or deficit would be modified in the following way :

As may be seen, the keeping of a third child caused serious difficulties in the family budget. Even in the years 1925—1927 there hardly remained enough money for a normal replacement of implements and livestock. Middle-peasant families with the same number of, or more, members had to live even in the best three years partly by living up their property. Such families were in a serious difficulty already in 1929—1930, and from 1931 on they had a life full of cares. The money income was never — not even in the good harvest year 1933 — enough to cover the production and consumption expenses, not to mention replacements. In some years it was so low that the family was compelled to cut its clothing expenses by 40—80 per cent if they wanted to keep up their former nutrition level ; or else, if they wanted to keep their former level in clothing, they were compelled to sell over one-half of the food they used to consume themselves. Of course, practically neither of these alternatives presented itself in such an extreme form ; but it is obvious that such families were compelled strictly to reduce both their diet and clothing at the same time, without being left anything for replacement costs.

[130] Eleventh report of the former Institute for Agricultural Policy, Budapest, 1943, p. 5. (In Hungarian.)

TABLE 35

Year	Surplus or deficit (in Pengoes) of Families with	
	two children	three children
1925....	+ 641	+ 426
1926....	+ 564	+ 355
1927....	+ 574	+ 367
1928....	+ 450	+ 230
1929....	+ 374	+ 184
1930....	+ 175	+ 95
1931....	— 91	— 165
1932....	— 63	— 215
1933....	+ 46	— 85
1934....	— 90	— 232
1935....	— 101	— 262
1936....	+ 247	+ 101
1937....	+ 222	+ 63

If we regard the latter aspect it must be emphasized that middle-peasant families with a similar number of members were, even after 1935, hardly any better off. Their »money surplus« was then still only one-fourth of what it had been in 1925—1927. And, as even the pre-crisis income was not enough to secure full replacement : the discontinuance of replacement over a period of almost ten years made certain purchases of animals, implements, building repairs etc. absolutely inevitable about 1936. To achieve these, the family was compelled to restrict their diet and clothing needs to the same extent as during the crisis. A failure to do so would have inevitably led either to the complete disruption of farming, or the sale of a piece of land.

Finally, we must try to judge the condition of our middle-peasant family in the case of having *liabilities.*

If, in doing so, we were to rely on debt figures representing the national average per *hold*, we would not get anywhere ; it is evident that when a farm was encumbered with debts, these were necessarily greater than the average amount,[131] for at the same time there were farms which were free of debts. Therefore, we have to take the average of the *encumbered farms* of the corresponding group of size. On this basis, the liabilities of a 15-*hold* farm at the end of 1932 may be estimated at P 5000. It is inferred that these debts had been

[131] At the end of 1932, agricultural debts in national average amounted to P 137 per *hold.* (See Table 24.) This amount was about 15 times the total net income of the landed property as fixed in the land-register.

accruing from 1925 on, at the same rate as had the total indebtedness of Hungarian agriculture been accumulating, and that of the P 5000, P 3000 were long-term debts, which is a very moderate estimate as compared with the national average ; but we shall see that even in this case, the accruing debts would have greatly exceeded the financial means of our farmer, even if it is assumed that he had but two children.

The financial position of the farm may be correctly reviewed only when we look at it in its totality. That is, we have to add the money income resulting from the sales of produce to the loan receipts. (See Table 36.)

TABLE 36

Year	»Surplus« (+) or deficit (—) after deduction of current expenses for production & consumption	Balance (+ or —) of loan receipts and amortizations	Unexpended balance for replacement and investment (+) or growth of indebtedness (—)
	pengoes		
1925.....	+ 641	—	+ 641
1926.....	+ 564	+ 1092	+ 1656
1927.....	+ 574	+ 802	+ 1376
1928.....	+ 450	+ 712	+ 1162
1929.....	+ 374	+ 692	+ 1066
1930.....	+ 174	+ 472	+ 646
1931.....	— 91	— 548	— 639
1932.....	— 63	— 436	— 499
1933.....	+ 45	— 326	— 281
1934.....	— 90	— 208	— 118
1935.....	— 101	— 182	— 283
1936.....	+ 247	— 182	+ 65
1937.....	+ 222	— 182	+ 40

Table 36 shows most clearly the startling reverse which took place in the conditions of the indebted part of Hungarian agriculture. The deterioration of the conditions of these farmers during and after the crisis was incomparably greater than it was in the case of those who were indebted. The former disposed, before the crisis, over considerable sums for replacement and investment purposes, whereas their financial situation became unbearable during and after the crisis when they could not raise new loans but had to amortize the old ones. Our imaginary farm of 15 *holds*, when not encumbered, had a deficit ranging from P 60 to P 100 during the crisis. The deficit of an averagely encumbered farm of the same size amounted to more than P 600 in 1931, to P 500 in 1932 and so on. The money balance varied from P + 1656 to P — 639 (1926 to 1931), whilst in the case of the unencumbered farm it fluctuated between +564 and —91 during the same period. The deficit of encumbered farms continued to

be very serious until 1935 ; and even after, a great part of the money surplus deriving from sales of produce was devoured by payments of interest.

It is true that only about one-third of all middle-peasant farms were encumbered with banks debts,[132] and that even within this category there were large differences. But there were also other debts whose effect upon this particular category of farms we are able to assay. However, our assessment of the proportion of long-term debts was very moderate and put the accruing interests far below the average. What is more important, our figures show that the indebtedness would have created a catastrophic situation even if its extent had been much smaller than our conjecture.

*

We have built up an imaginary peasant farm, supposed to have been run under the most favourable conditions possible for a middle-peasant at the given stage of historical development. Our investigation has led us step by step to the recognition that even this »model« middle-peasant was always balanced on the razor's edge, and that broad masses of the middle-peasantry were driven on to the road leading to an incredible deterioration of nutrition and clothing, to the sapping of their vital energy, the wasting away of their animals and buildings, the ruthless exploitation of the soil, to poorer crops. It is in the light of these considerations that one can wholly and truly understand the teaching of *Lenin*, which has been our guidance in making this inquiry : »Small scale farming manages to exist by methods of sheer waste — waste of labour and the vital energy of the farmer, waste of strength and the quality of the cattle, and waste of the productive powers of the land. Consequently, any investigation which fails to examine these circumstances thoroughly is nothing more nor less than bourgeois sophistry.«[133]

The middle classes

The effects of the crisis, aggravated by a government policy serving the monopolies and hostile to the people, severely afflicted the middle-classes as well. We have already analyzed the conditions of the middle-peasants. As for the *petty bourgeoisie* of the towns, a considerable part of *craftsmen and retailers* were ruined.

Each year thousands of craftsmen and retailers became bankrupt and closed their workshops or shops. The number of bankruptcies trebled over pre-crisis. In 1933 about 46 per cent of all craftsmen were exempted from the

[132] Cf. Tables 24 and 25 : of the 144 000 farms between 10 and 20 *holds*, 40 658 were encumbered with bank debts.

[133] *Lenin*, *Collected Works*, London, Martin Lawrence, Ltd, Vol. IV, Book 1., p. 248.

income tax, their income having fallen below the taxability level. Eighty per cent of the craftsmen liable to taxation earned an average of P 1,26 a day, a considerable part of which amount went for taxes. In the same year, in a memorandum sent to Parliament and the Government, the National Federation of Craftsmen's Associations stated that 80 per cent of all workshops were without orders. The crisis of the building industry alone created a most critical situation for more than forty crafts.[134]

The *intellectual workers* were also severely affected by the economic crisis. Most of them drew miserable salaries or were unemployed.

First of all, we have to examine the standard of living of the *emloyees of private firms*, representing the bulk of the salaried class. Of course, we disregard the few thousands strong upper stratum of this group, whose services in organizing in close community of interest with industrial and banking capital, the exploitation of workers and employees, were remunerated with excessive »salaries« at the expense of the profits. Nor do we include here the managerial class, which, though classified in the category of employees, had its share of the profits. The position of this class of people was naturally inseparable from that of the big capitalists.

The overwhelming majority of the employees of private firms had to suffer serious privations during the crisis. This was partly due to the fact that the retail prices of foodstuffs scarcely followed the slump of wholesale prices in which the agrarian crisis expressed itself, and also, that the drop in the prices of manufactured goods and the charges of services was even smaller. On the other hand, salaries were cut down heavily during the crisis. The decisive factors were, however, the mass dismissals and the almost complete lack of new employments. It was due to these factors that the *total income* of this category as a whole diminished in a far greater measure than the earnings of individual employees. This implied that — just as in case of industrial workers — the average income of the *families* belonging to this category was also reduced in a greater measure than the average earnings of one employee. There were no jobs for the rising generation, which had to be supported by the parents, or, on the contrary, elder family members who had been sacked, depended for their sustenance on the earnings of the young.

If we add the estimated number of unemployed employees and their family members to the number of the dependants of the actually employed — for, practically, all these non-working people depended on the earnings of those who were fortunate enough to hold down a job —, we find that whilst before the crisis there were 1237 non-earning people for every 1000 breadwinners, in 1933 this ratio was 1605 for 1000 (See Table 38).

[134] *Crisis and Misery under the Horthy-Regime*, by Miklós *Incze*, Budapest, 1952, pp. 34—36. (In Hungarian.)

In examining the conditions of the employees of private firms, another important factor has to be taken into consideration. When the employers tried to take the edge off their troubles resulting from the fall of sales and prices, credit restrictions, etc. partly by dismissing some of their employees and reducing the salaries of the rest, it was, of course, not the general-managers, directors, etc., that these measures affected. Also in the various departments of the various companies it was again the highly-placed and higher-paid that were retained in service. The percentage of low-salaried employees was further diminished by the non-employment of young clerks. Thus, when we find that the *average* annual salary of the Budapest private employees in 1933 still amounted to 85 per cent of the pre-crisis level, and that also the national average represented 75 per cent of the 1929 salaries, we must remember that these averages do not indicate the reduction of the *individual* employee's salary.

Of the factors enumerated above, we shall deal at first with *the prices of consumers' goods and of services.*

In 1929 the Budapest Bureau of Statistics compiled a detailed statistical survey concerning the household budget records of 50 employees' families. This work contains plenty of details concerning the incomes, diet, clothing, fuel, lighting, and miscellaneous expenses, rents, etc.[135] For obvious reasons, this investigation was never repeated. Still, the figures at hand suit our purposes because by selecting a typical family and analyzing their various expenses item by item, we can figure out, taking into account the trend of prices in later years, how much they would have had to pay for the same quantities of food, manufactured goods, etc. as they had consumed in 1929. For the purposes of the present analysis, we have chosen a family of three living on a salary of about P 300 a month.

The household expenses computed by this method are shown in Table 37. They are based on the supposition that in each year the family bought the same quantities of food, clothing, fuel, etc. of the same quality as they did in 1929, and that their other needs (lodging etc.) were likewise met.

According to the table, *food* was the only item that became considerably cheaper ; expenditure in this group was at its lowest point in 1934, totalling one-third less than in 1929.

The lowering of prices was much less considerable in *clothing* (23 per cent between 1929 and 1934). Other items were hardly any cheaper. As for *fuel and lighting*, the price of coal *rose* by 14 per cent between 1930 and 1931, and never changed afterwards. In the same period, the price of firewood also *rose* by 8 per cent ; in 1932 it came down by 16 per cent (only 7 per cent as compared with the 1929 level). The price of gas remained unaltered between 1929 and

[135] *Social and Economic Conditions of the Population of Budapest*, by Lajos *Illyefalvy*, Budapest, 1935, p. 444.

1935. In the group of *miscellaneous* expenses, there was a reduction of only 10 per cent between 1929 and 1932. On the whole, even in the cheapest year, i. e. in 1934, the maintaining of the 1929 standard of living would have cost

TABLE 37

Year	Food	Clothing	Fuel & lighting	Miscellaneous	Total expenses[136]	
	expenses in Pengő				1929 = 100	
1929.....	1600	384	340	462	3642	100,0
1930.....	1402	392	333	468	3451	94,7
1931.....	1327	380	347	423	3333	91,5
1932.....	1200	360	362	424	3202	87,9
1933.....	1108	312	342	409	3027	93,1
1934.....	1058	290	342	410	2956	81,1
1935.....	1128	286	342	407	3025	83,0
1936.....	1151	304	335	418	3064	84,1
1937.....	1201	356	336	434	3163	86,8

this family only 19 per cent less than in 1929.

We have now to examine the salaries of the employees. In working out the total number of this category of people, the same method was used as in the case of industrial workers, that is, the returns of the 1930 Census, and the annual changes in the figures published by the social insurance institutes were taken into account. The results are shown by Table 38.

TABLE 38

Year	Employed	Unemployed	Non-working dependants	Non-working dependants unemployed	Number of non-working and unemployed for every 1000 employed
1929	107 477	12 500	120 540	133 040	1237
1930	106 688	16 838	120 074	130 912	1283
1931	103 177	21 926	119 608	141 534	1371
1932	96 836	29 844	119 142	148 986	1539
1933	94 795	33 462	118 676	152 138	1605
1934	100 276	29 558	118 210	147 768	1474
1935	101 888	29 523	117 744	147 276	1445
1936	106 617	26 371	117 278	143 649	1347
1937	112 205	22 360	116 812	139 172	1240

[136] Including P 856 for rent each year.

An army of more than 33 000 unemployed intellectual workers was the deciding factor that left its mark on the conditions of this class of people during the crisis.

Whilst the number of persons who had to live on the earnings of one employee grew considerably, salaries were decreasing. This is shown by Table 39.

Thus, the per capita income share diminished more rapidly than the average salary. It was reduced by more than one-fourth during the crisis. It is remarkable that it remained stagnant for a long time after the crisis. This may be explained by the fact that the »reserve army« of unemployed was, even in 1937, by 80 per cent larger than in 1929.

This was due in no small measure to the fact that a great number of formerly non-working members of the families of this group — chiefly wives and daughters — had by now gone to work in office, or were out to find a job, considerably boosting the supply of manpower which acted as a check on the rise of salaries, despite the fact that, in consequence of the gradual building-up of »controlled economy« and the growing tendency towards monopolistic state capitalism, the growth of the number of employees outstripped even the growth of production.

TABLE 39

Year	Employed	Average annual salary P	Total earnings million P	Combined total number of employed, unemployed, and other dependants	Per capita earnings P
1929.....	107 477	2700	290,2	240 517	1270
1930.....	106 688	2646	282,3	243 600	1159
1931.....	103 177	2560	264,1	244 711	1079
1932.....	96 836	2443	236,6	245 822	963
1933.....	94 795	2308	218,8	246 933	886
1934.....	100 276	2233	223,9	248 044	903
1935.....	101 888	2192	223,3	249 155	890
1936.....	106 617	2165	230,8	250 266	922
1937.....	112 305	2155	241,8	251 377	962

Thus, the moderate rise in the per capita earnings was due to the growth of the personnel, which absorbed about one-half of the unemployed, and not to any rise of salaries. This is evident from the fact that, as soon as the increase of the personnel slowed down (e. g. from 1934 to 1935), per capita earnings again diminished.

Table 40 compares per capita earnings with the household expenses of our model family.

TABLE 40

Year	Living costs of model family necessary to keep up 1929 living standard	Per capita income (including employed, unemployed, and other dependants)
	index numbers, 1929 = 100	
1929....	100,0	100,0
1930....	94,7	96,0
1931....	91,5	89,4
1932....	87,9	79,8
1933....	83,1	73,4
1934....	81,1	74,8
1935....	83,0	74,3
1936....	84,0	76,4
1937....	86,8	79,7

We find that between 1930 and 1937, the per capita income was invariably less than what would have been necessary to maintain the 1929 standard of living. Thus the salaried workers, too, were severely affected by the crisis, even if less severely than were industrial workers and working peasants.

On the other hand, after the crisis the improvement of their conditions was slower and less comprehensive than in the case of other workers. In many cases, indeed, not even the year 1937 brought any improvement.

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The *civil service* was regarded by the Horthy-clique as one of the mainstays of their regime. Civil servants, active or pensionary, constituted a much greater percentage of the whole population than in pre-war Hungary.

Following the outbreak of the crisis, it was only after a long hesitation that the Government decided to reduce the civil servants' salaries. It even effected a partial rise in their salaries in 1930 and 1931, as an electioneering trick.[137] Act XXVI of 1930 favoured the members of the armed forces, guaranteeing them, or their widows a more advantageous treatment in the event of disability or death resulting from accidents while on duty. The same law also accorded various other advantages to the officers and detectives of the gendarmerie and police.

[137] From the middle of 1930 on, higher rent allowances were paid to employees residing in 72 localities.

The armed forces of Horthy were granted further advantages in the 1930—1931 Budget. It provided for a revision of salary categories for members of the army, river-forces, customs staff, gendarmerie, and police. This re-adjustment resulted in a rise of salaries on the one hand, and in the transformation of certain kinds of extra pay into additional allowances to be reckoned in the old-age pensions. The importance of this measure is shown by the fact that it was greatly responsible for the increase in the proportion of personal expenses in the State budget from 51,7 per cent in 1929/1930 to 54,1 per cent in 1930/1931.[138] Finally, on July 1, 1931, another partial rise of civil servants' salaries came into force.

All this happened in the middle of the slump, when prices fell, the earnings of employees and workers were declining, unemployment was mounting, State revenues were shrinking, the Treasury wrestled with deficit, and the Government turned to foreign finance capital and its agents, the various foreign governments, and the League of Nations, for assistance.

Characteristic for the privileged position of civil servants was Act XLVII of 1930, which introduced various new taxes and a supplement to the tax imposed on the salaries of private employees,[139] but left the salaries of civil servants absolutely free from all taxation.

The same law provided for a 10 per cent reduction in the civil service to be carried through in the next six years. A government decree of 1931 ordered that this reduction (which included also the natural vacancies of positions) be carried out in four years.

This measure, which was not eventually fulfilled without fail, affected first of all the lower categories. The tendency to increase the proportion of higher-paid officials continued to work. Within a constant or only slightly decreasing total, the annual promotions caused a constant growth of this proportion.

In the autumn of 1931, the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, at the request of the Hungarian government, met in Budapest. The Committee proposed to the Government that it should slash the appropriations of the budget and cut the number of civil servants considerably.[140]

The first salary-reduction came into force on September 1, 1931. This was followed by another on January 1, 1932 ; a third on July 1, 1932 and a fourth on March 1, 1933. The salary reductions amounted to the percentages indicated below :

[138] *Die Lage des Staatshaushaltes*, by Tibor *Kállay*, Ungarisches Wirtschaftsjahrbuch (The Situation of the Hungarian Budget, Hungarian Economic Year Book), Budapest, 1930, pp. 260—263.

[139] The law declared also that the tax supplement imposed on salaries and wages must not be paid by the employer even if he was contractually bound to do so. The supplement in question was repeatedly raised in subsequent years.

[140] League of Nations, Archives, C 794, M—348.

Categories	I—III. (Ministers, Secretaries of State) ...	30	per	cent
«	IV. (Department heads)	25	«	«
«	V—VI. (Ministerial Counsellors and Assistant Counsellors)	23	«	«
«	VII. (Ministerial Secretaries)	21	«	«
«	VIII. (Assistant Secretaries)	19	«	«
«	IX. (Junior clerks)	18	«	«
«	X—XII. (other employees)	16	«	«

Family allowances and communication supplements were also reduced. The rate of reduction of the pensions was somewhat greater.

Comparing the salaries of civil servants with those of employees of private firms[141] we find that the average salary of the latter was much lower. The national average salary of employees performing intellectual work was P 225 a month in 1929. This corresponded to the salary of the lowest but one category in the civil service, or to the salary of an attendant Category A in the City Administration of Budapest. During the crisis these low salaries of the employees suffered far greater reductions than the corresponding salaries in the civil service. In 1932 the average salary was ten per cent lower than in 1929 whilst the difference in the corresponding State category was only four per cent. This discrepancy continued to grow.

It is to be emphasized that while between 1930/1931 and 1933/1934 the number of civil servants was reduced only by 2600, or 1,8 per cent, the number of employees figuring in the social insurance statistics diminished by 21 000 or twelve per cent.

Of course, there were large sections of civil servants who were in very straitened circumstances. At the end of 1933 for instance, 2500 unemployed teachers petitioned the Minister of Education for employment, and 600 of the employed teachers were not fully paid even their meagre salaries ; the arrears of salaries amounted to P 1,5 million. The National Union of Teachers repeatedly protested against the salary reductions which particularly affected the teachers, whose salaries had even before the crisis been exceedingly low.

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Particularly sad was the plight of those professionals who obtained their diploma during the crisis ; most of them could not find positions, or work of any kind. Those who were lucky enough to find a position had to accept exceedingly bad and humiliating terms. At the end of 1929, the Diósgyőr Iron Works engaged young engineers for *wages* amounting to P 0,40 an hour. It was

[141] For this purpose, instead of the rough averages given by the social insurance statistics, we have used the result of our own calculations, in which we tried to leave out salaried employees not engaged in intellectual occupations.

stipulated that if they would quit their employment within the next seven years they would have to repay half of their wages.

According to a memorandum of the Budapest Chamber of Engineers dated October 9, 1931, the situation of the engineers was absolutely hopeless, whether they worked on own account or were employed, or were looking for employment.

Almost the only source of earning were the scanty public works.

When in 1931, a number of engineers were engaged to project a bridge to be built in Budapest, they were paid monthly salaries of P 140. At the same time, they had to sign a written engagement to abandon all claims to a pension or compensation and to accept the possibility of their being dismissed at any time. After two years, their salary was reduced to such an extent which even the bourgeois press was prompted to denounce. »The work, accomplished in the service of the Hungarian State, by a married, perhaps not quite young, qualified mechanical engineer with no right to a pension, is valued by the State at P 112 a month ; the work of an unmarried engineer is remunerated with P 70 a month, or P 16 a week... Their meagre salaries are lower than the minimum salary of the despised «relief worker»...[142] of the City Administration, whose work is not comparable to the exerting, highly qualified brain work required by the projecting of a bridge.«[143]

A university student, who was compelled to work for many years as an attendant in office in the City Administration, wrote to the Mayor of Budapest asking him to promote him to the post of a temporary official. He wrote, »In 1925, I, then a university student, was compelled by the illness of my mother to accept the post of attendant in office. It was promised to me that I should be promoted in three months (i. e. to the post of an official). I am sorry to say that 8 years have passed without this promise having been kept. I beg you to... take into consideration that I have a family of five to keep...«[144].

Under the pressure of mass discontent, the Cabinet of Ministers was forced to deal with the problem of preventing unemployed professionals from being plunged into »utter poverty«. In compliance with a Government decree, the Ministry of Defence allocated in two army barracks one hundred of these people, giving them »officer's beddings« and other rank's rations. »They live in separate rooms in groups of 6 to 12... Some of them had until now lived in night-shelters or cheap hotels. Now they had not only board and lodging, but also a home, yielding their former places to other poor people in need... They live in groups with their colleagues of the same profession and mentality.«[145]

[142] From the great mass of unemployed, a few young professionals were employed by the City of Budapest. These were called »relief workers«.

[143] Miklós *Incze*, Op. cit. p. 37.

[144] Ibidem, p. 38.

[145] Ibidem, pp. 38—39.

This is how the bourgeois press glorified a shameful act of the government by which they »provided« for a few unemployed professional people, instead of securing them employment.

A most glaring example of such »care« was seen in 1933 when unemployed professionals were banished from a university canteen which was run by the City of Budapest. The free luncheons served here generally consisted of a ladleful of soup and the same measure of vegetables. During university terms about 700, in summer about 350, students and unemployed professionals used to lunch here. The latter received only the left-over — thanks to the students. One day the Dean of the University of Economics came in and announced that unemployed professionals would be no longer permitted to lunch there, because their presence had »a prejudical effect, morally, upon the students.« Instead of giving assistance to these starving people, the Professor explained that in his view there was a need to »examine their cases one by one that we may see just how they became and have remained unemployed.« At this point one of the unemployed cut in, saying : »It's not we that have brought this country to such a pass !... We can't be held responsible for the pooh-bah !« The Professor retorted by saying : »Whena general leads his soldiers into battle, he must not show them beaten and ragged soldiers.« A voice again interrupted : »We don't want to be led into battles. We want to eat.« Of course, interruptions were of no avail. There appeared a notice on the blackboard of the canteen, saying that from September on only persons matriculated to the University would be admitted. The State of big landowners and big capitalists compelled unemployed professionals to queue up before soup-kitchens. This act affected also students who did not have the money to matriculate, though many of them worked throughout the year as day-labourers to earn the money for the next university term.

The fascist regime made no real efforts to relieve the distress of intellectual workers and unemployed professionals. At the beginning of 1933 the Cabinet discussed the results of a »social scheme«, launched with the object of providing positions for young professionals. The results were the organising of a committee and, later on, the holding of a conference at the prime minister's office on the problems of youth. Characteristically, the chairman of the conference proposed to establish a »scientific institute to analyse the problems of the young generation« with the task of a »constant registration of statistical figures concerning young people who could not be employed in the field of their profession«, and of the »elaboration of a more practical educational system on the basis of the lessons drawn from the present overproduction (that is overproduction of educated people ! — M. I.) ; construction of the sociographical chart of the condition of youth...«[146] The representative of the youth organisations corrupted by the

[146] Ibidem, p. 40.

government, supported this eyewash by the ruling classes : »This road will lead to the social unity of Hungarian youth and may be the starting-point of a scientifically-based, ideal reform movement.«

All this remained, naturally, on the level of »ideal reform movement«, as the condition of the intellectual workers, employed or unemployed, went from bad to worse.

Bálint Hóman, the fascist Minister of Education of the Horthy-regime and a war criminal, appealed to the capitalists to employ some of the unemployed professionals. At the same time he prepared measures which he considered suitable to diminish largely the number of graduates leaving the universities and colleges. He stated that »every year, 2300—2500 graduates are leaving the universities and colleges though not even half of this number are able to find positions«, and said he hoped that »the Secondary Schools Bill, which has just been drafted, and the proposed restrictions in the universities will prevent the alarming growth of the number of unemployed professionals.«[147] Of course, such »reforms« did not bring about the least improvement in the conditions of the unemployed ; the problem of providing employment for them remained unsolved.

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We have analyzed the conditions of the various sections of the working people of Hungary during the »stabilization« period preceding the World Economic Crisis, throughout the years of this crisis and — in order to show the effects of the latter — also during the period of that peculiar depression which followed it. The conditions of the working class, the working peasantry, and the intellectual workers alike, were, during the whole period of Horthy fascism, even in its relatively best years preceding the crisis, much worse than in 1913. In 1929, on the eve of the crisis, they were considerably worse off than in any of the preceding years.

Throughout the World Economic Crisis, real wages of industrial workers kept decreasing, and the living standard of the working class as a whole, as a consequence of the mass unemployment, dropped even more sharply. The real earnings and the extent of employment of farm workers also diminished severely. The working peasantry was in the grips of an agrarian crisis. They were compelled to sell their produce at exceedingly low prices, their money income dwindled to a minimum whilst the drop in the prices of manufactured goods was much smaller because of the growing strength of monopolies and because of the economic policy of the Government which spurned the interests of the people. The middle-classes — craftsmen, retail traders, and the various sections of the intelligentsia — also became impoverished. Thousands of crafts-

[147] Ibidem, pp. 40—41.

men and retail traders were ruined. The conditions of the employees deteriorated owing to salary reductions and mass unemployment. Very similar was the situation of the professionals, especially the young who throughout the crisis found no employment.

The ruling classes endeavoured, with the assistance of the government, to shift the burden of the crisis on to the backs of the working people. This was made possible for them by the colossal growth of unemployment (a quarter of a million of industrial workers, half a million of farm workers, and about 33 000 intellectual workers were unemployed). Thus, a large-scale wage reduction was possible when, at the same time, industrial prices in Hungary did not fall in proportion to the price slump on the world market, as a consequence of a government policy which served capitalist interests and showed a tendency toward State capitalism.

The most characteristic feature of this crisis — and a sign of its peculiar gravity — is the fact that when the capitalists already began to recover from the consequences of the crisis the conditions of the working masses continued to deteriorate. The development of real wages in industry, the position of the middle-peasant farmer whose conditions we have analyzed, the day-wages in agriculture, the living standard of the middle classes alike show that the real income of the working people did not even begin to rise during the period of »recovery«. On the contrary, they continued to diminish by a few per cents because — and this is the decisive fact — prices and taxes were already beginning to rise. Thus, the real earnings of the working people diminished or stagnated till as late as 1935. It was only in 1936 or in 1937 that their situation began slightly to improve. But none of these categories could ever regain its 1929 standard of living, not to mention the level of 1913.

The decaying forces of capitalism in Hungary — as the forces of world capitalism in general — were not strong enough to enable the ruling classes to find a »normal« bourgeois way-out from the crisis. During the period of depression the drive after maximum profits continued through the increased impoverishment of the majority of the working people and by means of militarization.

In the second half of 1937, another serious crisis began which led to the Second World War. The symptoms of this crisis were evident also in Hungary. But by this time the Hungarian ruling classes had already switched over to the rapid preparation of war, open militarization and to the building-up of a monopolistic war-time State capitalism. All this opened a new chapter in the history of the working masses.

ПОЛОЖЕНИЕ НАРОДНЫХ МАСС В ВЕНГРИИ В ПЕРИОД ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОГО КРИЗИСА 1929—1933 гг.

М. Инце

Резюме

Экономический кризис 1929—1933 гг. был первым мировым кризисом после первой мировой войны. Его характеризовало прежде всего то, что он развился на почве всеобщего кризиса капитализма, переплелся с аграрным кризисом, в результате чего исключительно обострился сам кризис, а последующая за ним депрессия продолжалась особенно долго.

Во время этого кризиса особенно обострились противоречия капиталистического строя: противоречия между рабочими и капиталистами, между империалистическими и колониальными странами, а также противоречия между империалистическими странами. Кризис обострил всеобщий кризис капитализма. Он положил конец временной стабильности, характеризовавшей капиталистический мир в период между 1924 и 1929 годами. Ведущие капиталистические страны не смогли после кризиса поднять свое производство выше уровня 1929 года. В Венгрии кризис был особенно разрушительным. Созданный в 1919 году, после свержения диктатуры пролетариата, с помощью империалистов Антанты контрреволюционный режим сделал все возможное, чтобы сложить бремя кризиса с плеч капиталистов и помещиков на рабочий класс и трудящееся крестьянство.

Автор в трех главах проанализировал влияние кризиса на различные слои венгерского общества. В первой главе говорится о положении рабочего класса, во второй — о положении трудящегося крестьянства, в третьей — средних слоев общества.

Положение рабочего класса во время кризиса определяли два главных фактора: снижение зарплаты и массовая безработица. Исходным пунктом анализа влияния кризиса является вообще 1929 год. Поэтому автор считает нужным посвятить часть своей книги ознакомлению с положением в 1929 году. Он доказывает, что покупательная способность зарплаты в период между войной и кризисом достигла кульминационной точки в 1926 году. Однако покупательная способность зарплаты даже в этот год едва превышала 70% уровня 1913 года, а в 1929 году уже вновь пала до 68,5%. В 1929 году значительна была уже безработица и среди промышленных рабочих: по оценке автора число безработных в фабрично-заводской промышленности, в горно-рудной и металлургической промышленности могло составлять уже 76 тысяч человек, то-есть 12 процентов всех рабочих.

В период между 1929 и 1932 годами, из которых последний считают обычно годом наибольшего обострения кризиса, номинальная зарплата снизилась до 81 процента уровня 1929 года, число же безработных возросло до 240 тысяч человек, то-есть до 35,8 процента общего числа рабочих. Оба эти процесса продолжались и в 1933 году; в этот год номинальная зарплата составляла 77 процентов уровня 1929 года, число же безработных выросло до 242 тысяч человек, то-есть до 35,9 процента числа всех рабочих.

В соответствии с учением И. В. Сталина, согласно которому при анализе положения рабочего класса какой-либо капиталистической страны надо принимать во внимание также и соотношение между работающими и безработными рабочими, автор знакомит с результатами своих выводов в этом направлении. Разделяя сумму выплаченной зарплаты на общее число действительно работающих и членов их семей, а также безработных и членов их семей, он показывает, что в 1929 году на одного человека приходилось в год 708 пенгё, и до 1932 года эта сумма уменьшилась круглым счетом до 400 пенгё.

Далее, на основании прожиточного индекса по данным Всевенгерского Совета Профсоюзов, автор анализирует покупательную способность этой номинальной суммы. Согласно этому анализу прожиточные издержки семьи будапештского рабочего, имеющего троих детей, составляли в 1929 году 3918 пенгё, в то время как в 1932 году для поддержки такого же жизненного уровня было необходимо 3494 пенгё. В то же время, по предыдущей оценке автора, доход такой семьи в 1929 году составлял 3540 пенгё, а в 1932 году — 1997 пенгё. Таким образом, для поддержания жизненного уровня 1929 года в 1932 году нехватало 1497 пенгё, то-есть 43 процентов всех необходимых издержек.

Изменилось и распределение этой суммы. Значительная часть расходов, например, расходы на квартплату, отопление, освещение и т. д., не сократились или же сократились всего лишь на несколько процентов. Таким образом, сумма, остающаяся после вычета такого рода расходов на питание, одежду и другие цели, еще более сократилась: с 2736 пенгё 1929 года до 1251 пенгё в 1932 году, хотя в этом году на поддержание жизненного уровня в 1929 году в этой группе расходов надо было 2789 пенгё. Предполагая даже то,

что семья совершенно прекратила покупку одежды и сократила все другие расходы, чтобы больше оставалось на пропитание, по сравнению с 1929 годом уровень пропитания надо было снизить более, чем на 50 процентов. Вследствие этого режим питания очень ухудшился, не была удовлетворительна даже калорийность.

Анализ положения крестьянства начинается данными о распределении земельных владений. В 1921 году контрреволюция осуществила »земельную реформу«, показную реформу, главной целью которой было разоружение революционных сил. И после реформы положение было таковым, что 1,6 млн. человек из 4,5 млн. аграрного населения совсем не имели земли, а полтора миллиона человек имели участки меньшие 5 кадастровых хольдов (1 кадастровый хольд = 0.575465 г.), то-есть такие хозяйства, производство которых не могло обеспечить пропитание крестьянской семьи. Поэтому Венгрию называли »страной трех миллионов нищих«. Основой существования этого населения являлся главным образом наемный труд.

В то время, как $^1/_3$ аграрного населения страны не имела совсем земли, а в руках второй трети было лишь 9 процентов всей площади, более чем миллионная масса мелкого и среднего крестьянства, 24% аграрного населения владела 22 процентами земельной площади в виде хозяйств величиной в 5 – 20 хольдов. Главной основой пропитания этого слоя крестьянства являлось собственное производство. Большинство их не нанималось на работу, но и не нанимало наемных рабочих.

»Крупные крестьяне« или »кулаки«, имеющие хозяйства величиной от 20 до 100 хольдов, владели 3,2 млн. хольдов, 20 процентами всей земельной площади, в то время как их число вместе с членами их семей составляло 286.000 человек, т. е. 6 процентов всего аграрного населения страны. Крупные помещики, имеющие хозяйства от 100 до 1000 хольдов, вместе с членами их семей составляли 23.000 человек, $^1/_2$ процента всего аграрного населения владела 19 процентами территории страны. И, наконец, 745 поместий величиной свыше 1000 хольдов, распространявшиеся на 4,8 миллиона хольдов, на более, чем 30 процентов территории страны, кормили всего на всего 2242 человека.

Автор в своей книге рассматривает положение лишь »трудящегося крестьянства«, то-есть аграрного пролетариата и мелких и средних крестьян, имеющих хозяйства величиной от 5 до 20 хольдов.

Значительная часть аграрного пролетариата, вместе с членами семей — 600.000 человек, жили в крупных поместьях в качестве нанимающихся на годовой срок батраков. Преобладающую часть зарплаты они получали натурой. Таким образом, с падением цен во время кризиса снизилась и их зарплата, причем более, чем на 40 процентов по сравнению с уровнем до начала кризиса. Буржуазные экономисты того времени считали, что это не затрагивало батраков, потому что их не интересовала стоимость полученного в натуре и съеденного зерна и других продуктов. Это утверждение было простой фальсификацией, потому что батраки всегда должны были продавать часть полученной продукции, чтобы иметь возможность удовлетворить свои минимальные потребности в промышленных товарах. А так как цены на промышленные товары во время кризиса снизились лишь на несколько процентов, батраки вынуждены были продавать гораздо большую часть своего полученного натурой заработка, вследствие чего в огромной мере снизился уровень их пропитания.

Подобным было положение и сезонных рабочих, зарплатой которых являлась определенная часть урожая (например, жнецы получали $^1/_{11}$, $^1/_{12}$ или даже $^1/_{13}$ часть собранного ими урожая и т. д.).

Наконец, сельскохозяйственные поденные рабочие получали зарплату наличными деньгами, но во время кризиса эта форма наемного труда в сельском хозяйстве была сильно оттеснена на задний план, кроме того в большой мере снизилась и покупательная способность поденной платы. Автор измеряет здесь покупательную способность расходами на одежду, потому что аграрный пролетариат на пропитание зарабатывал вообще трудом, оплачиваемым в натуре, и полученные за поденную работу деньги расходовал, главным образом, на одежду. Измеряя таким образом покупательную способность поденной оплаты мужского летнего труда можно видеть, что она снизилась на половину по сравнению с уровнем до кризиса.

До кризиса безработица в сельском хозяйстве была очень большого размера. Трудоспособность аграрного пролетариата и крестьян, имеющих карликовые хозяйства величиной в 1 2 хольда, в годовом среднем можно было оценивать только на 50 процентов, но распределение занятости по сезонам была исключительно неравномерной, и в большей части года полмиллиона рабочих не имели работы.

Положение мелкого и среднего крестьянства, живущего, главным образом, на доходы со своего производства, определяли низкие цены на сельскохозяйственные продукты, мало снизившиеся цены на промышленные товары, неизменившиеся налоги и

растущая задолженность. Влияние всего этого автор показывает, приводя в качестве примера судьбу крестьянской семьи, ведущей хозяйство на 15 хольдах в условиях, считаемых в тогдашнем положении наиболее благоприятными. Денежный доход такой семьи — в случае неизменного собственного потребления — в 1932 году составлял только 62 процента дохода 1929 года. Одновременно денежные расходы на производство составляли 80 процентов, а налоги — 90 процентов уровня 1929 года, так что остававшиеся семье наличные деньги составляли только 50 процентов суммы, остававшейся семье в 1929 году. В то же время цены на промышленные товары ширпотреба почти не изменились, и если в 1929 году после покрытия издержек на товары потребления оставалось еще 370 пенгё для возобновления инвентаря (и этого не было достаточно для обеспечения простого воспроизводства!), то в 1932 году нехватало примерно 100 пенгё для покрытия издержек даже на товары потребления.

В этом примере не фигурирует задолженность ; положение обремененной долгами части крестьянства, по численности примерно половины всего крестьянства, было еще тяжелее. В 1925 году, после стабилизации валюты, задолженность сельского хозяйства росла такими бурными темпами, что к 1929 году сумма задолженности составила уже 1,9 миллиарда пенгё и к концу 1932 года, главным образом из-за просроченных процентов и не погашения займов, возросла до 2,2 миллиарда пенгё. В 1925 году задолженность сельского хозяйства составляла только 1,4 процента всех его денежных доходов, в 1929 году — 9 процентов, а в 1932 году — уже 28 процентов. Преобладающая часть задолженности лежала на трудящемся крестьянстве;их задолженность составляла 1,1 миллиарда, то-есть круглым счетом половину 2,2 миллиарда пенгё, в то время как им принадлежал только 31 процент земельной площади.

В очень тяжелом положении были во время кризиса и средние слои городского населения. Обанкротились тысячи мелких ремесленников и розничных торговцев, уменьшился заработок лиц свободных профессий, возросла безработица среди служащих. По отношению к последнему слою общества, самому крупному по численности, автор применяет такой же метод оценки, как и по отношению к промышленным рабочим. Наибольшее число безработных среди служащих было в 1933 году, их число составляло 33.000 человек, Таким образом, разделяя общий заработок работающих на общее число находящихся на службе и безработных частных служащих и их семей, можно установить, что на содержание одного человека в 1929 году приходилось 1270 пенгё, а в 1932 году только 963 пенгё. По сравнению с сокращением доходов на 24 процента, сокращение расходов на содержание семей служащих автор оценивает в 14 процентов. То-есть, и средние слои общества, хотя и не в таком размере, как рабочие и трудящиеся крестьяне, должны были снизить свой жизненный уровень. Положение государственных служащих было более благоприятным, потому что число увольнений и безработица среди них имели лишь небольшие размеры, и их жалования не были снижены в таком размере, как жалования частных служащих.

Автор анализирует положение каждого из этих слоев общества и в годы после кризиса, вплоть до 1937 года. В качестве особой характерности кризиса 1929 – 1933 годов он подчеркивает, что с точки зрения широких масс влияние кризиса не прекратилось и в последующие годы. Наоборот, в годы депрессии их положение еще более ухудшилось. Это показывает образование как реальной зарплаты промышленных рабочих и частных служащих, так и заработка сельскохозяйственного пролетариата и положения трудящегося крестьянства. Низшей точки все это достигло в 1935 году, улучшение в 1936 году было также незначительным : а в 1937 году начался новый кризис, с которым открылась новая глава и в формировании положения трудящихся масс.

LE PROBLÈME DU RASSEMBLEMENT DES FORCES NATIONALES PENDANT LA GUERRE D'INDÉPENDANCE DE FRANCOIS II RÁKÓCZI

par

P. ZS. PACH

Au cours du XVII[e] siècle qui servait de prélude à la guerre d' indépendance organisée par François II Rákóczi, les luttes pour l'indépendance nationale, luttes qui s'opposaient aux tendances colonisatrices et à l'oppression féodale de l'absolutisme des Habsbourg, formaient, pour ainsi dire, une suite ininterrompue. De temps en temps même une partie de la classe dominante de Hongrie se voyait contrainte de s'opposer à l'absolutisme habsbourgeois et à son alliée, la réaction catholique, quoique auparavant — pour ne pas devoir faire face aux lourds sacrifices exigés par la lutte contre les Turcs et craignant aussi les mouvements des serfs — ce fut précisément cette classe qui avait préparé le terrain pour l'expansion des Habsbourg (et n'omettons pas de souligner que même au XVIII[e] siècle la majeure partie de la classe dominante continuera de jouer un rôle analogue). Une partie de la classe dominante devait s'opposer aux Habsbourg, parce que la cour et le clergé catholique ne se bornaient pas à vouloir l'évincer du gouvernement politique du pays ; ils tendaient aussi à diminuer ses propriétés, constituant ainsi un danger permanent pour ses possibilités d'exploitation. Voilà pourquoi on trouve de temps à autre au camp des partisans de l'indépendance tel ou tel groupe de la classe dominante ; il y avait des périodes où les grands propriétaires allaient jusqu' à prendre en main la direction de ces luttes. Néanmoins, d'une manière générale, même pendant cette période de l'histoire de la Hongrie la classe dominante restait fidèle à la politique coutumière de ses hautes trahisons «vendant le peuple hongrois pour des profits matériels à tous ses ennemis.»[1]

Mais ce siècle est caractérisé aussi par les soulèvements des masses laborieuses opprimées de la Hongrie, par les mouvements sans cesse renaissants des serfs. Parallèlement au développement de la production de marchandises l'exploitation seigneuriale devenait de plus en plus lourde ; de même les conversions imposées par la violence de la Contre-réforme et les abus des mercenaires impériaux aggravaient sans cesse la situation de la paysannerie, provoquaient une effervescence permanente dans les masses et les opposaient à plusieurs re-

[1] Mátyás *Rákosi :* A magyar jövőért (Pour l'avenir de la Hongrie.) Budapest, 1947, p. 9.

prises aussi bien aux oppresseurs qu' aux intrus étrangers. Ces mouvements de la paysannerie ne se déployaient pas indépendamment des luttes pour l'indépendance, bien au contraire, il existait des relations complexes entre les deux séries de mouvements. Ces connexions se manifestaient dans trois domaines : d'un côté, les luttes de la paysannerie se dirigeaient contre les grands propriétaires et les seigneurs nobles qui, pour défendre leurs privilèges féodaux, trahissaient les intérêts de la patrie ; de l'autre côté, les mouvements de la paysannerie — qui, au XVI[e] siècle, s'étaient souvent opposés aux conquérants turcs — formaient alors, au XVIII[e] siècle une vive résistance vis-à-vis de la pénétration des Habsbourg ; enfin il faut tenir compte aussi du fait que dans bien des cas les luttes pour l'indépendance furent déclenchées précisément par les masses paysannes exploitées. La lutte de classe de la paysannerie doit donc être considérée comme une partie intégrante de la lutte nationale.

La question capitale des luttes pour l'indépendance du XVII[e] siècle était le problème des relations qu'il y avait entre la résistance des Ordres nobles et les mouvements de la paysannerie. Restait à savoir, si le groupe, hostile aux Habsbourg, de la classe des propriétaires serait capable de s'appuyer sur la paysannerie et s'il oserait profiter des puissantes sources d'énergies révolutionnaires qui se cachaient parmi les masses laborieuses ; autrement dit, si ce groupe, pour s'opposer d'autant plus efficacement à l'oppression étrangère, avait la faculté de créer ce large rassemblement des forces nationales, soutenu par les masses laborieuses, qui était l'unique garantie de la réalisation et du maintien de l'indépendance. La principale conclusion qui se dégageait des luttes nationales du XVII[e] siècle était la thèse qu'il n'était possible d'obtenir de succès qu'aux moments où le rassemblement des forces nationales s'était plus ou moins réalisé (comme par ex. à l'époque du soulèvement de Bocskai). En revanche la conspiration de Wesselényi qui n'avait guère envisagé les possibilités d'une collaboration avec les serfs, devait nécessairement se réduire à une aventure avortée des grands seigneurs. Le même sort fut le partage du soulèvement des hors-la-loi dans la région dite Hegyalja, ce mouvement qui ne visait point à gagner la sympathie de la noblesse, était dès le début condamné à l'échec. Des luttes précédentes on pouvait donc tirer l'enseignement que vis-à-vis de l'ennemi commun *il fallait* créer un large rassemblement des forces nationales.

Cette conclusion était claire pour les hors-la-loi (en hongrois : *szegénylegények)* et les fugitifs (en hongrois : *bujdosók*) qui se groupaient autour de Tamás Esze et qui — pour la plupart d'origine paysanne — «déployant une activité ininterrompue parmi les paysans pauvres opprimés,»[2] organisaient, dès les premiers mois de 1703 la population rurale en vue de la lutte contre les oppresseurs étrangers. Conformément au principe du rassemblement des forces, ce groupe

[2] C'est un passage inconnu de l'autobiographie de Sándor Károlyi. (Magyar Könyvszemle, 1945, p. 113.). Je tiens à exprimer mes vifs remerciements aux camarades Tamás Esze et Gusztáv Heckenast pour les données qu'ils ont bien voulu mettre à ma disposition.

des hors-la-loi envoya ses délégués en Pologne et demanda à François Rákóczi qui y vivait en émigration de retourner en Hongrie et de se mettre à la tête du soulèvement. La noblesse restait passive ; elle ne prit aucune initiative pour s'associer à la guerre d'indépendance. Selon une question que plus tard Tamás Esze aura bien le droit de poser au prince, «les nobles ne regardaient-ils pas les yeux clos la ruine de notre chère nation?» Ce n'est pas aux nobles, mais aux paysans devenus simples vagabonds que revient le mérite d'avoir fait le premier pas en vue du rassemblement des forces nationales.

L'initiative des hors-la-loi et la délégation envoyée par les fugitifs exercèrent une influence décisive sur l'évolution intérieure de Rákóczi. Auparavant — malgré le long laps de temps qui séparait ses années passées au couvent des Jésuites à Neuhaus de son émigration en Pologne — il n'était pas parvenu beaucoup plus loin que son grand-père : de même que Wesselényi, il pensait à un mouvement organisé par les aristocrates et la noblesse qui de leur côté, auraient mis leur confiance surtout dans l'aide à espérer de dehors . . . Ce fut la délégation des fugitifs qui — sinon d'un jour à l'autre, mais après beaucoup de méditations — éveilla en Rákóczi une idée nouvelle : la nécessité de collaborer aves les masses des travailleurs et de jeter les bases d'un rassemblement de vaste envergure des forces nationales. Cette nouvelle conception, ce tournant décisif de l'évolution idéologique du prince se reflètent déjà dans sa proclamation de Brezan (début du mois de mai 1703) qui invite «*tous les vrais Hongrois*, ecclésiastiques et laïques, *nobles et roturiers*, militaires et civils, qui aiment leur patrie et désirent rétablir l'ancienne liberté glorieuse de notre cher pays», à prendre les armes «pour notre patrie, notre nation et notre liberté ancestrale» et aussi «pour la délivrance de la paysannerie de toute sa misère.»[4] Ces phrases courageuses de la proclamation de Brezan qui préconisent un large rassemblement des forces patriotiques, de même que le programme national et social de la proclamation et la remise des drapeaux permettant le recrutement démontrent bien qu'à cette époque-là Rákóczi était déjà parvenu à un point qu'aucun de ses ancêtres n'avaient jamais atteint au cours des luttes antérieures pour l'indépendance du pays. Dans ce cas un aristocrate, voire le propriétaire le plus en vue du pays s'allia aux insurgés paysans, parce qu'il était convaincu que la lutte pour l'indépendance nationale ne pouvait être séparée ni du renouvellement intérieur, ni de l'ascension sociale de la classe des serfs.

Lorsque, au printemps de 1703, l'alliance de Rákóczi et des insurgés paysans de la région dite Tiszahát, prit naissance, il existait déjà d'autres conditions de la concentration des forces et même dans une mesure plus considérable qu'au cours des dizaines d'années auparavant. Les abus de la colonisation habs-

[3] Lettre du 2 décembre 1707 de Tamás Esze à Rákóczi. Tarpa, Országos Levéltár (dans ce qui suit : OL. = Archives Nationales de Budapest). A Rákóczi-szabadságharc levéltára (abrév. : R. szh. lt. — Archives de la guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi). II. 2. e/A.

[4] Kálmán *Thaly :* A székesi gróf Bercsényi-család (La famille des comtes Bercsényi de Székes). Budapest, 1887, II pp. 469—471.

bourgeoise et de la réaction catholique pesaient sur la paysannerie à tel point qu'ils rendaient sa situation presque intenable; en même temps ils pesaient sur les autres classes et les autres couches de la société hongroise. «Les villes royales, écrira le prince plus tard dans ses Mémoires . . . étaient autant de témoins du régime autrichien. Leur misère, le nombre restreint de leurs bourgeois, l'inexpérience de l'industrie et l'absence de l'artisanat démontraient bien là que le pays menait la vie d'un orphelin et que les biens des orphelins sont toujours à la merci des tuteurs.»[5] Dans bien des cas les bourgs étaient déchus au rang de simples villages; parmi la petite noblesse, nombreux étaient ceux qui — selon les paroles de Rákóczi — «réduits à la pauvreté par l'oppression allemande, appartenaient plutôt à la paysannerie qu' à la classe des nobles.»[6] La noblesse moyenne considérait également le régime habsbourgeois comme un pesant fardeau ; obligée de payer la taxe militaire («portio»), elle souffrait aussi des excès des garnisons impériales. Enfin certains grands propriétaires se rangeaient eux aussi parmi les mécontents à cause de l'influence du gouvernement militaire et du régime fiscal de Vienne ; la perte des hautes fonctions et des doléances d'ordre économique n'étaient point de nature à faire disparaître leur amertume. « . . . Quant aux grands seigneurs, écrira Rákóczi, depuis que le peuple eut été appauvri par les exactions effectuées du côté autrichien, leurs revenus diminuaient également d'une manière sensible et leurs propriétés héréditaires allaient dépérissant.»[7]

Outre le soulèvement des paysans on voyait donc mûrir aussi la résistance nobiliaire. Toutes ces conditions favorisaient l'organisation d'une guerre d'indépendance s'étendant aux classes et aux couches les plus diverses de la société : dès alors, la création d'un large front de coopération nationale contre les Habsbourg n'était pas seulement *nécessaire*, mais même *probable*.

Néanmoins, il serait erroné de supposer que cette possibilité se soit aussitôt transformée en *réalité*. Les autres classes, bien qu'elles eussent tout intérêt à se débarrasser de l'oppression habsbourgeoise ne s'associèrent pas sans retard aux paysans du Tiszahát. Vis-à-vis du mouvement de la paysannerie les grands propriétaires et la classe nobiliaire des comitats gardaient pendant quelque temps leur attitude habituelle : ils s'efforçaient de l'étouffer, préférant même le régime étranger à tout essai de collaboration avec le peuple. Sous ce rapport rien n'est plus significatif que la sévère ordonnance que le préfet du comitat de Szatmár, Sándor Károlyi, opposa au début de mai au mouvement des Kouroutz : «Si, aux villages, aux villes, dans les forêts et dans les champs on rencontre des

[5] II. Rákóczi Ferenc emlékiratai (Mémoires de François II Rákóczi). Budapest, 1951, pp. 5—6.

[6] II. Rákóczi Ferenc önéletrajza (Autobiographie de François II. Rákóczi). Budapest, 1876, p. 141.

[7] Cf. Cantio alia de porcione. Szentsei-daloskönyv. Régi magyar verskönyvek. I. (Recueil Szentsei de chansons hongroises. Anciens recueils de poésies hongroises. I). Budapest, 1943, p. 37.

personnes soutenant la cause des Kouroutz ou ayant l'intention de s'associer à eux et d'agir de connivence, on doit aussitôt prendre les mesures indispensables pour les poursuivre, engageant pour cette action des villages entiers.«[8] Un mois plus tard ce même préfet, se mettant à la tête de ses troupes nobiliaires, dispersera une partie des serfs insurgés ; «plein de gloire, et de fierté, il ne manquera de porter à la cour de Vienne les cinq drapeaux comme butin en témoignage de sa fidélité et de son heureuse intervention contre les rebelles».[8b] «Attendez un peu, maudite canaille, dit à la même époque le baron Nicolas Perényi à ses serfs, pour le moment vous donnez votre confiance à Rákóczi, mais vous verrez bientôt l'Allemand, avec l'aide de qui vous serez tous empalés.»[9] Non moins caractéristique est la déclaration, remplis de haine à l'égard des paysans, du gentilhomme nommé István Nagyidai : «Si j'avais un *cubulus* de millet et si je savais que de chaque grain poussera un Allemand, je ne tarderais pas à le semer à cette heure même.»[10] Les nobles se retiraient donc dans leurs châteaux et leurs manoirs. Au fond ce n'étaient que l'accroissement rapide des troupes paysannes «kouroutz», les brillants succès militaires et les tendances anti-Habsbourg du mouvement, mises en relief par Rákóczi lui même, qui décida la majeure partie de la noblesse moyenne et une partie des grands propriétaires à soutenir la cause de la guerre d'indépendance. Même à cette époque la noblesse des comitats manifestait une attitude indécise : «Elle ne savait, écrit le prince, à qui s'allier, parce qu'elle craignait aussi bien le peuple que les Allemands».[11] Les comitats, les villes des *hajdú*-s et les villes royales n'épousaient la cause du soulèvement qu'au moment où les troupes des Kouroutz atteignaient leur territoire ou au moins étaient capables de le passer sous leur contrôle. Les nobles de Szabolcs, avant de se rendre au camp des Kouroutz, prenaient bien garde d'insérer dans les procès-verbaux du conseil départemental des documents attestant leur fidélité à l'empereur ; quant aux bourgeois aisés de Debrecen, ils n'ouvrirent les portes de la ville que sous l'effet de la pression simultanée des citadins plébéiens et des troupes kouroutz. On pourrait faire des constatations analogues — et même à plus forte raison — au sujet, des grands propriétaires, ces «Kouroutz malgré eux» ;[12] leur sentiment national ne «s'éveilla» que dans les murs d'un château assiégé . . . Inutile de dire qu'une majorité des grands propriétaires ne furent jamais pour la cause de la guerre d'indépendance ; la majeure partie des seigneurs laïques et surtout des seigneurs ecclésiastiques s'opposaient ouvertement à ce rassemblement des forces patriotiques, se démas-

[8] II. Rákóczi Ferenc emlékiratai, p. 73. — II. Rákóczi Ferenc önéletrajza, p. 65.

[8b] Cité par Tamás Esze : A tiszaháti felkelés (Le soulèvement de la région dite Tiszahát). Budapest, 1952, p. 5.

[9] II. Rákóczi Ferenc emlékiratai, p. 40.

[10] Cité par Tamás Esze : II. Rákóczi Ferenc tiszántúli hadjárata. (La campagne de François II Rákóczi dans la région située au-delà de la Tisza). Századok, 1951, p. 36.

[11] Ibidem.

[12] II. Rákóczi Ferenc emlékiratai, pp. 48—9.

quant comme traîtres à la patrie et partisans de l'oppression étrangère. Pour s'en convaincre, il suffit de prendre en considération un fait significatif : au commencement de 1704, quand la guerre d'indépendance — s'appuyant sur un vaste mouvement populaire en Transdanubie — ralliant même la Hongrie occidentale, les aristocrates et les prélats transdanubiens se réfugièrent en Autriche.[13] Tout compte fait, il convient de souligner, une fois de plus, le rôle du peuple dans la guerre d'indépendance : comme au début les paysans insurgés du Tiszahát avaient été les initiateurs du rassemblement des forces nationales, de même plus tard aussi l'adhésion enthousiaste et l'esprit combatif des masses paysannes, «l'affluence des troupes populaires»[14] restaient autant de facteurs essentiels de la réalisation de cette grande tâche.

L'autre facteur décisif était constitué par la personne et la politique de Rákóczi. Le rassemblement des forces nationales n'était imaginable que sous sa conduite. «Ma personne, écrit le prince lui-même, était la force, soutenue par la patrie et le prestige de mes ancêtres, qui unissait les intentions des âmes pénétrées d'une idée commune».[15] D'autre part, le prince avait non seulement de l'autorité, mais aussi le sens politique pour ceindre autour de soi, grâce à une politique nationale consciente de ses buts, les forces sociales prêtes à s'opposer à l'ennemi commun : au pouvoir colonisateur des Habsbourg. Cette politique nationale impliquait, à proprement parler, deux tâches : d'une part il fallait gagner la collaboration d'un nombre suffisant de paysans insurgés et soutenir leur enthousiasme, leur combativité, d'autre part, il s'agissait de maintenir à l'engagement au service de la cause nationale même, une partie notable des grands propriétaires et des nobles.

La première tâche était plus simple à accomplir : les serfs, au moins au début du mouvement, s'engageaient sans réserve à la lutte nationale: ayant beaucoup souffert sous l'oppression étrangère, ils rêvaient à une victoire qui, à leurs yeux, aurait équivalu à l'abolition du servage. Les paroles encourageantes de Rákóczi ne faisaient qu'attiser cet espoir : d'abord à Brezan, ensuite à la frontière du pays, aux camps de Klimietz et de Zavadka, «il promit à tous ceux qui prendraient les armes pour délivrer de son joug la pauvre nation hongroise l'abolition des redevances seigneuriales et l'exemption d'impôt.»[16] Bien entendu, ces promesses ne pouvaient résulter uniquement de la bienveillance personnelle du prince mais avant tout de la reconnaissance du fait que les serfs constituaient la base même de la guerre d'indépendance et du rassemblement des forces

[13] Cf. Két szegénylegénynek egymással való beszélgetése (Entretien de deux hors-la-loi). Magyar költészet Bocskaitól Rákócziig (La poésie hongroise de Bocskai à Rákóczi). Budapest, 1953. p. 332.

[14] Cf. Ágnes *Várkonyi :* A Dunántúl felszabdítása 1705-ben (La libération de la Transdanubie en 1705). Századok, 1952, 2, pp. 400—402.

[15] II. Rákóczi Ferenc önéletrajza, p. 67.

[16] Requête du régiment de Soltis, Gábor Balogh et Kövesdi accompagnée de la réponse de Rákóczi (17 février 1704). Miskolc. Requête de soldats kouroutz et des membres de leurs familles. Ms. aux Archives d'Histoire Militaire (abrév. : Folyamodványok). OL. R. sz. lt. II. 2. f.

nationales. Rákóczi mit donc sa confiance dans les paysans et ceux-ci — après avoir pris connaissance des promesses princières par l'intermédiaire des lettres ouvertes — des hors-la-devenus loi officiers se groupèrent par plusieurs milliers sous les drapeaux de la guerre d'indépendance. «Les troupes des Kouroutz, lisons-nous dans une requête de 1704, se composent surtout de serfs qui prirent les armes sous l'effet de la promesse qu'ils lutteraient pour leur propre affranchissement.»[17]

La seconde tâche qui consistait à gagner la sympathie de la noblesse, posait des problèmes plus épineux. Au début, comme nous venons de le constater, la noblesse résistait vivement au soulèvement, pusqu'elle considérait l'action de la paysannerie comme un danger pour ses intérêts de classe. Néanmoins ce problème devait être résolu, puisque dans cette situation seule la noblesse pouvait devenir la classe dirigeante de la guerre d'indépendance. Pour galvaniser la noblesse, il ne suffisait pas de mettre en relief les doléances provoquées par l'oppression habsbourgeoise ; au surplus, il fallait démontrer que les seigneurs disposés à s'allier aux insurgés n'avaient rien à craindre du côté de la paysannerie et qu' ils ne seraient menacés que dans le cas où ils s'opposeraient au mouvement des serfs. C'est pourquoi déjà dans la proclamation de Brezan, Rákóczi mit en relief les doléances communes et en même temps il interdit toute action dirigée contre la personne et les propriétés des nobles et des ecclésiastiques[18]; dans la patente de Namény (18 juillet) il s'adressa surtout aux «seigneurs nobles», les invitant à rejoindre les camps dans trois jours : en même temps il formula — s' appuyant sur la vigueur du soulèvement populaire — une sérieuse menace à l'adresse des membres de l'opposition : au cas où ceux-ci et leurs propriétés auront à souffrir du fer et du feu, ils n'auront à l'attribuer qu'au manque de patriotisme et à la politique germanophile.»[19] Gagner la sympathie de la noblesse, s'assurer l'appui de la paysannerie et, au surplus, subordonner tous les antagonismes aux intérêts communs — voilà ce qui caractérise aussi les autres dispositions prises par Rákóczi au cours de l'été et l'automne de 1703.[20] On peut signaler à ce propos ses ordonnances émises contre les vagabonds ou l'édit militaire qui prévoyait aussi la défense de la paysannerie. D'une manière générale, c'étaient surtout les nobles qu'il voulait apaiser : il se fixait le but d'étendre ses soins aussi bien à la «nation» (c'est-à-dire aux nobles) qu'aux «pauvres» (c' est-à-dire aux serfs).[20b] Les mêmes intentions caractérisent la célèbre patente

[17] István R. *Kiss :* II. Rákóczi Ferenc erdélyi fejedelemmé választása (Élection de François II. Rákóczi, prince de Transylvanie). Közlemények a br. Radvánszky család levéltárából (Communications des archives des barons Radvánszky). V. 4. Budapest, 1906, p. 144. Juillet 1704.

[18] Cf. *Thaly :* op. cit. II, p. 471.

[19] OL. R. szh. lt. II. 3. 0. 18 juillet 1703.

[20] Cf. par ex. la patente de Gyulaj en date du 24 juillet 1703 et l'Edictum Militare du 7 septembre.

[20b] De l'ordonnace émise par Rákóczi le 7 septembre 1703 au camp de Domahida. Történelmi Tár, 1901, p. 398.

de Vetés (28 septembre 1703) sur les serfs : par cet acte Rákóczi garantit aux serfs enrôlés dans son armée et à leur famille (femme et enfants mineurs) l'exemption des charges communes et des redevances seigneuriales ; en même temps, pour faire un geste vers les propriétaires, il précisa que les serfs restés auprès de leurs foyers ne seraient point exempts de la corvée et des redevances seigneuriales ; bien au contraire, ils auraient, comme auparavant, à s'acquitter avec une obédience parfaite de toutes leurs obligations.»[21] A coup sûr, la patente de Vetés est née dans l'atmosphère du rassemblement des forces nationales ; d' un côté, elle représentait un pas décisif vers la satisfaction des exigences de la paysannerie dans l'esprit des promesses faites à la frontière, de l'autre, elle offrait des garanties à la noblesse au sujet du maintien de ses privilèges : par son double caractère, cet acte attachait toutes les deux classes à la cause de la guerre d'indépendance.

Au cours de l'automne de 1703, par suite des succès militaires du soulèvement des serfs et de la sagacité politique de Rákóczi, le rassemblement des forces nationales était donc un fait accompli. C'est ce qui se reflète dans la patente de Vetés. Le même document renvoie aussi aux contradictions intérieures de ce rassemblement : il est vrai que la patente rendait possible la lutte commune de la noblesse et de la paysannerie contre leur ennemi commun, mais au fond elle n'a contenté aucune des classes opposées. Jusque-là le mouvement des classes s'était manifesté sur deux lignes : l'une représentait le puissant élan du soulèvement des paysans, l'autre l'adhésion de la majeure partie de la noblesse moyenne. La patente reflétait une sorte d'équilibre ou, pour mieux dire, la résultante de ses deux forces. Mais cet équilibre ne pouvait être que temporaire ; la paysannerie continuait à lutter pour son affranchissement et la noblesse pour le rétablissement total de son pouvoir sur la paysannerie.

Quel fut l'effet de l'évolution ultérieure de la lutte des classes sur la concentration des forces? Quel fut l'effet des tendances de classe de la paysannerie, d'une part, et de la noblesse, de l'autre, sur les sources d'énergie et l'évolution des luttes nationales?

En ce qui concerne les exigences de classe de la *paysannerie*, il serait erroné de partir du fait qu' à un certain degré de l'évolution sociale la direction du rassemblement des forces devait être nécessairement confiée à la noblesse et que la continuité de la production exigeait le maintien du régime économique féodal. Tout cela est juste, mais ne représente qu'un seul aspect des choses. L'autre aspect de la question consiste en ce que la nation est une catégorie historique, notamment une catégorie intimement liée à l'époque du déclin de la féodalité et de la naissance du capitalisme et que, par conséquent, selon les conditions historiques du rassemblement des forces nationales, celui-ci ne peut être fondé sur un maintien rigide et intact du régime féodal, mais uniquement

[21] OL R. szh. lt. 2. a. Cf. Történelmi Tár 1909, p. 280, etc.

sur un certain relâchement des liens féodaux et sur l'ascension sociale des serfs. En 1848, quand le moment de la révolution bourgeoise sera déjà venu, le rassemblement national ne sera possible que grâce à la liquidation des conditions féodales. En 1703, par contre, il ne pouvait être question en Hongrie ni de révolution bourgeoise, ni d'un effort tendant à liquider la féodalité; néanmoins, dès *cette époque la création du rassemblement* des forces nationales devait s'associer à la réforme intérieure, au progrès social, à l'allègement du fardeau imposé par le joug féodal.[22] La lutte de classe de la paysannerie n'a donc point freiné le rassemblement des forces et la guerre d'indépendance; bien au contraire, elle en était une condition essentielle et même une de ses forces motrices.

Le fait que pendant les premiers mois, le soulèvement des serfs était le moteur de la guerre d'indépendance est si évident qu' il serait inutile d'en fournir des preuves. Pour ne signaler qu'un détail ; dans le comitat de Szabolcs les serfs obéirent surtout aux patentes de Tamás Esze, en vertu desquelles aucun serf ne pouvait plus servir, sous peine de mort, les seigneurs qui s'opposaient au mouvement de Rákóczi.[23] Il est donc certain que les serfs pensaient non seulement à la liberté de la patrie, mais aussi à leur affranchissement ; au fond, ces deux buts n'en formaient qu'un seul et chacun renforçait l'autre . . . Et après les mesures prises à Vetés? Il est un fait que les serfs enrôlés dans l'armée de Rákóczi parlaient avec une amertume parfaitement justifiée de ce que le fils d'un père enrôlé devait continuer à servir à la maison et que le père d'un fils enrôlé devait se soumettre à la même obligation;[24] il n'est pas douteux que les paysans désiraient étendre l'exemption de tout service seigneurial même aux membres non enrôlés de leur famille. Mais il faut admettre qu'à ce moment- là, pareille réglementation de l'exemption aurait été un coup fatal pour le régime féodal et que toute tentative de ce genre aurait provoqué l'opposition de la noblesse et la désorganisation du rassemblement national. Au fond, l'exigence essentielle ne se référait point aux serfs non enrôlés ; on désirait plutôt une promesse qui garantirait l'affranchissement de tous les serfs armés. Certes, les paysans voulaient aller au-delà de la patente de Vetés ; dans celle-ci il n'y avait aucune promesse pour l'avenir, tandis qu'eux, les serfs exigeaient d'être rassurés que «tous ceux qui faisaient le service militaire auprès de Son Excellence, notre seigneur («kegyelmes urunk»), ne seraient plus réduits au servage»[25] et que «chaque serf qui a ceint l'épée pour participer au soulèvement organisé par son Altesse («Őnagysága»), serait affranchi, dès que «Dieu lui accorderait la grâce de triom-

[22] Cf. J. V. Sztálin művei (Oeuvres de J. V. Staline, en langue hongroise). Budapest, 1949. p. 328.

[23] Cf. József *Révai :* Marxizmus és magyarság (Le marxisme et le peuple hongrois). Budapest, 1946, p. 147.

[24] Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár Kézirattára (Section des Manuscrits à la Bibliothèque Nationale Széchenyi). Fol. Hung. 1389 (Documents de l'époque des Kouroutz, recueillis par Kálmán Thaly). XXVIII. 186.

[25] Ol Radvánszky-lt. III. o. XLIII. 42.

pher et de conquérir le pays»,[26] en un mot, on exigeait que l'affranchissement fût valable non seulement pour la période des hostitilités, mais aussi *après* la cessation. Il convient d'ajouter que les sources nous donnent une idée de la forme même de l'affranchissement auquel les paysans rêvaient: ils auraient désiré jouir des privilèges semblables à ceux des *hajdú*-s ce qui aurait pu être réalisé de deux manières : d'une part, leurs communes pouvaient être transformées en villes de *hajdu*-s (comme ceci ressort des requêtes des communes de Salánk, Nagyszőllős et Tarpa), d'autre part, on aurait pu accorder à certains régiments le droit de fonder de nouveaux établissements de caractère *hajdú* (pour le second cas cf. la requête du régiment de István Kajdi).[27]

Dès alors cette exigence de la paysannerie n'était ni irréalisable, ni inacceptable de la part de la noblesse (ce que d'ailleurs la marche des événements ne tardera pas à prouver). Pour mieux dire, à mesure que la satisfaction de cette exigence aurait limité le rassemblement national *d'en haut*, du côté de la noblesse, elle l'aurait aussi élargi et affermi *d'en bas*, du côté des masses paysannes. L'exemple héroïque des communes Tarpa et Diószeg qui, au cours de la guerre d'indépendance, avait obtenu les privilèges des villes *hajdú*, de même que le fait que les serfs armés étaient prêts à servir pendant la guerre d'indépendance et après sa victoire dans des organisations de *hajdú*-s, prouvent que la satisfaction des exigences des classes concernant les privilèges des *hajdú*-s, aurait ouvert une puissante source d'énergie de la lutte nationale.

D'autre part, en quoi consistaient les exigences de classe de la noblesse après son adhésion? Comme il ressort des nombreuses doléances des paysans, la plupart des propriétaires, négligeant les mesures formulées par la patente de Vetés dans l'intérêt de la paysannerie, voulaient rétablir leur pouvoir féodal sans aucune restriction. Beaucoup de paysans se plaignent au prince que, malgré l'ordonnance de celui-ci «leurs femmes restées auprès des foyers de famille se voyaient chargies de corvée soit par le seigneur, soit par le comitat.«[28] Selon d'autres requêtes, «ceux qui refusaient d'aller travailler, étaient amendés; on confisquait même leurs bestiaux.»[29] Selon le dépositaire d'une plainte, «à la maison nos pères et nos serviteurs sont incessamment harcelés par les officiers du Noble Comitat qui leur exigent des redevances et des services.»[30] «Le joug féodal est devenu plus pesant, et si l'on refuse de servir, le seigneur nous menace de nous bannir de notre terre.»[31] Citons encore les paroles d'un vieux guerrier qui était

[26] R. *Kiss :* op. cit. pp. 144—5. Juillet 1704.
[27] Ibidem, p. 145. Cf. encore la requête du régiment de Soltis, G. Balogh et Kövesdi (note 16).
[28] Cf. Archivum Rákóczianum. T. L. Pest 1873, pp. 233—4, 240.
[29] Cf. la requête du régiment de István Kajdi, 1706 (Folyamodványok. Ol R. Sz. lt. II. 2. o. (A).
[30] Voir p. ex. la requête d'André Bési Bereznai. 11 février 1704. Miskolc (Folyamodványok Ol R. szh. lt. II. 2. f.)
[30]*b* Voir la requête de Soltis, G. Balogh et Kövesdi (note 16).
[31] Requête de Gergely Suponyo et de ses compagnons. 10 mai 1705. Eger (Folyamodványok. Ol R. szh. lt. II. 2.).

dès le début avec ses deux fils au service de Rákóczi et dont la femme et les autres enfants furent quand même bannis du lopin de terre où ils vivaient.[32] Quel fut l'effet de *cette* attitude sur le sort de la guerre d'indépendance? Pour s'en convaincre, on n'a qu'à lire les déclarations des soldats du régiment d'Albert Kiss : «étant donné que nous sommes menacés de périr, nous ne pouvons plus offrir nos services à votre Altesse et à notre noble patrie.»[33] Au surplus, l'intervention des propriétaires terriens et des prêtres tendait à agir même directement sur le camp des insurgés. Comme on lit dans une requête des habitants de Mezőterebes, rédigée dans les premiers mois de 1704, « . . . arrivant dans notre village un moine d'Ujhely, le P. Hyacinthe, ordonna que nous tous qui mettons nos armes à la disposition de Votre Altesse amenons nos femmes et nos enfants et que l'usufruit des champs et des forêts soit désormais interdit à tous les gens de cette espèce. Je vous emmenerai, dit-il, des serfs qui seront sous mon commandement et qui devront m'obéir.»[34] En Transylvanie, au milieu de 1704, les «Ordres seigneuriaux» s'attaquent au point le plus vulnérable du rassemblement: ils veulent enlever à la paysannerie l'espoir même de son affranchissement dans un proche avenir. Ils comportent, lisons-nous dans les plaintes adressées par plusieurs lieutenants à la Diète de Transylvanie, des rumeurs «d' après lesquelles les serfs auraient en vain recouru à la force des armes : après la fin des hostilités, ils retomberaient dans le servage. Les propos de ce genre ont découragé beaucoup de nos soldats à tel point qu' ils ont déjà déposé des armes ou s'ils ne l'ont pas encore fait, ils en cherchent l'occasion ; en tout cas, ils évitent nos camps.»[35] Les efforts des propriétaires tendaient donc à saboter, directement ou indirectement, la cause de la concentration nationale, et à limiter les sources d'énergie de la guerre d'indépendance.

Quelle était l'attitude de Rákóczi vis-à-vis de l'exaspération des antagonismes et du conflit d'intérêt des classes opposées? Restait-il fidèle à la politique du rassemblement national pendant ces années qui représentaient la période ascendante de la guerre d'indépendance? Certes, Rákóczi savait s'élever bien au-dessus de sa classe et de son milieu féodal ; c'est de cette perspective qu'il envisageait aussi bien le problème du servage que celui du rassemblement national. Au baron István Sennyei, par exemple, qui avait recouru à des mesures violentes aux dépens d'un village de serfs, il adressa la demande suivante : «Modérons-nous encore en ce qui concerne la réparation de nos dommages. Grâce à la liberté, Dieu vous donnera tout ce qu'il faut, mais sans cette liberté nous n'aurons rien.»[36] Lorsque Samuel Ebecki, chef de la chancellerie de Ber-

[32] Requête de Péter Karácson. 4 avril 1705 (Folyamodványok — Ol R. szh. lt. II. 2. f.).
[33] Requête des soldats du régiment d'Albert Kiss. 13 avril 1704. Eger (Folyamodványok. Ol R. szh. lt. II. 2. f.).
[34] Requête des habitants de Sztrabicsó, 14 avril 1704. Eger (folyamodványok. Ol R. szh. lt. II. 2. f.).
[35] R. *Kiss :* op. cit. p. 144. Juillet 1704.
[36] Archivum Rákóczianum, T. I. p. 151. 11 décembre 1703.

csényi, essayait de récupérer ses serfs évadés, il lui adressa une admonestation laconique : «Ce moment n'est pas favorable à la poursuite des serfs.»[37] Il écoutait volontiers les plaintes de ces derniers ; durant son règne sa porte était toujours ouverte aux paysans. Les requêtes présentées par ses Kouroutz, ainsi que par les familles de ceux-ci ont gardé bien des traces des mesures prises en faveur des serfs : le prince assurait les frais nécessaires pour soigner les blessés, il accordait aux Kouroutz délivrés la solde remontant au temps de leur captivité et aux veuves de guerre la solde convenue, exonérant les dernières de toutes redevances pour une année, etc.[38] Quelle était son attitude vis-à-vis des moments essentiels de l'antagonisme des serfs et de la noblesse? D'une côté, il obligea les seigneurs et les comitats de n'exiger aucun service aux familles des soldats ;[39] d'autre part il énonçait à plusieurs reprises que le père d'un soldat, s'il partage la condition des serfs ne pouvait être exempt de l'impôt et des redevances.[40] D'une part il ramena *manu militari* à leurs lots de terre les familles bannies des soldats ; d'autre part il obligea de la même manière les serfs désobéissants de s'acquitter de leurs obligations, envoyant à cet effet un «renfort militaire» assez conséquent pour étouffer tout essais d'inobédience et pour rétablir les services normaux qui avaient existé auparavant.[41] Cela veut dire que Rákóczi restait fidèle à la politique du rassemblement national, ou, plus exactement, à cette forme de la réglementation des rapports des seigneurs et des serfs qui, en vue du rassemblement des forces ne pouvait guère jouer le même rôle dans les années suivantes. En automme de 1703 il s'agissait d'attacher la noblesse adhérée «malgré lui» à la cause de l'indépendance au camp des luttes nationales dans l'atmosphère créée par un puissant mouvement populaire, dans ces conditions même à propos des problèmes des serfs il fallait faire certaines concessions en faveur de la noblesse. Mais cette situation ne s'avéra pas durable. Pendant que les exigences de classe de la paysannerie contribuaient à l'élan de la lutte nationale, le rôle dirigeant de la noblesse qui s'affermissait de plus en plus tendait plutôt à restreindre les sources intérieures du rassemblement. Dans cette nouvelle situation il fallait faire des concessions plutôt à la paysannerie, précisément dans l'intérêt du rassemblement national. Il aurait fallu aller plus loin que les mesures prévues par la patente de Vetés et satisfaire l'exigence principale de la paysannerie : pour l'époque qui devait succéder à la guerre d'indépen-

[37] Ol R. szh. II. 2. f. 29 mai 1705.

[38] Voir p. ex. la requête de l'épouse d'István Patai en date du 16 avril 1704. Eger ; la requête de l'épouse de György Bud en date du 20 avril 1704, Jászberény ; celle de l'épouse de György Cseh, en date du 19 mai 1705, Eger ; celle de la veuve de Máté Szkucska d'Ocsova en date du 2 septembre 1706, Esztergom, etc. (Folyamodványok. — Ol R. szh. lt. II. 2. f.).

[39] Voir p. ex la requête des soldats de Nagyfalu en date du mai 24, 1705, Eger ; celle d'André Bési Bereznai en date du 11 février 1704, Miskolc (Folyamodványok. Ol. R. szh. lt. II. 2. f.).

[40] Voir p. ex. la requête d'André Tót Karabélyos en date du 12 juin 1705, Eger (Folyamodványok. Ol. R. szh. lt. II. 2. f.).

[41] Archivum Rákóczianum, I[ère] série, t. I. pp. 166—7.; 2. juillet 1704; ibid. p. 153, 22 décembre 1703 ; Károlyi Oklevéltár (Documents concernant la famille Károlyi), V, p. 192, 2 mai 1705 : Történelmi Tár, 1901, p. 401, 17 juin 1705, etc.

dance, il aurait fallu lui assurer l'affranchissement grâce à des privilèges semblables à ceux des villes de hajdú-s.

Mais Rákóczi, bien qu'il voulût s'en tenir à l'idée du rassemblement des forces, n'a pas encore reconnu la nécessité de cette démarche à ce moment-là, pendant la période ascendante de la guerre d'indépendance. Si supérieur qu'il fût à son entourage, il ne pouvait se soustraire à son influence et se débarrasser entièrement de ses contraintes de classe. En 1704 aux soldats et aux *hajdú*-s qui enduraient la misère au château de Munkács et qui, dans leur requête rappelaient au prince sa promesse d'être exempts un jour de toutes les obligations il répondit : « . . . Nous n'avons guère pris les armes pour abolir les droits et la liberté des seigneurs.» Dans ces conditions il est impossible de vous libérer *entièrement* de vos obligations vis-à-vis des seigneurs, néanmoins, pendant que les serfs servent sous les drapeaux, ils ne peuvent être contraints à aucun service.[42] En 1705 la diète de Szécsény qui indentifia l'organisation du rassemblement national avec la confédération des Ordres, n'a pas contribué non plus à la solution des problèmes des serfs. Selon l'article 19 des résolutions de la diète de Szécsény les soldats enrôlés furent obligés de rester dans l'armée jusqu'à la fin des hostilités. Cette disposition aurait dû être suivie d'un article sur les récompenses à accorder aux serfs fidèles à l'armée et contenant aussi au moins des promesses concernant leur affranchissement. Mais on n'y trouve rien de pareil : le code de Szécsény se termine par l'article 19 . . . Quant au Conseil Économique, créé par la même diète, les instructions élaborées à son usage par le prince en personne ne vont pas non plus au-delà de la patente de Vetés ; il n'y est question que des mesures encore plus draconiennes pour parer la désobéissance et l' «insolence» des paysans restés dans leurs foyers.[43]

Ce n'est donc pas un cas fortuit qu'après la diète de Szécsény l'élan du rassemblement national commence à s'affaiblir et que les antagonismes intérieurs viennent à la surface. La noblesse s'enhardit au cours des années suivantes, elle fera valoir tous ses droits seigneuriaux vis-à-vis des paysans non enrôlés et, dans bien des cas, elle ne respectera point les ordonnances de Rákóczi concernant l'exemption des membres de son armée. Voici ce qu'on lit à ce sujet dans la requête des soldats de Porcsalmás : «D'un côté, nous endurons la misère au camp, de l'autre, malgré l'exiguité de nos biens, les officiers exigent de nos pauvres familles restées sans maître aussi bien la dîme que l'impôt sur l'habitation et sur la terre ; il en est comme auparavant, sous le régime des Allemands».[44] Le seigneur, mécontent de ne pouvoir plus disposer chez lui de nos services, me traîte en tyran» — écrit un soldat désespéré de la garde de Rákóczi et ajoute : «comment pourrais-je faire mon service militaire, si même à la maison

[42] Requête du régiment de Soltis, G. Balogh et Kövesdi, cf. la note 16.
[43] Cf. Magyar Gazdaságtörténelmi Szemle, 1897, p. 119, 7 octobre 1705.
[44] Requête des soldats de Porcsalmás, régiment du capitaine Bálint Ilosvay, 17 novembre 1706. Lőrinci (Folyamodványok. Ol R. szh. lt. II. 2. f.).

j'endure les pires persécutions?»[44b] Les actes de violence des seigneurs pesaient non seulement sur les familles des serfs enrôlés, mais aussi sur ces derniers : en un mot, les propriétaires formulaient un programme préconisant le rétablissement de leurs droits sur les insurgés. Pour citer un cas concret en été de 1706, lorsque Tamás Esze essaie de réorganiser son régiment, les propriétaires résistent à cette tentative et, s'opposant à l'ordonnance de Rákóczi qui prévoit une intervention *manu militari* auprès de ceux qui «cachent leurs serfs et refusent de suspendre leur juridiction seigneuriale»[45], ne se soucient point du fait que par leur égoïsme, par leurs intérêts de classe ils travaillent de plus en plus contre la combativité des troupes des Kouroutz. Les Ordres de Transylvanie agissent encore plus ouvertement : quand, en avril 1707, à la diète de Marosvásárhely, a lieu l'installation de Rákóczi au siège princier, les Ordres, malgré les protestations du prince, réintroduisent une loi, en vertu de laquelle le seigneur peut revendiquer les serfs qui avaient pris les armes sans son consentement. Les propriétaires transylvains, écrit Tamás Esze au prince dans une lettre désespérée, «ne veulent point que ces soldats agissent au service de la patrie ; bien au contraire, leur unique souci consiste à récupérer et à poursuivre les serfs.»[46] Et écoutons Rákóczi lui-même à ce sujet : «Les Sicules furent réduits à la servitude . . . par leurs propres officiers qui, d'une manière inconcevable, abusive et contraire à la loi, les retenaient au service militaire et leur ordonnaient de cultiver leurs terres.»[47] Dans ces conditions il n'était point surprenant de voir que bientôt la Transylvanie devint tout à fait incapable de parer au coup de l'ennemi. Ces malheurs n'empêchaient pas les seigneurs de Hongrie de suivre l'exemple des Transylvains. En 1707, écrivait Rákóczi : «même en Hongrie la noblesse reprenait de plus en plus le pouvoir sur les serfs et cherchait à les détourner de la guerre pour avoir de la main d'oeuvre pour leurs terres.»[48] Les Ordres transdanubiens, lors de leur réunion à Sümeg, exigeaient que «les serfs partis à la guerre sans leur consentement leur fussent rendus *ad requisitionem*».[49] Dans la Haute-Hongrie, apprenons-nous d'une lettre particulièrement émue de Tamás Esze, les serfs armés sont retenus ou récupérés par les seigneurs ; celui qui excelle dans ces machinations est Sándor Károlyi : il produit des actes attestant l'exemption au service militaire de ses serfs et ceux de sa famille. «Leurs Seigneuries, écrit Esze, au lieu d'accroître les troupes, n'accroissent que le nombre des serfs.»[50] Cela revenait à dire que la noblesse, en pleine guerre, cherchait à démobiliser la plu-

[44b] Requête de Péter Gór, membre de la garde, 25 septembre 1706. Ujbars (Folyamodványok. Ol R. szb. lt. II. 2. f.).

[45] Cité par Tamás Esze — Köpeczi Béla : Tamás Esze. Budapest, 1952, p. 62.

[46] Lettre du 7 juin de T. Esze à Rákóczi, Ekemező. Ol R. szh. lt. II. 2. e/A.

[47] II. Rákóczi Ferenc emlékiratai, p. 167.

[48] Ibidem. p. 169.

[49] Történelmi Tár 1899, p. 199, janvier 1708.

[50] Cf. la lettre du 27 janvier 1708 de T. Esze à Rákóczi, Smizna prope Iglo. Ol R. szh. lt. II. 2. e.A.

part des troupes craignant la force des serfs armés et s'efforçaient par tous les moyens à maintenir l'exploitation féodale.

L'affermissement du rôle prépondérant des nobles avait d'ailleurs aussi une autre conséquence, non moins dangereuse pour la cause du rassemblement national : les serfs enrôlés se décourageaient de plus en plus et les hors-la-loi perdaient également leur enthousiasme. Selon une chanson de 1706 qui reproduit l'entretien de deux hors-la-loi quelque part «dans le champ» «quand nos seigneurs sont arrivés dans le pays, ils avaient rendu honneur à beaucoup de hors-la-loi» ; en revanche, maintenant «personne n'estime plus ces vagabonds, parce que ce sont les seigneurs vêtus de fourrures qui dominent . . . »[51] C'étaient bien les seigneurs qui provoquaient toutes les doléances des hors-la-loi : à cause d'eux «le sang des derniers n'est guère épargné»,[51b] la monnaie de cuivre s'est dépréciée et le salaire mensuel d'un *hajdú* ne suffit pour acheter une paire de sandales rustiques (bocskor).[52c] C'est également à cause de ces seigneurs que les hors-la-loi sont déçus : ils ne mettent plus d'espoir dans les promesses concernant leur affranchissement. «Certes, nous aimions beaucoup le mouvement des Kouroutz, parce que nous espérions obtenir la *liberté* «— chante un hors-le-loi sur un ton plein d'amertume.» Mais l'heure ardemment désirée de la liberté n'est pas venue ; comme ils voient, même «les promesses ont changé». «Voilà pourquoi beaucoup de hors-la-loi sont si déçus.»[52] Pour les mêmes raisons certaines troupes s'éparpillent ou — comme en Transylvanie et dans la région située au-delà de la Tisza — «se retirent dans les montagnes pour y massacrer plusieurs seigneurs en un seul jour».[53] Malgré toutes ces difficultés, les serfs enrôlés continuent à donner maintes preuves de leur endurance, de leur vaillance et de la conscience nationale qui inspire leur âme. Beaucoup d'entre eux voient nettement, écrit au prince un serf devenu militaire en 1706 «que le rétablissement de la liberté est une tâche bien ardue qui ne peut être réalisée que par les armes fortes et victorieuses de Votre Altesse et par beaucoup de patriotes fidèles à Votre Altesse et prêts à verser leur sang pour la cause nationale . . .»[54] «Comme je viens de l'apprendre, écrit le prince un peu plus tard à Bercsényi, des rapports de quelques officiers revenus du comitat de Nógrád, les habitants de cette région n'hésitèrent point à participer à l'insurrection proclamée par Vous».[54] Et voici ce que, deux ans plus tard, Bercsényi communiquera au

[51] Két szegénylegénynek egymással való beszélgetése. Op. cit. pp. 330, 332. Voir encore : T. Esze : Irodalomtörténet, 1949, p. 256.

[51b] A szegénylegények éneke (Chanson des hors-la-loi). Op. cit. p. 335. 51. c. Lettre de T. Esze à Rákóczi, 6 juillet 1707. Harság. Ol R. szh. lt. 2. e./A. Cf. Magyar Századok, p. 136.

[52] A szegénylegények éneke (Chanson des hors-la-loi). Op. cit. p. 335, Két szegénylegénynek egymással való beszélgetése. Op. cit. p.333, 331. Cf. T. Esze : A szegénylegények éneke. Magyar Századok. Budapest, 1948. p., 131.

[53] Section des Manuscrits à la Bibliothèque Széchenyi. Fol, Hung. (Doc. Thaly). VII. pp. 126—7. juin 1707.

[54] Requête de Pál Gyürki de Rimaszombat. 1 août 1706. Érsekújvár. (Folyamodványok. Ol R. szh. lt. II. 2. f.).

prince dans un de ses rapports : «L'armée ne pense plus à la solde ; les soldats se rendent compte du fait qu'il n'y a plus moyen de la payer! La solde c'est quelque chose de *supervacaneum* (superflu) ; cette fois aussi, ce ne fut point l'argent qui ranima les coeurs, mais l'espoir éveillé par mes belles paroles.»[55] Néanmoins la difficulté consistait précisément en ce que l'espoir de l'affranchissement malgré les promesses éloguentes commençait à déserter les coeurs des serfs enrôlés et des hors-la-loi ; jusque-là cet espoir ne pouvait s'appuyer sur rien de précis . . .

Pour caractériser la grandeur et la perspicacité politique de Rákóczi, il suffit de rappeler que déjà en 1707, c'est-à-dire à l'apogée des succès de la guerre d'indépendance aussi bien dans le domaine de la politique intérieure qu'au point de vue international, le prince se rendait bien compte de tous ces changements et ne tardait pas à en tirer certaines conclusions. Ses expériences transylvaines ne firent qu'aggraver sa déception; dans cette province, comme il l'écrivait dans un passage rempli d'indignation, rédigé en mars 1707, «j'étais scandalisé par la tyrannie et la rapacité des puissants ; je vois bien que l'unique raison qui les avaient décidés à prendre les armes, c'était de pouvoir agir à la manière Allemande ce que, bien entendu, ils n'auraient pu faire sous le régime des derniers; ils ne s'étaient point proposé le but de faire de la liberté un bien commun . . .[56] De même le prince pouvait tirer des conclusions analogues de ses expériences de Hongrie : les comitats, s'opposant aux résolutions de la diète d'Ónod sur la contribution aux charges communes, «et ayant l'habitude de se soustraire à toute espèce de contribution, n'hésitaient pas à imposer la paysannerie pauvre et ne considéraient pas comme un crime qui criait vengeance au ciel leur essai d'aggraver la misère des misérables.»[57] A la fin de 1707, Rákóczi déclara ouvertement à la diète de Kassa que «l'action militaire ayant été commencée avec l'appui enthousiaste des paysans, il fallait tout faire pour éliminer leur déception» dans le cas contraire, «le feu que nous avons attisé contre l'ennemi, pourrait bien servir d'arme aux pauvres contre nous mêmes.»[58] Dès cette époque le prince était convaincu que la contribution aux charges communes devait être réglementée en faveur des serfs et qu'il fallait endiguer aussi les abus des comitats ; néanmoins ce n'est qu'une année après que la défaite de Trencsén lui dictera une autre résolution, formulée à la diète de Sárospatak (novembre — décembre 1708) : il faut satisfaire à la principale exigence des serfs armés et des hors-la-loi, accordant l'affranchissement définitif, la possession de la terre et une organisation semblable à celle des villes de *hajdú*-s aux serfs qui combattront jusqu'au bout aux côtés de Rákóczi.[59]

[54b] Archivum Rákóczianum. Ière série, t. I. p. 617. 12 septembre 1706.
[55] Archivum Rákóczianum. Ière série, t. VI. pp. 78—9. 15 sept. 1708.
[56] Archivum Rákóczianum. Ière série, t. II. p. 61. 27 mars 1707.
[57] Ol R. sz. lt. II. 3. e. 15 septembre 1707.
[58] Imre Wellmann: Az 1707. évi kassai országgyűlés tárgyalásai (Les débats de la diète de Kassa en 1707). Levéltári Közlemények, 1935. pp. 50—1 ; décembre 1707.
[59] Cf. Gróf Eszterházi Antal kuruc generális tábori könyve. (Journal du camp du général kouroutz Cte A. Eszterházi) 1706—1709. Budapest, 1901 p. 286. 18 décembre 1708.

La résolution de Sárospatak est un important document de la guerre d'indépendance et de la politique nationale de Rákóczi. Elle montre que la prince a enfin inséré dans la loi la promesse faite aux hors-la-loi au début du soulèvement ; à propos de la question des serfs — dépassant de beaucoup les autres membres de sa classe — il alla jusqu'à un point qui représentait la limite même des concessions compatibles avec une guerre d'indépendance dirigée par la noblesse. Autrement dit, il manifesta sa fidélité à la politique du rassemblement national. Mais à ce moment-là, à l'époque du déclin de la guerre d'indépendance, la résolution de Sárospatak ne suffisait plus pour affermir le camp des insurgés et pour en élargir les bases populaires. De même que le point de vue reflété par la patente de Vetés avait été la garantie du rassemblement national en 1703, mais la défense des mêmes principes ne convenait plus à la situation de 1705, un remaniement de la réglementation du problème de serfs dans l'esprit de la résolution de Patak aurait pu donner une nouvelle source d'énergie au rassemblement national en 1705, mais il ne pouvait plus le sauver en 1708. Les années qui s'étaient écoulées depuis 1705, avaient sensiblement modifié les rapports réciproques des classes et leur attitude vis-à-vis du rassemblement national. Durant ces années la noblesse proclamaient ouvertement son programme qui impliquait le désarmement des serfs enrôlés et leur remise sous l'autorité seigneuriale : quant aux hors-la-loi armés, ils furent découragés par l'évanouissement de l'espoir de l'affranchissement et par les tentatives des seigneurs de les réduire au servage. Par ces conditions ils s'éloignaient de plus en plus de la cause de la guerre d'indépendance. La résolution de Sárospatak étant venue trop tard : elle ne pouvait plus galvaniser les masses. Les antagonismes intérieurs étaient déja trop aigus : il ne pouvait en résulter que de la désorganisation du rassemblement des forces.

Au cours des années suivantes la désorganisation fit des progrès bien rapides. Les «Kouroutz malgré eux», notamment les grands propriétaires et beaucoup de membres de la noblesse moyenne qui, pendant quelque temps, avaient appuyé la cause de la liberté, finirent par déserter le camp de Rákóczi ; même s'ils ne s'y décidaient pas, ils ne pensaient qu'à une sorte de compromis, c'est-à-dire à la capitulation devant les Impériaux, en échange du maintien de leurs privilèges féodaux et de leurs propriétés. Au cours de ces années la Cour et la réaction ecclésiastiques firent aussi des tentatives pour attirer une partie de la paysannerie et pour l'employer *contre* Rákóczi, mais tous ces essais étaient voués à l'échec. Des milliers de serfs armés et de hors-la-loi continuaient à lutter jusqu'au bout contre les propriétaires traîtres ou prêts à la trahison ; ces gens-là restaient donc fidèles à la cause nationale. Quant aux autres serfs qui avaient été déçus et découragés par la prépondérance des intérêts féodaux, ils se sentirent incapable de prendre les armes *contre* la cause nationale. Après la défaite aussi, la paysannerie restait fidèle à son chef ; la nécessité de la lutte nationale était si profondément empreinte dans sa conscience que même plusieurs dizaines d'an-

nées après le nom seul de Rákóczi et un vague espoir de son retour suffiront pour soulever les masses paysannes.

Pourquoi avons-nous fêté il y a quelques mois avec une fierté légitime une de nos plus glorieuses traditions historiques, le 250e anniversaire du début de la guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi? Le principal motif de cette fête était le fait qu'il s'agissait d'un mouvement fondé sur les larges masses du peuple sur un rassemblement national soutenu par la force de la paysannerie ; d'un mouvement qui, pendant de longues années, s'opposait héroïquement aux oppresseurs étrangers pour assurer l'évolution indépendante de la nation hongroise. Et qu' avons-nous appris de l'histoire de cette guerre d'indépendance? Nous en avons tiré la conclusion que le rassemblement national, pour être ferme et indissoluble, pour mener une lutte impitoyable contre tous les ennemis du peuple travailleur, doit être basé sur l'alliance et la communauté d'intérêt des classes laborieuses. Pour résumer cette conclusion, les hors-la-loi devenus Kouroutz forgèrent, il y a 250 ans, les vers poignants que voici : «Magyarországot megnyertük volna, Ha sok fondorkodó urak nem lettek volna.»[60] (Nous aurions conquis la Hongrie, s'il n'y avait eu tant de seigneurs intrigants.) De nos jours la démocratie populaire hongroise, ayant définitivement évincé ces «seigneurs intrigants», a enfin atteint son but: elle a réellement conquis le pays.

ВОПРОС НАЦИОНАЛЬНОГО ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЯ В ПЕРИОД ОСВОБОДИТЕЛЬНОЙ ВОЙНЫ, ВОЗГЛАВЛЯЕМОЙ РАКОЦИ

Ж. П. Пах

Резюме

Решающим вопросом борьбы венгерского народа за независимость в XVII. столетии, предшествовавшей освободительной войне, возглавляемой Ракоци, являлось: способна ли выступающая против габсбургского абсолютизма группа помещичьего класса опираться на крестьянство ; смеет ли она использовать богатые источники революционных сил, кроющиеся в трудящихся массах ; сможет ли она создать широкое, базирующееся на трудящихся массах национальное объединение, которое является единственной гарантией завоевания и сохранения национальной независимости.

В освободительной войне Ракоци, благодаря почину крестьянства — скрывающихся в лесах от угнетения помещиков крестьян, — и вследствие воодушевления крепостных солдат, а также целеустремленной национальной политики Ракоци, далеко превосходящей феодальное окружение, осуществилось широкое национальное объединение, сделавшее возможными успехи освободительной войны в ее первые годы.

Упадок освободительной войны в значительной степени можно объяснять обострением внутренних противоречий именно национального объединения, что являлось последствием укрепления феодального руководства. Феодальные помещики, боясь вооруженных крепостных и в интересах сохранения феодальной эксплоатации, стремились к разоружению большой части войск в самый разгар войны. Из-за беспощадного осуществления феодальных классовых интересов крестьянство все более теряло охоту к борьбе, слабела его готовность к бою.

[60] A szegénylegények éneke Op. cit. p. 335. Cf. Magyar Századok, p. 137.

Сам Ракоци твердо придерживался политики национального объединения; точнее: той формы урегулирования отношений между помещиками и крепостными, которую он изложил в первый год восстания, осенью 1703 года, в Ветешском патенте в целях обеспечения национального объединения. Но эта форма урегулирования отношений между помещиками и крепостными, вследствие сдвига в соотношениях классовых сил, в последующие годы становилась все более непригодной для этой роли. Надо было бы сделать новый важный шаг вперед, выполнив главное требование вооруженного крестьянства, обеспечив свободу и на время после окончания освободительной войны, обещая дать крестьянству привилегии гайдукских городов.

Однако Ракоции в восходящий период освободительной войны еще не осознал необходимость этого шага; он еще находился под влиянием феодального окружения, не мог преодолеть классовые ограничения. Таким образом, это требование было осуществлено только в нисходящий период освободительной войны, в решении, принятом в Шарошпатаке в 1708 году. Это решение уже опоздало, не смогло всколыхнуть массы. Внутренние противоречия обострились уже до крайности, началось разложение национального объединения.

Главный урок освободительной войны Ракоци заключается в следующем: национальное объединение может быть действительно прочным и нерушимым только в том случае, если оно базируется на союзе трудящихся классов, основано на их интересах и ведет беспощадную борьбу со всеми врагами трудящегося народа.

К ВОПРОСУ О ПОЛОЖЕНИИ И ЗАДАЧАХ ВЕНГЕРСКОЙ ИСТОРИЧЕСКОЙ НАУКИ

(МАТЕРИАЛЫ ДИСКУССИЙ РАСШИРЕННОЙ РЕДКОЛЛЕГИИ ЖУРНАЛА ОБЩЕСТВА ВЕНГЕРСКИХ ИСТОРИКОВ »*SZÁZADOK*« (»*Века*«)*

Постановления партии и правительства, опубликованные в июне и октябре 1953 года, оказали решающую помощь дальнейшему развитию и расцвету Венгерской Народной Республики. Эти постановления показали путь к реальной оценке положения в хозяйственной, политической и культурной жизни страны, к подведению итогов достигнутых до сих пор результатов, к преодолению ошибок и помогли наметить очередные задачи.

Эти исторические постановления, а также итоги Съезда венгерских историков, состоявшегося в июне 1953 г., сделали возможным и необходимым, чтобы венгерские историки изучали положение исторической науки и обсудили стоящие перед ними задачи. Этой цели служили дискуссии расширенной редколлегии журнала Общества венгерских историков »Századok« (»Века«) в конце прошлого года.

Основой дискуссии служил доклад генерального секретаря Общества венгерских историков, Лайоша Элекеша, глубоко оценивший результаты и широкое влияние Съезда венгерских историков. В докладе подверглись критике отдельные доклады Съезда и отмечались общие ошибки и недостатки Съезда в целом. Так докладчик указал, например, на то, что на Съезде не были организованы дискуссии, связанные с отдельными докладами, и вообще весь характер докладов не способствовал развертыванию дискуссий. Принципиальная критика реакционных школ историографии была пропущена из докладов, и тем самым докладчики лишили самих себя, а также всех слушателей мощного оружия марксистско-ленинской науки — открытой дискуссии. Наблюдались недостатки в освещении всемирно-исторических взаимоотношений, бросалось в глаза отсутствие выводов из истории развития народов, живших в системе монархии Габсбургов. В отдельных докладах проявлялись тенденции к упрощению, а также пережитки позитивизма. Разоблачение политики национального гнета венгерских господствующих классов не занимало должного места в тематике Съезда. Съезд только частично дал возможность познакомиться с несколь-

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кими областями истории, в которых уже велась значительная исследовательская работа. Особенно заслуживает сожаления тот недостаток Съезда, что на нем не было доклада, который, охватывая все развитие венгерской исторической науки со времени освобождения нашей страны, осветил и критически оценил бы это развитие и наметил бы наши дальнейшие задачи. Однако, Съезд, несмотря на его недостатки, был большой пробой сил и смотром нашей исторической науки и одновременно значительным этапом ее развития. Он дал результаты решающего значения, особенно в области выяснения общих с дружескими странами исторических вопросов и укрепления дружеского сотрудничества историков заинтересованных стран, в частности всемирно известных представителей советской науки. Делегации историков дружеских стран, во главе с советской делегацией, на совещаниях Съезда, состоявшихся в узком круге специалистов, проделали большую работу по выяснению общих проблем и задач. С помощью их предложений возникшие вопросы получили более широкое освещение, были подняты на более высокий уровень и направлены на путь ближайшего осуществления. В ходе этого сотрудничества проявилось твердое принципиальное единство венгерских и зарубежных историков.

Лайош Элекеш затем кратко остановился на предложениях ученых дружеских стран и венгерских историков, заложивших основу дальнейшего успешного и тесного сотрудничества между странами, строящими социализм.

Выводы, сделанные из положительных результатов и недостатков Съезда, дают точки зрения для дальнейшего, более широкого изучения положения венгерской исторической науки, а документы основного принципиального значения, опубликованные в период после Съезда, как, например, постановления ЦК КПСС, тезисы ЦК КПСС, опубликованные по случаю 50-летия КПСС, июньские и октябрьские постановления Венгерской Партии Трудящихся и правительства Венгерской Народной Республики, показывают путь к разрешению будущих задач венгерской историографии. Однако, чтобы наметить задачи, необходимо рассмотреть положительные результаты и недостатки прошлых лет.

В своем докладе Лайош Элекеш указал на тот факт, что развитие нашей культурной жизни, в том числе и венгерской исторической науки, в годы после освобождения страны отставало от успехов, достигнутых в области экономики и политики. С реорганизацией Академии Наук Венгрии произошел поворот в венгерской научной жизни. Поворот этот выражался, наряду с созданием Института венгерского рабочего движения, в общем собрании по реорганизации Общества венгерских историков весной 1949 года, в реорганизации Института истории Академии Наук, а также в создании единой организации и руководства архивами. Одновременно с этим в сознании значительной части венгерской интеллигенции — в том

числе и старых деятелей исторической науки — начался перелом, в результате распространения идей марксизма-ленинизма. Преобладающее большинство наших старых историков до освобождения страны совсем не было знакомо с идеями марксизма-ленинизма, с произведениями классиков, с успехами советской исторической науки. Они сомневались в правильности идей и методов исследований, неизвестных для них, чуждых их воспитанию и прежним взглядам. Эти сомнения не могли прекратиться до тех пор, пока правильность теории не была доказана им опытом повседневной жизни. Для наших старых историков это означало, наряду с общим опытом строительства нашей страны, опыт, приобретенный ими путем ознакомления с работами историков, вооруженных теорией марксизма-ленинизма, знающих опыт Советского Союза, путем оценки и сопоставления этих работ со своими собственными работами. Для историка, для ценящего себя и свою работу ученого, такое сопоставление не могло быть легким, но по истечении большего или меньшего срока времени его результаты должны были быть несомненными. Способствовали этому процессу статьи руководителей ВПТ и работы историков-коммунистов, показавших практический пример. Наряду со старым поколением историков, искавшим правильного пути, постепенно вырастало поколение молодых историков-марксистов.

В докладе Лайоша Элекеш в дальнейшем рассматривались начала научного планирования в период подготовки пятилетнего плана народного хозяйства, недостатки научного планирования, превышение размеров научных планов, тематические недостатки и т. д., а также проблемы, связанные с этим. Профиль научно-исследовательских учреждений не был сформирован и согласован, организация исследовательской работы встречалась с трудностями, а ввиду отсутствия опыта работа научных коллективов началась по неправильным соображениям.

Все же, несмотря на недостатки, некоторые успехи могли быть отмечены уже в начальный период. Большинство исследователей не ограничивалось тем, чтобы, критикуя и переоценивая раскрытый буржуазной историографией материал, использовать его, а старалось привлечь новый фактический архивный материал. Стали вновь выпускать журнал Общества венгерских историков »Századok» («Века«), который в общем и целом успешно справлялся с задачей объединения сил историков. В статьях, книгах, очерках этого периода, однако, возникала опасность уклона к экономизму и социологизированию. Теоретическая подготовка у большинства наших историков являлась слабой и, следовательно, отсутствовали принципиальная критика и дискуссии на высоком уровне. Этот недостаток мешал раскрытию и преодолению ошибок, индивидуальному развитию научных работников. Для устранения этих недостатков важные шаги были сделаны Центральным лекторским бюро ВПТ, влияние которого могло бы быть несомненно значительнее как на широкие круги партийных историков,

так и на беспартийных, если бы результаты дискуссий были бы систематически опубликованы. Допускались ошибки и в области критики и самокритики, не велась достаточно систематическая и широкая борьба против школ старой историографии, пережитков их взглядов.

II. Съезд Венгерской Партии Трудящихся поставил перед нашими историками большую почетную задачу, особо подчеркнув важность сохранения и популяризации наших прогрессивных традиций защиты отечества. Одновременно с этим центральной задачей историков стало составление учебников, стоящих на высоком научном, марксистско-ленинском уровне. Работа по составлению учебников, начатая в 1950 г., (первые два тома — с первобытно-общинного строя по 1918 г. — вскоре будут закончены), означала большую пробу сил для венгерских историков, но одновременно дала и большой толчок к поднятию новых проблем, к улучшению исследовательских методов, к правильному применению теории. Работа по составлению учебников объединила историков и послужила основой для создания единого фронта историков, который еще более укрепился такими событиями, как совещание расширенного комитета Общества венгерских историков в 1951 г., а также как торжества и работы, связанные с 150-летием со дня рождения Лайоша Кошут.

Затем в своем докладе Лайош Элекеш дал критический обзор исторических изданий, рассмотрел работу, проводимую в области библиографии и документации, а также широкую деятельность архивов Будапешта и провинции по раскрытию, регистрации и организации документов, ознакомил слушателей с музеями и выставками Института рабочего движения, привлекающими большие массы посетителей, и с научно-популярными изданиями и лекторской деятельностью Общества венгерских историков.

Венгерских историков в этой их хорошей и успешной работе вдохновляли замечательное строительство, осуществляемое в нашей стране, общее развитие, развертывание культурной революции, интерес широких слоев трудящихся к их работе. Они чувствовали всестороннюю помощь ВПТ и государства, оказанную фронту историков во всех его начинаниях.

Огромное значение в развитии венгерской исторической науки имеет помощь советской исторической науки, посещения и письменные советы советских ученых, ценные подарки советских библиотечных органов. Пример советской науки воспитывает в венгерских историках принципиальную требовательность, глубокую систематичность в исследовательской работе. Значительная часть наших недостатков вытекает из того, что мы все еще недостаточно следовали этому примеру, не творческим образом применяли ее принципиальные указания.

В своем докладе Лайош Элекеш подробно останавливался на недостатках работы историков. Прежде всего отмечались ошибки, выявленные в реферате на годичном собрании Академии Наук в 1951 г., в котором указа-

лись основные недостатки в выборе тем и методов работы, частично сохранившиеся до настоящего времени. Недостаточно разрабатываются вопросы истории рабочего движения, трудящегося народа, вопросы новейшего времени, периода народно-демократического строя; мало работы сделано по раскрытию исторических связей Венгрии с Советским Союзом и с народами соседних стран народной демократии; довольно заброшенными областями истории является военная история, история культуры и краеведение, не создана соответствующая регулярная связь с родственными науками.

Основным недостатком нашей марксистско-ленинской историографии до сих пор является теоретическая неуверенность, недостаточно высокий уровень марксистско-ленинской подготовки работников, что находится в связи с отсутствием дискуссий. Большую помощь оказали нашим историкам постановления XIX Съезда КПСС и выход в свет труда И. В. Сталина »Экономические проблемы социализма в СССР«. Эти исторические документы обсуждались венгерскими историками в целом ряде исторических учреждений в рамках дискуссий, продолжавшихся в течение нескольких дней. Эти дискуссии еще раз показали некоторую неисторичность и склонность к схематизму у наших историков. В большой мере проявляется схематизм и в значительной части опубликованных или готовящихся работ — в своей наиболее распространенной форме — в упрощенчестве, в одноплоскостном изображении сложных и противоречивых исторических процессов. Венгерским историческим исследованиям эта опасность угрожает больше, чем это кажется из вышедших работ. В работах, касающихся истории нашей страны в новое и новейшее времена, упрощение нередко приводит к искажению пропорций, сочетавшемуся с насильственной актуализацией.

Схематизм в большинстве случаев связан с тем недостатком нашей историографии, который может быть охарактеризован как провинциализм — это недостаточный учет параллели, взаимосвязей всеобщего исторического развития, в частности развития соседних нам народов. После преодоления опасности уклона к экономизму, среди исследователей крестьянских движений с молниеносной быстротой распространились ошибочные взгляды профессора Поршнева. Одновременно с этим, особенно в научно-популярных работах, на первый план выдвинулись исторические биографии, которые часто сопровождались культом личности, чуждым марксистско-ленинскому взгляду на историю.

Наряду с схематизмом в методе работы и в работах значительной части наших историков возникает — как тенденция и опасность — эмпиризм: такое представление, когда определенное количество фактов, без их теоретического обобщения, пригодно и достаточно для отражения действительности. Форма проявления эмпиризма — фактология, нагромождение фактов, когда автор слишком много дает говорить самим источ-

никам (тем самым автор перепоручает выполнение своих собственных задач читателям), а также эмпирический метод доказательства.

Наша критическая литература в большинстве своем тоже мало развита и представляет низкий уровень; в критике вообще отсутствует соответствующая перспектива, редко делались попытки для принципиальной критики отдельных работ. Источниковедение также не является достаточно развитым. Критический аппарат наших сборников материалов и документов вообще редко выходит за пределы формальной критики. Пренебрежение источниковедением может вести и ведет, с одной стороны, к субъективным трактовкам, а с другой стороны, к объективизму, выражающемуся в одинаковом подходе к данным разного характера и ценности. Неразвитость критики облегчает возрождение пережитков враждебных взглядов. Все эти недостатки были показаны в докладе с помощью конкретных примеров. Уровень лекторской работы над работами историков хотя и поднялся по сравнению с прежним, но все еще недостаточно высок. Недостатки наших исторических исследований оказывают влияние и на работу по популяризации науки, в которой эти ошибки проявляются с большей силой. Осуществлению правильной работы наших историков, необходимому углублению мешает и перегруженность большей части наших историков, а кроме того, максимализм в планировании и порою отсутствие в ней перспективы.

По преодолению этих недостатков большие задачи стоят перед Обществом Венгерских Историков, которое призвано создать научное общественное мнение и более оживленную и демократическую научную общественность и которое само имело серьезные ошибки в последние годы. Жизнь Общества ограничивалась узкими рамками, активность, инициатива членов не могли развернуться.

Задача заключается в том, чтобы поднять уровень работы историков до такого уровня, который требуется от нее стоящими перед нею задачами в области строительства нашей страны, развития политической сознательности и культурного уровня нашего трудящегося народа. Важным условием этого является дальнейшее укрепление единого фронта наших историков, дальнейшее теоретическое углубление нашей марксистско-ленинской историографии, ее методологическое развитие. Важнейшей задачей является повышение теоретического уровня наших историков и творческое применение теории марксизма-ленинизма по примеру советских историков. Основной предпосылкой повышения теоретической бдительности является создание условий открытых дискуссий; в этом отношении большие задачи стоят перед журналом Общества Венгерских Историков »Századok«. С помощью открытых дискуссий необходимо всемерно укреплять дух критики и самокритики, преодолеть пережитки мелкобуржуазного духа воздержания от критики, наблюдающиеся до сих пор в нашей исторической науке. Необходимо повысить требовательность в отношении четкости постановки

вопросов, сжатости и точности выражения, критического использования источников и вообще в области методологических требований. Необходимо вооружать наших исследователей против влияния скрытых форм проявления враждебных идеологий. Следует улучшить преподавание истории и систему подготовки научных кадров. В интересах улучшения преподавания истории в высших учебных заведениях необходимо стремиться к скорейшему осуществлению того принципа, чтобы каждый способный на это научный работник занимался педагогической работой и каждый преподаватель высшей школы вел исследовательскую работу. Готовящиеся учебники, тезисы которых были поставлены на обсуждение институтами истории СССР и стран народной демократии, окажут нам большую помощь в улучшении дела преподавания в высших учебных заведениях.

Кроме того, необходимо создать более непосредственную связь между исторической наукой и жизнью, между исследователями и интересующимися их работой людьми.

Все эти точки зрения в соответствии с их важностью должны быть учтены при подготовке и выполнении нашего второго пятилетнего плана. Наряду с мобилизацией широких кругов исследователей необходимо обеспечить тщательную подготовку плана изданий, основывающегося на намеченных задачах. Необходимо всегда руководствоваться лозунгом »лучше меньше, да лучше«. Следует организовать более согласованное сотрудничество исторических учреждений и выработать формы организованного сотрудничества между исторической наукой и родственными науками. Открывающиеся большие перспективы возможности, вытекающие из непосредственной помощи исторической науки дружеских стран, должны быть использованы. Используя имеющиеся возможности, планомерно преодолевая недостатки, мы можем умножить наши успехи и выполнить нашу работу таким образом, чтобы она шла в ногу с потребностями нашего трудящегося народа и развивающейся страны и помогала ей в строительстве социализма.

После доклада Лайоша Элекеш развернулась оживленная дискуссия, в которой был поднят целый ряд спорных вопросов и в которой приняли участие многочисленные историки — представители старого и молодого поколений, партийные и беспартийные, работающие в столице и в периферии историки.

Важным результатом дискуссии было то, что она далеко вышла за пределы поднятых в докладе проблем. Однако, так как сам доклад имел задачу послужить основой дискуссии, выступившие прежде всего подробно остановились на критике самого доклада.

Целым рядом выступивших была отмечена многосторонность доклада Лайоша Элекеш. Доклад был положительно оценен с такой точки зрения, что он позволил осветить все существенные вопросы работы историков.

Основной недостаток доклада выступившие определили в том, что в нем сравнительно мало использовались выводы, сделанные в изданных со времени Съезда документах, в тезисах, опубликованных по случаю 50-летия КПСС, а также в постановлениях ЦК ВПТ. Намеченные в этих постановлениях задачи будут нашими центральными задачами, исходя из которых мы должны пересмотреть и поднять на более высокий уровень всю работу в области исторической науки. Доклад должен был бы сосредоточить внимание на связи между постановлениями ЦК ВПТ и положением венгерской исторической науки. Отсутствие этого момента в докладе законно критиковалось многочисленными выступившими. Этот недостаток доклада не может быть оправдан тем, как объяснил Лайош Элекеш в своем ответе, что материал доклада был закончен еще до выхода октябрьских постановлений партии. Несколько выступивших не одобрили слишком смягчающий тон доклада. »В докладе хотя и поднято большинство основных проблем, — сказал Ласло Маккаи, заведующий группой Института истории Академии Наук, — но этим и заканчивается; следовало бы острее критиковать и наметить задачи«. Заместитель директора Института истории Академии Наук Жигмонд Пал Пах и доцент Политэкономического института им. К. Маркса Пал Шандор говорили о том, что доклад исключительно мало занимается теоретическими вопросами исторической науки, и это еще более бросается в глаза, если сравнить его с подобными обзорами советских авторов. В докладе должна была бы анализироваться работа, касающаяся того или иного основного вопроса истории Венгрии, в нем нужно было бы рассмотреть положение в области изучения объективного характера общественно-экономических законов, преодоления культа личности, изображения исторической роли крестьянства (Пах), необходимо было бы изучать, где и в какой мере наши историки отошли от учений марксизма-ленинизма, выявить пережитки буржуазной идеологии (Шандор). Следует, однако, признаться, что слабость принципиальной критики является недостатком не только одного доклада Лайоша Элекеш, но и всего нашего исторического фронта.

В критических замечаниях, в общем правильных, которые примыкали к докладу, обнаружился некоторый максимализм, как указал Л. Элекеш в своем ответе; однако, из этого венгерская историческая наука может только извлечь пользу для своей дальнейшей работы.

Выступавшие не ограничились критикой недостатков доклада, а сделали целый ряд критических замечаний или поднимали новые проблемы. Так, например, оценку Съезда историков они не сочли окончательной. Профессор Аладар Мод подчеркнул, что Съезд недостаточно был направлен на главную задачу — на выяснение больших принципиальных вопросов истории Венгрии. Дьёзё Эмбер, главный директор Национального архива заметил, что одним из недостатков Съезда явилось отсутствие на нем доклада,

который обсуждал бы положение венгерской исторической науки. Некоторые выступившие отметили, что до сих пор не сделано должное в интересах выполнения решений Съезда. Некоторые из выступивших — директор Института рабочего движения Ласло Рети, заведующий кафедрой высшей Партшколы Дежё Немеш и зав. группой Института истории Академии Наук Петер Ханак — возвратились к критике отдельных докладов Съезда, основательно и конкретно проанализировав их.

Наиболее плодотворные замечания в ходе дискуссии были направлены на обсуждение положения, недостатков и задач венгерской исторической науки. Несколько выступивших — заведующий отделом Института рабочего движения Шандор Дьёрффи, заведующий отделом Института истории Академии Наук Эндре Арато, адъюнкт Института им. Ленина Лайош Лукач, преподаватель Высшей Партийной Школы Петер Шимон — очень правильно подчеркнули выводы, которые могут быть сделаны для нашей историографии из тезисов, опубликованных по случаю 50-летия КПСС, а также из постановлений ЦК ВПТ, открывших новый этап развития нашей страны. Петер Шимон отметил, что задачи марксистско-ленинской историографии определяются потребностями классовой борьбы рабочего класса и руководимых им трудящихся масс. Эндре Арато говорил, что необходимо более решительно бороться против максимализма, каждый в своей области исследования, и следует еще раз критически пересмотреть уже опубликованные работы, чтобы не повторить допущенных ошибок. Шандор Дьёрффи подробно анализировал основные методологические выводы из тезисов, опубликованных по случаю 50-летия КПСС, и применил решения ЦК ВПТ к проблемам нашего исторического фронта. Из тезисов ЦК КПСС Дьёрффи сделал такой основной вывод: в центр нашего внимания нужно поставить основной марксиситский принцип — »Народ — это творец истории«. Тезисы одновременно обращают наше внимание на такую ошибку, которая нашла распространение и в пропагандистской работе Венгерской Партии Трудящихся — это опасность догматизма, талмудизма и механического применения положений марксизма-ленинизма. Одной из форм проявления догматизма в нашей историографии являлось чрезмерное пользование цитатами. С догматизмом было связано искажение нашего отношения к советской историографии. В то время, когда существо советской историографической школы — уважение к фактам, марксистский метод анализа, партийный, полемический, но в то же время глубоко научный, учитывающий объективные законы подхода к истории, — мы исключительно медленно и трудно усвоили, ошибочные же взгляды некоторых советских историков — обнаружившийся в отдельных местах культ личности, догматизм, распространились у нас тем легче и быстрее. Мы должны все больше учиться у советской историографии и мы должны все лучше учиться; мы должны овладеть ее сутью.

Правильно показал крайности и ошибки в организации научной работы декан будапештского университета им. Лоранта Этвеш, Зольтан И. Тот, подвергший критике чрезмерный рост научной администрации. Лучшие наши силы до того перегружены организационной работой, что у них не остается времени для исследовательской деятельности. Что касается научного планирования, мы были слишком смелыми, вследствие чего мы переоценили свои силы. Вредный максимализм, проявившийся в наших планах, привел к снижению принципиального уровня и углубленности, к пренебрежению общей образованностью. Максимализм в планировании вытекал из нашей сравнительной неопытности в отношении методов научно-исследовательской работы, оценки подлежащих разработке исторических документов, а также из нетерпения в достижении быстрых успехов, из одностороннего и неподвижного подхода к плану, как закону, и вытекающих из этого ненужных опасений, и, наконец, из недоверчивого подавления критики работы по планированию.

Ошибочным было и поверхностное применение возможностей промышленного планирования к планированию научной работы ; но в то же время мы недостаточно учились из аналогий промышленности, которые могут успешно применяться. Профессор Иштван Хайнал в интересах прекращения перегруженности научных работников и преодоления максимализма предложил срочно осуществить более экономное планирование, а также улучшение личных и материальных условий для исторической науки. Что касается принципиальных и методологических вопросов научной работы, Иштван Хайнал предложил начать с разрешения проблем, требующих более простого подхода, которые более пригодны для выработки результатов более общего значения.

Анализируя допущенные ошибки, Аладар Мод указал, что в работах историков, занимающихся историей более отдаленных исторических периодов, наблюдается определенный правый уклон (культ личности, повествовательный характер историографии, недостаточное применение принципиальных вопросов марксизма-ленинизма), а в разработке истории нового времени (как, напр., истории рабочего движения), наблюдается некоторая сектантская тенденция, тенденция к отрыву от общих вопросов развития нашей страны. Адъюнкт Андраш Шиклош расценил работы о положении рабочего класса при всем богатстве разработанного в них материала—поверхностными, так как их авторы не поставили перед собою задачу анализа законов абсолютного и относительного обнищания рабочего класса в специальных условиях Венгрии. Он также говорил о работах по истории крестьянства. Он считал, что в работах по новейшей истории анализ не достаточно глубокий и заменяется нагромождением данных. Касаясь вопроса краеведения, он указал на важность написания истории Будапешта, а в связи с монографиями, разрабатывающими историю отдельных заводов,

он отметил, что в последнее время такие работы немного стали задачей писателей и журналистов. Во втором пятилетнем плане историографии этому вопросу следует предоставить должное место, в соответствии с его важностью. Ласло Маккаи высказал мнение о том, что в венгерской историографии все еще чувствуется опасность экономизма, который, по его мнению, вытекает не из того, что мы слишком много занимаемся историей экономики, а из того, что мы очень мало знаем историю венгерской экономики. Именно поэтому в наших работах конкретное описание процесса развития заменяется часто повторяющимися фразами, как, напр., »рост производства«, »рост эксплуатации«. Он предложил в течение второго пятилетнего плана разработать тему развития производительных сил и производственных отношений в Венгрии. К этому мнению присоединился и Петер Шимон, особенно в отношении XIX и XX вв. По его мнению, основной удар нашей работы должен быть в еще большей мере перенесен на разработку истории последних 100 лет.

Выступившими были выявлены недостатки в области изучения национального вопроса, пренебрежение плодотворными связями с родственными науками, непонимание проблем издания источников. (Дьёзё Эмбер, Кальман Бенда.) (Это проявляется и в отсутствии единых правил по опубликованию документов.) Были высказаны упреки — вполне законные — (по наиболее непосредственному опыту преподавателем высшей школы Кальманом Эперьеши), в связи с изолированностью историков периферии, недооценкой значения краеведческих работ. Академик Имре Ревес в своем выступлении занимался, между прочим, с переводами трудов по всеобщей истории. Показом конкретных и полезных примеров Иштван Хайнал особенно обратил внимание на сравнительный анализ особенностей развития как всемирной истории, так и истории Венгрии, а профессор Института им. В. И. Ленина Н. И. Мицкун подчеркнула, что необходимо поставить на передний план исследование взаимоотношений между первой и второй. В своем ответе Лайош Элекеш коснулся и этого вопроса, отметив, что, по его мнению, для конкретного определения действия всеобщих объективных закономерностей прежде всего необходимо изучать вопрос связей и отношений, но одновременно с этим необходимо исследовать параллели и расхождения.

В ходе дискуссии были подняты и основные вопросы высшего образования, подготовки аспирантов и научных кадров. Выступления по вопросу о подготовке аспирантов были сравнительно немногочисленны (зав. отделом Института истории Академии Наук Ласло Жигмонд и сотрудник того же института Дьёрдь Шпира), но недостатки работы в этой области подверглись ими острой критике. Подготовка в аспиранты в настоящее время, впрочем очень неправильно, служит восполнению пробелов подготовки в университете. Слабость научной подготовки проявится лишь через 2—3 года.

Неправильно, что ежегодным приемом многочисленных аспирантов мы стремимся только к количественным показателям. В области преподавания в университете и в Институте истории университета наблюдаются сектантские взгляды, левые уклоны, как на это самокритически указал доцент Иштван Като.

В ходе дискуссии проявился оживленный критический дух. В докладе Лайоша Элекеш многие критиковали отсутствие объективной, независимой от авторов и лиц критики. Из основных постановлений ЦК ВПТ и из его самокритики для венгерских историков особенно важным является создание условий для критики, для творческих дискуссий. Критику, доныне в большинстве своем декларативную, необходимо превратить в конкретную, — сказал Дежё Немеш. Недостаточность теоретической работы, основной источник ошибок многие видели в отсутствии духа дискуссий. Ценная и полезная критика была высказана в отношении работы Отделения общественно-исторических наук Академии Наук и в отношении руководства Академии Наук, которое не уделяет должного внимания проблемам общественных наук.

Группа участников дискуссии подробно разбирала работу Института рабочего движения. Они законно потребовали, чтобы Институт поднял идейный и научный уровень своей работы. Основной недостаток работы Института Андраш Шиклош определил в том, что Институт занимается большим числом конкретных, многосторонних и разветвленных задач, разрешить которых в настоящее время он еще не в силах. Вследствие этого, Институт через свои публикации и свою работу не может в нашей идеологической и научной жизни занимать такого выдающегося места, которое он — в силу своего положения и задач — должен был бы занимать. С другой стороны, один из сотрудников Института справедливо отметил, что значительной части сотрудников Института в ходе работы приходилось стать специалистами и просил — также справедливо — конкретной деловой профессиональной критики опубликованных Институтом работ.

Правильной критике подверглись работа Общества венгерских историков, метод работы его руководства и в особенности журнал Общества »Századok«. Особенно слабым является критический отдел журнала, он разбирает слишком мало работ, не дает полной картины даже о венгерской исторической литературе, а из зарубежной литературы помещаются только выдержки. (Профессор университета Дьёрдь Бониш). Журнал »Századok« должен стать более подвижным, деятельным, живым и было бы желательно чаще выпускать его. Густав Хекенаст, научный сотрудник Института истории Академии Наук Венгрии, поставил вопрос о целесообразности издания — помимо »Századok« — исторического журнала, публикующего материалы и статьи меньшего объема. Редакция журнала признала большую часть выявленных

ошибок и критику, которой журнал подвергся, и сочла ее полезной для дальнейшей работы.

В выступлении заведующего отделом Национального архива Оскара Паулини говорилось также о проблемах архивной работы. Национальный архив освободился от задач института, занимающегося составлением генеалогии, благодаря освобождению нашей страны. Наши западные коллеги завидуют нам за условия нашей работы и за задачи, к разрешению которых мы имеем возможность приступить — сказал Оскар Паулини. В дальдейшем он просил обсудить основные марксистские принципы архивной теории, указал на необходимость пропаганды культурной ценности архивного материала и торопил проведение реформы в преподавании архивного дела.

Наряду с этими важными частными вопросами участниками дискуссии обсудился один значительный вопрос общего интереса — вопрос единого фронта историков. Насколько постановка вопроса являлась актуальной, показывается большим числом выступлений, как со стороны историков, членов партии, так и со стороны беспартийных историков.

В ходе дискуссии в нескольких выступлениях правильно оценился этот важнейший вопрос фронта венгерских историков. Подчеркивалось, что деятельность нашего нового фронта историков должна руководствоваться основными указаниями ВПТ и заданиями новой правительственной программы. Венгерские историки должны объединитсься для осуществления этих задач; вместе должны идти вперед те ученые, которые выполнением этих задач желают честно, искренне служить делу своего трудящегося народа. Однако, созданию широкого единого фронта не должно сопутствовать — во имя свободы критики — протаскивание в науку старых идей. Историография, служащая делу грудящегося народа, может быть только марксистско-ленинской историографией, иначе мы бы не могли осуществить стоящие перед нами задачи. Несколько выступивших (Аладар Мод, Жигмонд Пал Пах, Иштван Като, Домокош Кошари, Шандор Дьёрффи, Дьёрдь Шпира и проч.) анализировали серьезные недостатки при создании единого фронта, наблюдающиеся наряду с многочисленными успехами. Из недостатков, пожалуй, самым серьезным является слабость идеологической, научной критики, пробелы в принципиальном убеждении и в воспитании, как уже упоминалось выше. Нет сомнения, что единый фронт историков может быть крепким только в том случае, если он будет покоиться на принципиальных основах, если выражает истинное единство, вытекающее из убеждения и убежденности. Приближение к сотрудничеству со старым поколением историков осталось формальным. Об этом говорил и Домокош Кошари, который полагал, что укреплению единого фронта историков мешали проявления некоторого сектантства. Это чувствовали старые специалисты, это высказали и историки-коммунисты, энергично указавшие на

допущенные недостатки. Они констатировали, что между старыми буржуазными историками и историками-марксистами нехватало должной критики. После опубликования постановлений ЦК ВПТ и в этом отношении произошли сдвиги; беспартийные ученые смелее высказывают свое мнение, растет их активность. Профессор Хайнал горячо приветствовал решение о том, чтобы более энергично привлечь старых специалистов к работе; Оскар Паулини ожидает от укрепления единого фронта историков укрепления связей между исследовательской наукой и архивным делом; в выступлении Ласло Маккаи было сделано правильное предложение, направленное на укрепление единого фронта историков: организовать широкие дискуссии, создать новые научные коллективы, выявить скрытые резервы историков. Новое открытое обсуждение вопроса о едином фронте историков дало возможность и для дальнейшего развития самокритики.

В ходе дискуссии большинство выступивших вообще реально оценивало успехи и недостатки нашей работы, однако, в некоторых выступлениях обнаружились левацкие моменты и чрезмерный критический дух. Эти выступившие, забыв о достигнутых успехах, искали и видели во многих моментах и результатах работы историков ошибки даже в тех местах, где их не было. Во время дискуссии со стороны некоторых бывших представителей буржуазных направлений историографии проявился правый уклон, отражавшийся, напр., в неправильной оценке исторических школ западной ориентации, продолжавшейся и после освобождения, или на требовании единого фронта, существовавшего в 1945 г. Еще во время дискуссии ряд историков выступил против правых и левых уклонов (Ж. П. Пах, П. Ханак, Ш. Дьёрффи), с одной стороны, с помощью богатого материала, доказывая факт западной ориентации и, тем самым, поощряя критику буржуазных исторических направлений, с другой же стороны, отвергая крайне левацкие максималистические требования.

Академик Эржебет Андич подвела итоги этой важной дискуссии, выявившей основные вопросы фронта венгерских историков. Она отметила, что в своем заключительном слове она не может исчерпывающе рассмотреть все богатство вопросов, поднятых во время дискуссии. Материал дискуссии следует очень тщательно изучать, необходимо будет время от времени возвращаться к этим вопросам. Все это требует продолжительного времени и углубленной работы. Вполне правы товарищи, — говорила академик Андич — подчеркивающие, что для настоящей нашей дискуссии, а также для всего дальнейшего развития нашего фронта историков, основное значение имеют последние постановления партии и правительства. Мы уже в прошлом году все чувствовали, что на фронте исторической науки наблюдается известный застой, что мы выросли из ботинок, которые мы до сих пор носили. Постановления ЦК ВПТ и нашего народно-демократического правительства оказывают огромную помощь и венгерским истори-

кам. Они помогают выявить недостатки и дают принципиальные указания. Бóльшая часть наших недостатков вытекала не только из того, что мы оставили без внимания вопросы, которых нельзя было бы игнорировать, но и из того, что методы работы, организационные рамки, уровень, осуществленные нами, постепенно отживали. В работе венгерских историков были недостатки уже с самого начала, но если что-нибудь отживает, то оно само по себе становится ошибкой; а если это во-время не выявляется, то оно может вырасти в большую ошибку. Во многих отношениях это произошло и с нами. Докладчица подчеркнула, что постановления ЦК ВПТ и нашего народно-демократического правительства по существу полностью относятся к фронту историков. Слишком большая торопливость в намечании задач, недостатки планирования, стремление к количеству, часто за счет качества, левое сектантство, принятие административных мер вместо убеждения, недостаточный демократизм в руководстве проявились и у нас. Критический дух и у нас не был достаточно сильным, более того, в этом отношении обнаружились большие слабости и недостатки. Однако, наибольшую ошибку мы допустили недооценкой теории.

Затем академик Андич указала на то, что раскрывать недостатки необходимо так, чтобы не забывать о достигнутых успехах. Партия показывает нам пример и в этом отношении. Правда — говорила она — мы с большой жадностью набросились на разработку исторического материала, но нам и нужно было торопиться. Неотложной задачей было осветить хотя бы несколько важнейших вопросов истории Венгрии с помощью марксизма-ленинизма, чтобы по крайней мере по важнейшим вопросам начать борьбу против фальсификации истории, и, что не менее вреднее этого, против умолчания фактов. И если даже нам не удалось создать классические труды, мы всё же немедленно должны были приступить к работе, чтобы наш народ правильно ознакомился с великой освободительной борьбой прошлого, с великими личностями, прогрессивными традициями нашей страны, с ролью народных масс и с революционными движениями. На нашей работе отражалась торопливость, но это не должно рассматриваться только как недостаток, а наоборот, прежде всего как достоинство.

Если наша работа и не всегда представляла должный уровень, если в ней обнаруживались недостатки, обусловливаемые торопливостью, а главным образом недостаточной подготовкой, все же этими работами мы оказали помощь нашему народу, выяснили вопросы, которых старая историография не позволила выяснить. Необходимо обратить внимание на то, чтобы все, нами до сих пор сделанное, не рассматривалось как плохое, как некоторые говорили, как нечто расчитанное на внешний эффект. Это было бы неправильно.

Гораздо более серьезный недостаток видела академик Андич в том, что метод, которым мы руководствовались на практике, не был достаточно

демократичным. Здесь она остановилась, прежде всего, на оценке деятельности Общества венгерских историков, так как оно, как общественная организация, должно было бы действовать на самых широких демократических началах и прежде всего ей — председателю общества — следовало бы об этом заботиться. Деятельность Общества венгерских историков, которая после реорганизации Общества началась в правильном направлении, вскоре становилась все более бюрократичной и, наконец, в Обществе совсем не стало организационной жизни. Затем академик Андич, рассказав о недостатках в работе по редакции журнала Общества венгерских историков — »**Századok**«, остановилась на вопросе научно-популярных изданий. Она оспорила мнение некоторых выступивших о том, будто бы популярные исторические издания недостаточно научны. По ее мнению, при издании научно-популярных книг мы руководствовались тем правильным принципом, что научно-популярную книгу, хотя бы и малейшего объема, может писать только тот, кто научно изучал данный вопрос, является его специалистом. Основной недостаток заключается в том, что наша научно-популярная литература не была достаточно популярной, ее стиль не был достаточно красивым, ярким, убедительным и вдохновенным. Кроме того, мы не заботились о том, чтобы довести ее до самых широких слоев венгерского народа.

После этого академик Андич перешла к оценке исследований, связанных с составлением университетских учебников по истории. Правильным было сосредоточить лучшие силы на разрешении этой важнейшей задачи, однако, мы впадали в крайность, поставив наши силы почти полностью на службу исследовательской работе, оставив без должного внимания проблемы преподавания истории в средних и высших учебных заведениях.

Относительно принципиальных теоретических вопросов она разделила мнение товарища Элекеш в том, что наши ошибки могут быть разделены на две категории: с одной стороны, на схематизм, а с другой стороны, на эмпиризм. В самом деле, нам приходилось бороться на двух фронтах, но мы вели борьбу недостаточно последовательно, иногда только на словах.

Как эмпиризм, так и схематизм глубоко связаны с пренебрежением теорией. Ошибки, допущенные в экономической политике, в партийном руководстве, вызывались именно пренебрежением теорией. Естественно, что в области науки эта ошибка особенно вредна. Пренебрежение теорией прежде всего означало то, что не изучались и не выяснились закономерности переходного периода в достаточной мере. Вследствие игнорирования закономерностей переходного периода мы забежали вперед и плохо планировали работу. Наша идеологическая работа стала схематичной. Недооценка теории чужда марксизму-ленинизму. Марксизм-ленинизм характеризуется глубоким уважением к теории, неразрывной связью между теорией и практикой. Вследствие пренебрежения нами общими закономерностями переходного периода мы не выяснили закономерностей культурной политики

переходного периода и не изучали вопроса о том, какая политика требуется условиями переходного периода от нашего фронта историков. Весь наш подход к этим вопросам был лишен историчности. Мы и не считали, что живем в переходный период и полагали, что миновали все проблемы и вообще самый переходный период. Это проявлялось и в том, что богатый опыт Советского Союза, который показывал нам пример в прошлом, показывает теперь и будет показывать в будущем, мы применяли схематично, не учитывая, как видоизменяются в данный исторический период, в котором мы живем, некоторые вопросы, свойственные этому периоду. Мы недостаточно учитывали, что СССР уже достиг более высокой стадии развития, и даже соответствующая стадия развития не может у нас повториться точно так, как она произошла в СССР — при другой исторической ситуации и при другом соотношении сил.

Мы не усвоили важнейшего опыта Советского Союза: глубокое уважение к теории, ее культивирование, именно такое культивирование, которое соответствует сущности нашего революционного мировоззрения, которое не является догматичным, схематичным и поверхностным, а идет в ногу со смелейшими поворотами истории. В. И. Ленин говорил, что »хитрость истории« также не должна быть оставлена без внимания. Теорию нельзя рассматривать как схему, а необходимо ее непрестанно развивать и обогащать. Критерием правильности теории В. И. Ленин сделал саму жизнь, практику.

Мы не учитывали той закономерности переходного периода, что идеология медленнее развивается, преобразуется, чем другие элементы надстройки вообще и существенно медленнее, чем базис, экономика, производственные отношения. В этом отношении мы не учились у Советского Союза, где большое внимание уделяется этому свойству развития идеологии.

По мнению академика Андич, нашим лишенным историчности подходом обусловливалось и то, что мы недостаточно стремились к убеждению людей. Это проявлялось в двух направлениях. О людях, стоявших к нам близко, мы считали, что их уже не нужно воспитывать, хотя иногда мы могли бы проверить и самих себя: какие мы марксисты? А с другой стороны, на тех, кто не стоял к нам близко, мы часто слишком уж быстро ставили крест, считая, что они уже неспособны к развитию. Таким образом, мы переоценивали развитость материалистического мировоззрения, марксистской ориентировки стоящих к нам близко людей, а на тех, кто может быть вчера еще были нашими противниками, мы рассматривали так, как будто в течение почти 10 лет они совсем не развивались.

Пренебрежение теорией стало источником многочисленных ошибок. Мы не подняли вопросов теории: отклонились от принципиальной критики различных буржуазно-реакционных, порою даже фашистских взгля-

дов на историю. Марксизм-ленинизм — это революционная теория, революционное мировоззрение, родившееся и развивающееся в борьбе. А наш подход не был таким боевым. Это привело к тому, что идеологическое развитие наших историков не было удовлетворительным, и закрепился целый ряд ошибочных взглядов. Докладчица подчеркнула, что мы хотим преобразовать не только хозяйственную жизнь страны, но и образ мышления людей. Мы знаем, что и сделаем это, но для этого нужно бороться. В этой борьбе мы недостаточно пользовались великим учением, великой правдой нашего мировоззрения. Честных ученых, любящих свой народ, свою науку, можно убедить. Несомненно, что они хотят учиться, а тем, что мы поставили на них крест, что не верили в возможность их развития, мы способствовали закоснению их старых предрассудков. Это было косным, антипрогрессивным, чуждым духу преобразующего мир марксизма-ленинизма. С неправильными взглядами на историю мы прежде всего боролись с помощью фактов. Такая форма борьбы имеет право существования в исторической науке: фальшивым фактам противопоставить верные факты. Но неправильно было считать, что это достаточно. Мы не подвергали критике отдельных исторических школ в целом, поэтому и не могли достаточно глубоко и основательно раскрыть их ошибки. История бесспорно является конкретной наукой. Истина всегда конкретна, но если не систематизировать факты и не делать из них теоретических выводов, то получается только эмпирическая истина. Не может быть сомнения, что в нашей новой историографии мы »сохранили« целый ряд ошибочных взглядов, так как борьбу против старой буржуазной историографии мы не довели до конца. Эржебет Андич указала еще на одно серьезное последствие этого недостатка: вследствие того, что из старой историографии мы не подвергли критике плохое, не отделили его от хорошего, мы не могли в должной мере усвоить и положительных традиций. Без надлежащей дифференциации мы почти целиком отказались от старой историографии. Особенно в первые годы мы не желали пользоваться историческими разработками, а только архивными материалами. Ошибочно было оставить почти без всякого внимания положительные результаты работы нескольких поколений историков.

Прогрессивные традиции также были сектантски ограничены. Под прогрессивными традициями мы более или менее понимали только революционные традиции, хотя диалектическое развитие общества состоит не только в революционных скачках, а им предшествует постепенное количественное развитие, которое — на одном пункте, как известно — переходит в качественное изменение. Для освещения этого положения докладчица привела конкретный пример из истории Венгрии: положительной личностью истории нашей страны считала она не только Лайоша Кошут, но и Иштвана Сеченьи. Кошут стоит гораздо ближе к нам, чем Сеченьи. При оценке деятельности Сеченьи критика будет иметь больше места, чем

при Кошуте. Было бы, однако, неправильно заявить, что только Кошут рассматривается как прогрессивный деятель и наш предшественник, а Сеченьи нет.

Сектантство наблюдалось у нас во многих областях. Некоторые наши историки старого поколения могли чувствовать, что мы безразлично относимся к их судьбе, и некоторое недоверие также могло чувствоваться с нашей стороны. Это во многих случаях оказало на них парализующее действие. Наша задача теперь состоит в том, чтобы с полной серьезностью относиться к делу единого фронта историков.

Подытоживая широкую дискуссию по вопросу о едином фронте историков, академик Андич подчеркивала, что необходимо объединить силы, желающие и умеющие работать. Мы больше должны верить — говорила она — в убедительную силу нашей истины, и больше должны верить в историков, стоявших вчера еще далеко от нас, которые теперь уже честно стремятся принимать участие в работе.

Этот процесс — самокритика, освобождение от старых неправильных взглядов, ликвидация ошибок — требует большой и тяжелой работы. Необходимо обеспечить больше возможности для широких дискуссий, для высказывания мнений. Однако, основой свободной творческой дискуссии не может служить какой-то идейный, идеологический либерализм. В связи с этим Эржебет Андич касалась выступления Домокоша Кошари. Она отметила, что историки-марксисты имеют большие недостатки в отношении того, что до сих пор организовали мало дискуссий, не подвергали основательной критике буржуазные исторические школы. Так, например, мы не критиковали работы бывшего Восточно-европейского научного института и его журнала »Revue d'Histoire Comparée«. Академик Андич одобрила отдельные выступления, согласно которым утверждение того факта, что »Revue d'Histoire Comparée« и Восточно-европейский научный институт представляли западную ориентацию в венгерской историографии, еще не является критикой, основывающейся на глубоком анализе, а только общеизвестным фактом. Она считала неправильным, что Кошари и этого не признает, и хотя во время дискуссии он и сделал некоторые шаги по направлению к более критическому рассмотрению своей деятельности в прошлом, а также деятельности находившегося под его руководством института, а по сути дела он не признал объективного факта западной ориентации, стремившись направить дискуссию в неправильное русло с помощью фальшивых альтернатив; на такой основе трудно выяснить взгляды. Докладчица сослалась на то, что стоит только открыть номера Revue, вышедшие в 1945 г. и позже, где великий исторический факт освобождения Венгрии отмечается только в одном отношении: как »осада и связанные с ней трудности«. С этим Revue со своей стороны и кончил трактовать славную роль Советского Союза-освободителя и возрождение венгерского народа. Многочисленные статьи журнала,

его критический отдел решительно представили западную ориентацию, об этом любой человек может убедиться. Мы высоко ценим талант Домокоша Кошари — подчеркнула академик Андич — мы считаем важным, чтобы он работал, чтобы он работал вместе с нами, но для этого требуется, чтобы он продолжал начатый им путь с более критической оценкой своей прошлой деятельности, с выяснением приципиальных основ его сотрудничества с нами.

Одновременно академик Андич энергично подчеркнула, что мы ни в коем случае не должны впадать в панику, ставя наши ошибки на передний план, склонность к чему проявилась в некоторых выступлениях. Мы должны ценить достигнутые нами успехи! Мы доказали, что и для венгерского исторического развития действительны положения марксизма-ленинизма, раскрытые историческим материализмом закономерности; венгерские историки-марксисты доказали, что марксистско-ленинская историческая концепция, концепция научного социализма, плодотворнее, эффективнее и правдивее, чем любая другая, существовавшая до сих пор историческая концепция, это — единственная, истинно научная историческая концепция. Мы должны дорожить достигнутыми нами результатами, ведь всего за несколько лет мы успели осветить многочисленные вопросы, и для выяснения целого ряда вопросов мы сделали больше, чем буржуазная историография в течение десятков лет. Мы завоевали уважение к марксистской историографии. Докладчица напомнила, что еще несколько лет тому назад марксистская историография рассматривалась не как наука, а как публицистика. Существовал такой взгляд, что марксистская историография есть простое опрокидывание политических проблем наших дней в прошлое. Ясно, что теперь уже нет в Венгрии такого здравомыслящего человека, который стал бы утверждать это. Одновременно мы должны видеть, что наши успехи не настолько большие, как мы иногда склонны полагать.

Докладчица затем кратко остановилась на важнейших задачах, стоящих перед нашими историками.

Прежде всего — сказала Эржебет Андич — мы должны усилить борьбу как против схематизма, так и против эмпиризма. В этой борьбе, конечно, следует отличать ошибки друзей от враждебных взглядов.

Необходимо критически разработать отдельные исторические школы. Работы наших историков, вышедшие в последние годы, также должны подвергаться критике. Нельзя при этом полагаться на самотек, а следует работать над этим планомерно. При разработке университетских учебников также необходимо обеспечить большое место историографии, критике буржуазной исторической литературы.

Основной задачей является подъем теоретического уровня. Надо разработать план для более энергичного привлечения наших историков к изучению марксизма-ленинизма. В первую очередь следует обратить вни-

мание на идивидуальную работу над классиками марксизма-ленинизма. Наряду с этим нужно организовать теоретические конференции для небольших групп, где может развернуться интенсивная, открытая дискуссия. Изучение теории исторического материализма должно сочетаться с глубоким и широким изучением всемирной истории, на которое богатые возможности дают труды советских историков. Дальнейшей формой теоретической работы могло бы быть систематическое обсуждение венгерскими историками отдельных принципиальных вопросов истории Венгрии, организация ими теоретических дискуссий. Значительно больше места нужно отвести теоретическим вопросам и на страницах журнала »Századok«.

С точки зрения подъема политического уровня большой задачей является разработка истории периода режима Хорти и еще более истории развития страны после освобождения. В определенной мере и в определенном смысле почти все наши историки должны присоединиться к написанию истории периода после освобождения страны. В особенности разработка отдельных вопросов истории нашей страны после освобождения дала бы много не только нашим читателям, но была бы волнующей и, главное, поучительной задачей и для историков, с точки зрения творческого применения теории. Для немалого числа историков это было бы подходящим путем и к переоценке своей прошлой деятельности.

Академик Андич после этого остановилась на задачах в области организационной работы. Необходимо, чтобы Общество венгерских историков в самом деле жило жизнью общества, чтобы оно соблюдало свой устав, регулярно созывало общее собрание, создало свои специальные комиссии и больше внимания обращало на историков, живущих в периферии. Вместо существовавшей до сих пор крайне сильной централизации следует обеспечить отдельным историческим учреждениям большую самостоятельность, а постоянная комиссия Академии Наук должна занимать позицию только по основным вопросам планирования, выносить решения только в принципиальных дискуссиях.

Следует далее улучшить нашу политику по кадрам. Надо оказать помощь нашим историкам в деле достижения ими научных званий.

Наконец, Эржебет Андич подчеркнула, что историкам вообще следовало бы больше встречаться. Она предложила, чтобы историки раз в месяц встречались, не только в целях дискуссий, но и для дружеской беседы. Они должны получить возможность на обмен мнениями, на знакомство друг с другом.

Дискуссия, продолжавшаяся три дня, могла охватить только часть проблем. Ее нужно рассматривать только как начало, которое должно иметь продолжение. Правильные мысли, высказанные в ходе дискуссий, нельзя оставить без последствий. Дискуссия явилась чем-то новым, и это само означает шаг вперед. В связи с этим академик Андич указала на то,

в какой большой мере венгерские историки чувствуют на себе освежающее, мобилизующее влияние постановлений ЦК ВПТ. Исключительно убедительным доказательством силы Венгерской Партии Трудящихся является перелом, произведенный ею в своей политике, ее самокритика. Эти постановления вдохновляют и венгерских историков, помогают им расширить, улучшить свою работу. Эти постановления лишний раз свидетельствуют о том, что Венгерская Партия Трудящихся является настоящим вождем венгерского народа, венгерского рабочего класса, что наше народно-демократическое правительство справится со стоящими перед ним историческими задачами.

Заключительным словом Эржебет Андич, председателя Общества венгерских историков, подытожившей недостатки венгерской историографии, подчеркнувшей ее успехи и наметившей стоящие перед историками задачи, эта дискуссия окончилась. Она имела большое значение и внесла ценный вклад в дело повышения идейного уровня венгерской исторической науки.

Э. Х. Харасти

ÜBER DIE LAGE UND ÜBER DIE AUFGABEN DER GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFT IN UNGARN

Zusammenfassung

Auf Grund der Regierungs- und Parteibeschlüsse von Juni und Oktober 1953 sowie auf Grund der Lehren und Ergebnisse, welche die Tagung der Geschichtswissenschaftler im Juni 1953 zu Budapest gezeigt hatte, erörterten die ungarischen Historiker auf einer erweiterten Diskussionssitzung des Redaktionskollegiums der Zeitschrift »Századok«, des Organs der Ungarischen Historischen Gesellschaft, die Lage und die grundlegenden Aufgaben unserer Geschichtswissenschaft.

Eröffnet wurde die Diskussion von dem Generalsekretär der Ungarischen Historischen Gesellschaft, L. Elekes, der in seinem Referat einerseits eine umfassende Wertung der Erfolge und der Mängel der Tagung der Geschichtswissenschaftler bot, andererseits an Hand der seither erschienenen prinzipiellen, grundlegenden und richtungweisenden Dokumente und auf Grund der Erfahrungen unserer Geschichtsschreibung der jüngstvergangenen Jahre die zukünftigen Aufgaben umriss. — In seinem Vortrag verwies er auf die Entwicklungsphasen des ungarischen wissenschaftlichen Lebens nach der Befreiung — inbegriffen die Entwicklungsphasen der Geschichtswissenschaft, — gedachte der Anfänge unserer Planung auf wissenschaftlichem Gebiet und der bedeutsamen Hilfe der sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, erwähnte die Mängel bei der Zusammenstellung der Thematik, die theoretische Ungewissheit und Unschlüssigkeit. Er lenkte die Aufmerksamkeit auf das Auftreten der Gefahr des Schematismus und des Empirismus bei einigen unserer Geschichtsschreiber und auf das unzulängliche Niveau unserer Kritik.

Die umfassende Diskussion, die auf das Referat folgte, erstreckte sich auf alle wichtigen Problemkreise unserer Geschichtswissenschaft. Die Diskussion ermöglichte auch in entsprechendem Ausmasse die Erörterung eines solchen — in unserer gegenwärtigen Entwicklungsphase grundlegenden — Problems, wie das der Einheitsfront der Geschichtswissenschaftler. Die Diskussion war von lebhaftem kritischem Geiste getragen. Die Diskussionsredner gedachten in ihren Beiträgen der erzielten Erfolge, befassten sich mit den Personen und Organen, denen die Führung der Einheitsfront obliegt, und unterzogen deren Arbeit einer eingehenden Kritik, zeigten die Fehler auf, die in der Tätigkeit der geschichtswissenschaftlichen Institutionen zu bemerken sind, berührten die wichtigsten Fragen des Unterrichtes an den Universitäten und

Hochschulen, die der Ausbildung der Aspiranten und des Kadernachwuchses, machten auf die Übertreibungen bei der wissenschaftlichen Planung, auf die Gefahr des Maximalismus, auf die Mängel der Planung usw. aufmerksam. Ein entsprechender und gesunder Diskussionsgeist wurde durch jene Diskussionsreden gesichert, die schon im Laufe der Aussprache solche Ansichten und Meinungen zurückwiesen, die eine falsche, noch zurückgebliebene bürgerliche Anschauungsweise widerspiegelten.

Die wichtige Diskussion, welche die grundlegenden Fragen der ungarischen Geschichtswissenschaft an den Tag brachte, wurde abschliessend von Akademiker E. Andics zusammengefasst. In ihrem Schlusswort betonte sie, dass hinsichtlich der Diskussion und der weiteren Entwicklung unserer Geschichtswissenschaftler-Front den Beschlüssen der Partei der Ungarischen Werktätigen und der Regierung der Ungarischen Volksrepublik zentrale Bedeutung zukommt. Sie machte darauf aufmerksam, das es falsch wäre, nur von unseren Fehlern zu sprechen und unsere Erfolge nicht gebührend zu werten. Zugleich stimmte sie mit jenen Kritikern überein, die den Schematismus und Empirismus für die hauptsächlichsten Fehlerquellen erachten. An Hand konkreter Beispiele verweis sie auf die Erscheinungsformen der theoretischen Fehler, auf den hinter dem erforderlichen zurückbleibenden Demokratismus auf dem organisatorischen Gebiet unserer Geschichtswissenschaft, auf die ungenügende Beliebtheit unserer populär-geschichtswissenschaftlichen Literatur. Die Vernachlässigung unserer theoretischen Bildung habe zur Übernahme und Erhaltung zahlreicher falscher Ansichten, zum Ausbleiben der nötigen Überprüfung und Kritik bürgerlicher, reaktionärer Anschauungen geführt. Weitergehend erörterte Akademiker E. Andics eingehend die Frage der Einheitsfront unserer Geschichtswissenschaftler und zeigte in diesem Zusammenhang auf den Zusammenschluss der demokratischen, redlich und aufrichtig arbeitenden Kräfte als Hauptaufgabe hin. Deshalb sei es nötig noch öfter Gelegenheit zu Diskussionen und zur Darlegung der Meinungen zu bieten. E. Andics mahnte die Geschichtswissenschaftler unserer Einheitsfront an die Würdigung unserer Erfolge, denn unsere marxistische Geschichtsschreibung hat es im Verlauf einiger Jahre bereits bewiesen, dass sie einer weit grösseren Leistung fähig ist, als die bürgerliche Geschichtsschreibung, dass sie in ihrer Geschichtsauffassung und in ihrer Methode fruchtbringender, erfolgreicher und wahrer ist, als irgendeine der bisherigen geschichtswissenschaftlichen Richtungen.

Schliesslich bot Akademiker E. Andics einen kurzen Überblick der nächsten Aufgaben der ungarischen Geschichtswissenschaftler und sprach dann von den Aufgaben, die auf organisatorischem Gebiete zu lösen sind.

Éva H. Haraszti

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